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Air Transport and the Environment 
 
“In 2020, aircraft are cleaner and quieter and the aeronautics sector’s 
contribution to a sustainable environment is widely understood and 
appreciated… Aircraft noise is no longer a political and social issue. It has 
ceased to be a nuisance to people living close to airports thanks to a 
concerted effort to develop quieter engines, optimise operational procedures 
and improve land planning and use around airports.” (ACARE, 2000, p. 
14). These are words extracted from the so called Vision 2020 for European 
aeronautics that sets goals pertaining to several objectives including 
environment and safety: 1) 50% reduction in perceived aircraft noise; 2) 
50% cut in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per passenger kilometre, thus 
halving of fuel consumption; 3) 80% cut in nitrogen oxides (NOx); and 4) 
five-fold reduction in accidents. The report states a vision for the European 
air traffic system capable of handling 16 million1  flights per year with 24-
hour operation of airports, more comfort for passengers, 99% flight 
punctuality and continuous reduction of travel charges.  
Europe has a special problem due to the fragmentation of the ATM 
system that has 34 different providers of air navigation, in comparison to the 
US that has one. It is estimated that there are over 250 thousand unnecessary 
flying hours per year in the European airspace besides airport delays (IATA-
ATAG, 2003). This is not only an issue of system efficiency and 
environmental impact but also safety. The current capacity of the European 
air traffic system is approximately 8.5 million flights per annum, an increase 
of over 80 percent since 1990 (Eurocontrol, 2004). In 2004 over 40 percent 
of all flights were delayed on departure in Europe. Thus, a target of 99 
percent on time departures in 2020 means 160 thousand late flights opposed 
to 6.4 million if little is done to reduce delays over the next two decades. 
Vision 2020 is a daring objective for the industry and by no means 
contained to Europe. These objectives if reached will not only benefit 
Europe but every airline, every airport that has ties with her through service 
connections or product acquisition. The changes will in no doubt be marked 
and obvious as new generation of aircraft enter service, new concepts for 
ATM are implemented and the drive for a sustainable future based on the 
Kyoto Protocol2 continues. Given the past these aims are by no means 
unrealistic but require increasing effort from all stakeholders as performance 
returns to costs diminish. 
To give an idea of past accomplishments we can name examples such as 
Heathrow airport in the UK, where flights have increased by over 60 percent 
                                                 
1 100 percent increase over year 2000. 
2 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on February 16th, 2005. 
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since the 1970s, yet the number of people disturbed by noise has dropped by 
80 percent (ATAG, 2000). How has this been achieved? Aircraft today are 
on the average 20 decibels quieter than thirty years ago a 75 percent 
reduction in noise annoyance (EPNDB) around airports. Aircraft noise 
footprints of today have been reduced to approximately 10 percent of what 
they used to be for a typical aircraft of the 1970’s. To achieve similar results 
in the coming decades many facets of environmental improvements must be 
tackled besides aircraft engines alone: the airframe, ATC/M and operational 
procedures. Taking all of these measures together it is estimated that the net 
gain will be approximately 2 percent improvement in fuel efficiency per 
annum until 2020 (Arthur D.Little, 2000). Another important achievement 
has been the reduction of CO2 emissions by 50 percent over the last 30 years 
at the same time that fuel burn has been reduced by 70 percent. NOx 
emissions have trade-offs with emissions such as noise and carbon dioxide 
production. This trade-off can in some circumstances be substantial or over 
90 percent increase in smoke if NOx is reduced by 25 percent (IATA, 2004). 
Efforts to overcome trade-offs of this nature require concerted efforts by 
research establishments world-wide. A safe ATC/M system, airport ground 
operations and reliable aircraft systems can systematically reduce accident 
rates. Accident rates are today about one fatality per million flights a 
reduction of over 50 percent over the last 20 years (IATA, 2003). Cutting 
these rates five fold means a mere 0.2 fatalities per million flights.  
We have the pleasure of presenting 5 papers in this Special ATRS Issue. 
All of these papers were presented at the 2004 ATRS Conference at the 
Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey. Four of the papers deal with 
air transport environmental issues and one with safety. The papers range 
from implementation of ISO14001 in airports to future scenarios on aviation 
emissions. The safety paper deals with the transformation of air transport 
regulation governing safety in the Swiss ATM system. 
Simões, Schaeffer and Santo in their paper, Mitigation Alternatives for 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions by the Air Transport Industry in Brazil, discuss 
the contribution of Brazilian air transport to global climate change and 
possible alternative energy sources for mitigating CO2 emissions. This paper 
is particularly interesting in the context of suggesting the use of vegetable 
oils as energy source for aircraft. The authors point also to the importance of 
an efficient ATM system to reduce CO2 emissions. Given these measures 
suggested by the authors as well as foreseeable emission improvement in 
new generation of jet engines, Brazil has important concepts to offer in the 
domain of sustainable air transport. 
Finger and Piers in their paper, Air Transport Regulation under 
Transformation: The Case of Switzerland, argue for the conceptual 
framework on which recommendations for institutional and organizational 
changes to transform Swiss aviation safety regulation. The Dutch Airspace 
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Laboratory (NLR) was commissioned to give an external evaluation of 
safety due to several accidents and an increase of nearmisses in the airspace. 
The authors point out important recommendations of the NLR in the 
restructuring of the Swiss safety regulation and organizational structure. The 
strength of the article is the insight it provides on national organizational 
regulatory restructuring to enhance safety in air transport. 
Kesgin in his paper, An Estimation of Aircraft Emissions at Turkish 
Airports, uses an empirical approach to predict future emissions at Turkish 
airports. He demonstrates that a percentage change in the LTO cycle 
(landing and takeoff) would cause a proportionally larger percentage rise in 
emissions. However, reduction in taxiing time by mere 2 minutes would 
reduce emissions by 6 percent.  
Korul in her paper, Guide to the Implementation of the ISO14001 at 
Airports, demonstrates how an environmental quality management system 
can be implemented at airports. The paper is important by showing a specific 
approach for airports to reach environmental responsiveness in a 
programmed way.  
Berghof in his paper, The Impact of Constrained Future Scenarios on 
Aviation and Emissions, argues that infrastructure enhancements and lower 
noise emissions are better attained through landing charges rather than a fuel 
tax or leap changes in aircraft technology such as hydrogen powered aircraft 
due to the profitability impacts on the industry. The methodology applied in 
the paper is a scenario analysis and quantification through a state of the art 
model.  
 
Mehmet Fevzi Ünal 
Faculty of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Istanbul Technical University 
 
Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson 
Department Strategy and CERMAS Research Centre 
Toulouse Business School 
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MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES FOR CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS BY THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY IN 
BRAZIL 
 
André Felipe Simões 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
 
Roberto Schaeffer 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
 
Respicio A. Espírito Santo, Jr. 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
ABSTRACT 
Environmental issues are increasingly high priority when drawing up government 
policies for transportation in both industrialized and developing nations. Carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions generated by the sector has caused much concern, mainly 
due to the fast growing rate of these emissions, now accounting for approximately 
13% of global warming. Since the early 1990s, some of the highest growth rates of 
transportation emissions have been recorded for air transportation, which currently 
accounts for around 3.5% of total anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. This 
increase is particular in the industrial-based developing countries, such as Brazil, 
where demand for air transportation has increased rapidly. In view of this, the main 
purpose of this paper is to discuss the contribution of Brazilian air transportation to 
global climate change and to present more environmentally friendly energy sources 
for mitigating CO2 emissions from this sector. The paper presents an inventory of 
CO2 emissions caused by the air transportation sector in Brazil, a set of trend 
forecasts through to the year 2023, indicating the progression of these emissions, 
with several possible improvement alternatives.  
 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Simões holds a Doctor Science degree in Energy Planning from the Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). His research focuses on the air transportation sector in the context of 
global climate change. He is a senior researcher at UFRJ, working in projects related with the 
energy and environment planning area. Dr. Simões thanks the partial financial support from the 
CAPES research agency (Brazilian Ministry of Education) to develop this work. 
Roberto Schaeffer holds a Ph.D. in Energy Management and Policy from the University of 
Pennsylvania and he is Associate Professor at the Energy Planning Program of the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro. Professor Schaeffer is also Associate-Editor of Energy-The 
International Journal. Professor Schaeffer, and along with Professor Espírito Santo, Jr., wish to 
thank the partial financial support from the CNPq research agency (Brazilian Ministry of 
Science and Technology) to develop this work.  
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ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR IN 
BRAZIL 
The Brazilian aviation sector began to expand at significant rates from 
1994 onwards, mainly in terms of energy consumption. Figure 1 shows the 
development of energy consumption by Brazil’s air transportation sector 
(basically consumption of gasoline and jet fuel)1 from 1984 through 2002. It 
is suggested that the introduction of positive structural alterations in the 
Brazilian economy (ushering in economic stability) was the main factor 
behind the recent expansion of the nation’s air transport. In view of this, this 
expansion necessarily leads to several concerns over environmental issues.  
Figure 1. Development of Total Energy Consumption by Air Transportation in Brazil, 
1984-2002 (1,000 tons of oil equivalent) 
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Adapted from National Energy Balance, by Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2003. Adapted with 
permission of the publisher. 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CO2 EMISSIONS BY AIR 
TRANSPORTATION IN BRAZIL AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
EMISSIONS IN A TREND PROJECTION 
In this paper CO2 emissions caused by Brazil’s air transportation sector 
are calculated through the use of the top-down methodology suggested by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1994; 1996). The  
_____________________________________________________________
Dr. Espírito Santo, Jr., holds a Doctor Science degree in Transportation Engineering from the 
UFRJ. Dr. Santo is an associate professor in air transportation at the UFRJ, and since 1998 is the 
only faculty member there dedicated full-time to air transportation. Dr. Espírito Santo, Jr., 
thanks VARIG Brazilian Airlines for its direct support in his attendance for the 8th ATRS 
Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, in July 2004, where this paper was originally presented. 
                                                 
1  Jet fuel accounts for nearly 96.3% of the energy consumed by air transportation in 2001 (see 
MME, 2003). 
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development of total CO2 emissions by the air transportation sector in Brazil, 
between 1984 and 2002, is shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Historical Evolution and Trend Projection of Carbon Dioxide Emissions by the 
Air Transport Sector in Brazil, 1984-2023 
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Figure 2 also shows the evolution of these emissions in a Trend 
Projection until 2023. Within the context of drawing up this Trend 
Projection, it should be stressed that the assumptions used to assess the 
increase in Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reflect the nation’s 
expectations (BNDES, 1997). Based on the findings of several studies 
(Espírito Santo, 1996; Filho, Júdice & Quintans, 1998; Shäfer and Victor, 
1998), we can conclude that there is a direct link between the expansion rate 
of the air transportation sector and the level of economic activity in Brazil.    
Moreover, analysis of the historical series in several academic and 
industry studies (Embraer, personal communication, June 14, 2003; Lee, 
Lukachko, Waitz & Schäfer, 2001; Petrobras Aviation, personal 
communication, July 2, 2003; Schäfer, 1992) leads to the conclusion that 
energy consumption and the CO2 emissions associated with air transportation 
activities expand by approximately one percent less each year than the 
demand for air transportation. These studies are basically grounded on the 
hypothesis that energy efficiency will improve within the air transport sector. 
This paper adopts the same correlation mentioned as the basic hypothesis. 
Table 1 summarizes the basic characteristics and assumptions adopted for 
building up the trends scenario for the development of CO2 emissions by 
Brazil’s air transportation sector 
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Table 1. Trend Projection for  Emissions by the Brazilian Aviation Sector – Basic 
Characteristics and Assumptions Adopted 
ALTERNATIVES FOR MITIGATING CO2 EMISSIONS 
In order to draw up guidelines for indicating the highest levels of 
sustainability for air transport in Brazil, several possible alternatives are 
examined for mitigating CO2 emissions. It is suggested that the alternatives 
proposed herein could be tailored to the air transport sector in several other 
developing countries, with the observation that particular social, economic 
and cultural characteristics of each nation must be taken into account when 
formulating any of the strategies. 
Introduction of Alternative Fuels 
Vegetable kerosene 
 A pioneer in the development of alternative energy sources—such as 
alcohol as an automotive fuel in the 1980s—Brazil has supported and funded 
the research and the production (on a pilot scale) of a vegetable-based type 
of aviation kerosene through the Air Force Command. Consisting of a blend 
of linear esters obtained from vegetable oils (soy, canola, castor, colza, 
sunflower, among others), the PROSENE alternative fuel was obtained in 
late 1982 through a reaction known as transesterification, using methanol in 
the process. The following year, a Brazilian aircraft fuelled with PROSENE 
took off from the city of São José dos Campos (in the state of São Paulo, 
where the research center is located) and flew successfully to Brasilia. As oil 
prices stabilized, experimental production activities focused on PROSENE 
where terminated in mid-1984. 
Basic Characteristics 
– Continuation of current trends (lack of development incentives introduced by 
government policies for the Brazilian air transportation sector) — Rising participation 
of private enterprises in the planning and expansion of the Brazilian air transportation 
sector  deregulation  lower air fares and a greater variety of routes (greater coverage 
of scheduled air transportation) — Economic stability is maintained in order to reduce 
external vulnerability — Cargo shipments with higher growth rates than passenger 
traffic (spurred by government policies)  diversification and keener competitive edge 
for Brazilian exports. 
Assumptions Adopted 
Time 
Span 
GDP Growth Rate 
(% per year in 
average) 
Air Transportation Growth 
Rate  mean passenger air 
sector 
(% per year in average) 
Energy Consumption and 
CO2 Emissions Growth 
Rate 
(% per year in average) 
2003-
2011 4.2 6.7 5.7 
2012-
2023 5 7.6 6.6 
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When comparing PROSENE with aviation kerosene, researchers from 
the Centro Técnico Aeroespacial (CTA) [Air Force Aerospace Technical 
Center] noticed a small reduction in engine power when running on the new 
kerosene (of the order of some 10% due to the fact that it is a fuel with a 
lower energy content). Another issue addressed by the CTA was the thermal 
stability of PROSENE (CTA, personal communication, October 25, 2002). 
This latter problem, however, had been solved already, before the end of the 
PROSENE Project (CTA, personal communication, October 25, 2002). 
The reduction in pollutant emissions through the use of PROSENE is 
well documented, as compared to conventional jet fuel emission. In 1983, 
the CTA observed that the reduction of CO2 emissions from a Bandeirante 
aircraft, using a blend of 90% jet fuel with 10% PROSENE, could reach 7.8 
% per year (in average) comparing with the same aircraft flying the same 
envelope with conventional jet fuel. (CTA, personal communication, 
October 25, 2002). 
Within this context, this paper suggests that Brazil should study the 
possibilities of re-funding and re-launching the PROSENE Project. It is 
estimated that this alternative alone could result in a reduction in CO2 
emissions by Brazil’s air transportation sector of nearly 7.8% a year 
(compared to the Trend Projection, should the blend used be the already 
tested and approved 90% jet fuel plus 10% PROSENE). Based on interviews 
by the authors with several CTA professionals and aviation experts in the 
country, if re-adopted within a short period of time it is estimated that 
PROSENE could be certificated and fully operational for commercial use by 
the country’s airlines fleet of airplanes by 2018 (CTA, personal 
communication, October 25, 2002).  
Hydrated alcohol  
The project to develop an alcohol-fuelled aircraft in Brazil began in the 
mid-1980s at the CTA in São José dos Campos, when the alcohol fuel 
program for automotive use was flourishing. As this later program was 
gradually put aside, its aviation counterpart was also severely delayed. 
Nowadays, spurred by worldwide concern over minimizing the effects of 
climate change, and with constant upward variations in international jet fuel 
prices, re-launching this project may seem an interesting option, from both 
the environmental and economic aspects. Within this context, on October 10, 
2002, the Neiva aircraft company (an Embraer subsidiary headquartered in 
the city of Botucatu, also in the state of São Paulo) successfully tested the 
first aircraft fuelled by hydrated alcohol in Brazil (the testbed, an EMB–202 
Ipanema, is a piston-engine aircraft developed in the 1970s for agricultural 
purposes). 
The advantages of the alcohol-powered engine are basically lower 
operating costs and less environmental pollution. Although burning a higher 
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amount of fuel than a conventional aircraft flying on aviation gasoline 
(avgas), lower alcohol prices in the country strongly counterbalance the 
difference in fuel consumption. The main disadvantages rely in the fact that 
alcohol has only about one-half or two-thirds the energy density per unit 
volume compared to avgas. In view of this, the operating range and/or 
loitering time of the aircraft is reduced, thus requiring a higher fuel burn for 
take-off and climbing. In turn, this would require either a larger and heavier 
fuel system (mainly a larger fuel tank) or more take-off and landings to 
cover the same operations flown by avgas-burning aircraft. 
From the environmental viewpoint, the use of alcohol offers a key 
benefit: it does not increase the greenhouse effect when burned, as the 
amount of carbon emitted to the atmosphere corresponds to a similar amount 
fixed in the soil through the sugar-cane growth process (CTA, personal 
communication, October 25, 2002; Macedo, 1992). Within this context, the 
replacement of aviation gasoline by hydrated alcohol would result in a 100% 
drop in CO2 emissions, in an initial analysis.  
Accepting a future hypothetical one-to-one replacement of avgas-
burning aircraft with alcohol-burning aircraft as crop-dusters operating in the 
country, and assuming that the 100% theoretical reduction could be applied 
to the entire fleet, this would mean that the abatement in CO2 emissions 
could reach nearly 26 gigagrams (Gg) of CO2, an equivalent to 0.3% of the 
total CO2 emissions by aviation activities in Brazil in 2001. This assumption 
is obviously an utopian, highly improbable scenario (in energy and 
economical terms), where the entire fleet of almost 420 crop-dusters 
operating in the country would fly solely on alcohol, and that this fuel 
replacement could be done within a very short timeframe.   
However, introducing hydrated alcohol as an aviation fuel for 
agricultural applications and general aviation use could (and should) be 
phased in gradually. Embraer (personal communication, June 14, 2003) 
estimates that a period from eight to ten years would be required. Based on 
this Embraer scenario, the entire Brazilian crop-duster fleet could be flying 
on alcohol by 2011/2012, at the earliest, and this would only happen if the 
program were re-launched in the present year (2004). Due to the introduction 
of the CO2 emissions mitigation strategy, this is the year when it will be 
possible to detect an abatement of around 0.3% in total CO2 emissions due to 
aviation activities in Brazil, compared to the hypothesis described for 2001.  
The widespread commercial use of alcohol as a fuel, even still 
hypothetically, could be in such dimension that it would gradually replace 
avgas for the entire Brazilian fleet of aircraft fitted with piston engines, 
which in 2002 accounted for 3.7% of all energy consumed by the Brazilian 
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aviation sector2. It is estimated that the steady introduction of alcohol into 
Brazilian civil aviation activities after 2011 would account for the following 
reductions in CO2 emissions (compared to the trend scenario): 0.3% in 2011; 
0.6% in 2012; 0.9% in 2013; 1.2% in 2014; 1.5% in 2015; 1.8% in 2016; 
2.1% in 2017; 2.4% in 2018; 2.7% in 2019; 3.0% in 2020; 3.3% in 2021; 
3.6% in 2022; and 3.7% in 2023.  
INTRODUCTION OF A BROAD-RANGING INTEGRATED AIR 
TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 
Based on the success of the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) 
system in the U.S., Brazil has been developing its own version, called 
Gerenciamento de Fluxo de Tráfego Aéreo (GTFA). Through sophisticated 
computerized methods for processing data, this can also result in a more 
efficient and much better usage of both jet fuel and avgas. Consequently, an 
important aspect of this system is the generation of data on ideal flight 
altitudes from the standpoint of ensuring the most efficient, optimum fuel 
burning performance.  
Basically, the initiative for developing this system is justified by shorter 
flying times, as well as briefer turnaround times, in addition to fuel savings 
that would reach some 10% per annum by 2008, according to the Ministry of 
Aeronautics (Air Force Command), equivalent to some 3 million liters of jet 
fuel (nearly the equivalent of 24,000 trips between Rio de Janeiro and Paris) 
(Filho et al., 1996). In addition to fuel savings and the resulting reduction in 
CO2 emissions, the GTFA system has other objectives, such as reducing 
delays, cutting waiting times and enhancing flight safety. 
Based on the percentage estimated by the Air Force Command, of 10% 
CO2 emission reductions due to the introduction of a broad-based, integrated 
air traffic control system (the GFTA and its developments) would reach 
around 10% per annum, compared to the Trend Projection from 2005 
through to 2023.     
Jet Fuel Taxes in Brazil 
Levies, surcharges and other taxes are measures that are being 
introduced by governments in some European countries (especially in 
Sweden, Norway and UK as well as in the U.S.) in order to tentatively soften 
the aggressive relationship between the air transportation sector and the 
environment. These economic tools are designed to imbue the air 
transportation sector with a greater awareness of associated environmental 
factors. 
                                                 
2 Due to the interconnectivity of the global aircraft system, some problems may arise from the 
use of alcohol for aviation in Brazil. However, these problems could be greatly reduced if the 
strategy were to focus on regional aviation, where the majority of the aircraft in service is from 
the Brazilian manufacturer Embraer. 
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Based on the international examples and taking into consideration the 
crises affecting major Brazilian airlines, together with the characteristics of 
the nation’s air transportation sector, it is suggested that Brazil should study 
the adoption of a tax similar to the air passenger duty (APD) in the UK, 
which is included in air fares and where its value would vary by the distance 
covered (i.e., the longer the flight, the higher the value of the tax, following 
the principle that those who pollute more should pay more). The proposed 
tax might well be called the air tax for sustainable development (ATSD), 
which would be based on the jet fuel burn for each flight segment covered by 
Brazilian carriers, either domestic or international. 
 As a reference base for the amount of this ATSD tax, a figure of 
US$0.0005 3 per liter of jet fuel burnt could be used as a starting point of 
study and analysis. In this context, a passenger flying from São Paulo to 
Paris, where approximately 174,000 liters of jet fuel are burnt (Geipot, 
2001), would pay nearly an extra US$87.00 in her or his ticket for the total 
ATSD tax (in an approximate calculation).    
Based on the characteristics of Brazil’s commercial aviation sector 
(Geipot, 2001), while maintaining all present social and economic variables, 
and considering the analysis conducted by the European Federation for 
Transport and Environment (T&E; Anastasiadis, 1999), we estimated that 
the ATSD tax could result in a drop in the demand for airline services in 
Brazil of around 2.5% between 2005 and 2023. It is also assumed that this 
percentage in the reduction of demand due to the ATSD tax would be 
reflected in a certain reduction in energy consumption, with lower CO2 
emissions due to air transportation in Brazil. It should be stressed that the 
probable amount of the energy consumption and CO2 emissions reductions 
are not a trivial matter, as there is not a clear direct relationship between the 
demand for airline services and the parameters in question. Consequently, 
this paper does not attempt to estimate this reduction with any accuracy. 
Even so, it is felt that this reduction would not be negligible, as a drop in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions of around one percent a year from 
2005 through 2023 would be quite feasible, or at least within the possible 
value margins. 
 
 
                                                 
3 To reach the figure of US$0.0005, the following data was used: 5,600 liters as the amount of 
jet fuel burnt in a flight between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, being US$100.00 the average 
one-way fare for this segment, as of late 2003 (Gario, 2003). And based on the APD tax 
evaluation methodology (Anastasiadis, 1999), it was assumed that the ATSD calculation basis 
would be equivalent to 3% of the average value of an air ticket between Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo, namely US$3.00.  
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Modal Choices between the two Largest and Most Important Cities in 
Brazil: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
The shuttle between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (373 kilometers flight 
distance) is among the five busiest routes worldwide in terms of passenger 
traffic. Within the Brazilian context it is by far the busiest route, carrying 
more than two million passengers and 30,000 tons each year (Gario, personal 
communication, May 19, 2003). All this heavy traffic results in a high-
energy consumption: some 170 million liters of jet fuel were consumed by 
the shuttle flights in 2000 (Geipot, 2001). In terms of energy consumption 
(fuel) and passenger-kilometers, the percentage for this route compared to 
the total figures (within the Brazilian context) is similar, at around 8% 
(Geipot, 2001). 
For all these reasons, as well as the geographical characteristic between 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, some kind of alternative transportation modes 
have always been under consideration, for example, high speed trains (HST), 
as a mean of reducing fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gases 
emissions. In fact, over a similar distance, a HST4 produces just about one-
third of the emissions of a commercial aircraft, while being able to carry 
much more passengers and cargo, with the major drawback of not covering 
the distance in the same 45 minute period (Aviation Environment 
Federation, 1997).  
If just considering specific alternatives that could lead to major 
reductions of CO2 emissions from the civil aviation sector in Brazil, the 
implementation of a HST between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo could 
imply, between 2012 (which is assumed to be the first year of operation of 
the HST, if ever put into service) and 2023, in a reduction in the demand for 
air transport services by 40 to 50%.5 This reduction alone would imply a 
decrease of the same proportion in the share of fuel consumption for aviation 
in Brazil. In other words, the introduction of a reliable, efficient and 
economically viable alternative high-speed transport system in the Rio de 
Janeiro – São Paulo link could implicate a 4% reduction on total CO2 
emissions by the aviation sector in Brazil (as compared to the trend scenario 
presented in Figure 2), between 2012 and 2023. Considering the multiple 
uncertainties associated with this estimation, a conservative reduction of 2% 
(on total CO2 emissions from aviation in Brazil) will be adopted in the 
present study.  
The total investments required to implement the HST system between 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo could reach US$4 billion (Ferraz and Gualda, 
1993). As a result, this project is not likely to be implemented by the 
                                                 
4 High speed trains are electrical-powered, while one of its most advanced technological 
concepts achieve its high speeds through the use of silicon superconductors along the train’s 
body and the railroad tracks.  
5 This percentage is adopted based on results provided by Ferraz and Gualda (1993). 
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Brazilian government or even by any local private groups. However, due to 
the objectives in view, its feasibility might well be underpinned to a certain 
extent through deploying the clean development mechanism (CDM) and 
based on in-depth studies focused on assessments of the emission reduction 
certificates (ERC) it becomes far more feasible. 
Preliminary Examination of Other Alternatives 
Lower average flight speeds  
The aerodynamic friction of an aircraft increases by the square factor of 
its speed (Anastasiadis, 1999).  This indicates that substantial fuel savings 
(and consequently lower CO2 emissions) may be achieved through lower 
speeds in high altitude. In fact, the key issue for this CO2 mitigation strategy 
is flight altitude, with its success depending on how airlines could implement 
lower cruising speeds at high altitudes (above 10,000 meters), as technical 
constraints regarding reducing speed on flights below this altitude may even 
increase fuel consumption (Anastasiadis, 1999; Fransen & Pepper, 1984). 
According to engineers at the Brazilian Instituto de Aviação Civil (IAC) 
[Civil Aviation Institute] a reduction of around 12% in the average speed of 
commercial aircraft operating in Brazil (cruising above 10,000 meters) could 
result in fuel savings of nearly 20 million liters of jet fuel or approximately 
1% of the total consumption registered in 2000 (IAC, personal 
communication, December 3, 2003).  Taking the analysis drawn up by the 
IAC engineers as a starting point, it is estimated that jet fuel consumption 
could be cut by 1% a year through the implementation of the mitigation 
strategy in this section, with CO2 emissions reduced in a similar level. 
Higher load-factor  
According to the IPCC, a basic way of mitigating the problem of 
anthropogenic increases in the greenhouse effect is to increase the load-
factor on all types of transportation (Petrobras Aviation, personal 
communication, July 2, 2003). This philosophy is very simple, yet not so 
simple to achieve in the practical daily activities of an airline, for instance: 
the higher the load-factor, the lower the carbon emissions by passenger-
kilometer. This results in a better use of the energy content of the fuel used 
by any specific mode of transportation, boosting its energy efficiency. 
Although simple in theory, achieving constant rates of high load-factors is 
not simple at all for airlines. 
Studies indicate that a global occupancy rate of around 75-80% 
worldwide could be achieved by 2015, which would boost the energy 
efficiency of air transportation by around 12%, compared to 2001 (IPCC, 
1999). In Brazil today, this occupancy rate hovers around 54% (Geipot, 
2001). Assuming that airlines and other players in the Brazilian air 
transportation sector could work together in order to achieve always-
14 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
optimum load-factors (assuming it at approximately 80%), it is possible that 
a considerable reduction in energy consumption could be achieved. As a 
direct result, we could experience lower CO2 emissions.  
At the time of writing, the authors were unable to assess reliable data 
regarding calculating this reduction with a significant degree of accuracy. 
Consequently, a conservative reduction of around 1% a year is assumed here 
from 2015 onwards for CO2 emissions (compared to the Trend Projection), 
through the introduction of the aforementioned mitigation strategy. 
Application of specific regulations  
Analyzing the regulations implemented in the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK (Michaelis, 1997; Milieudefensie, 2000; Vedanthan & 
Oppenheimer, 1998), as well as the characteristics of the Brazilian air 
transportation sector, it is suggested that two rules be introduced by the 
government for the busiest airports, namely:  (a) aircraft with occupancy 
rates of less than 50% would not be released for take-off or its operator 
would be obligated to pay a high penalty fee and (b) depending on local air 
pollution conditions, aircraft with outdated engine technology (Stage 2 and 
early Stage 3, for example) would not be allowed to take off or its operator 
would be obligated to pay an extremely high penalty fee. It is estimated that 
implementing these regulations would result in a reduction of around 2% a 
year in CO2 emissions in Brazil from 2006 onwards (taking 2006 as the 
starting point of a broad introduction of this kind of regulation).  
Table 2 summarizes the potential CO2 emissions reductions for each of 
the mitigation strategies mentioned herein, as well as the associated 
potential. 
CO2 Emissions: Trend Projection versus Ample Mitigation Projection    
In order to assess the progress of the trend scenario compared to a 
scenario that includes the mitigation strategies under analysis, the Ample 
Mitigation Projection was drawn up. It should be stressed that a Medium 
Mitigation type of projection (that includes the introduction of some of the 
mitigation strategies explored in this study) or even a Limited Mitigation 
projection (covers the introduction of one or two of the mitigation strategies 
listed) might be much closer to a future reality. However, the philosophy 
underlying the conception of the Ample Mitigation Projection is to 
investigate the maximum possible avoided CO2 emissions associated with 
the Brazilian air transport sector. The idea would be to assess the gap that 
would build up for this sector, should it continue to develop while 
maintaining current trends (Trend Projection), compared to what could be 
considered as a sustainable air transport sector structure (particularly from 
the environmental standpoint, and more specifically for greenhouse gases 
emissions).   
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Figure 3 presents the Ample Mitigation Projection, drawn up on the 
basis of adopting all the assumptions and considerations included in the 
description of each of the CO2 emissions mitigation strategies under 
consideration for this paper, in terms of reducing CO2 emissions compared to 
the Trend Projection.   
 
Table 2. Alternatives for Mitigating and Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions Caused 
by Airborne Activities in Brazil 
Alternatives Time Period 
Accumulated Reduction in 
CO2 Emissions (compared to 
the Trend Projection): Gg CO2 
Introduction of Alternative Fuels 
2018-2023 13,538 
- Vegetable Kerosene 
- Hydrated Alcohol 2011-2023 7,214 
Introduction of Broad-Ranging 
Integrated Air Traffic Control System
2005-2023 38,819 
Tax on Aviation Kerosene 
Consumption in Brazil 
2005-2023 3,882 
Intermode Transportation Substitution 
Between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
2013-2023 5,504 
Lower Average Flight Speeds 2010-2023 3,252 
Higher Aircraft Occupancy Rates 2015-2023 2,383 
Introduction of Specific Regulations 2006-2023 7,540 
82,132 Gg CO2 ≈ avoided emissions until 2023 
 
Figure 3. Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Brazilian Air Transportation Sector: Background 
1984-2002 and Trend Projection 2003-2023 versus Ample Mitigation Projection 2003-2023 
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FINAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An exercise of building energy consumption (or CO2 emissions) 
projections over the medium and long terms (over 10 years) for the Brazilian 
air transport sector opens up wide possibilities of variation, associated 
particularly with technological changes and the effects of other energy 
sources. Nevertheless, despite uncertainties of this type and acknowledging 
the non-renewable nature of oil reserves, prospects may well be built up for 
Brazil’s air transport sector that are less environmentally aggressive and 
degrading over the medium and long terms. Within this context, the Ample 
Mitigation Projection was drawn up, which covers the joint implementation 
of the mitigation alternatives for CO2 emissions examined in this paper. 
Comparing the Ample Mitigation Projection with the Trend Projection, 
the percentage reduction in CO2 emissions varies from 11% in 2005 (when 
the mitigation strategies begin to take effect) to 28.5% in 2023. It is also 
noted that the accumulated reduction prompted by the joint implementation 
of the mitigation strategies analyzed from 2002 through 2023 reaches 82,132 
Gg CO2—equivalent to the total CO2 emissions by Brazil’s air transport 
sector over a period of ten years (1992–2002).  
It should be noted that the majority of the data shown in the tables and 
figures were generated from scenarios based on a variety of assumptions, 
hypotheses and considerations, therefore the precise numerical values should 
not be assumed, in order to ensure coherence. However, the difference—at 
times significant from the standpoint of CO2 emissions—between the figures 
for the Trend Projection and the Ample Mitigation Projection, and among 
the mitigation alternatives provides significant indication that could provide 
valid input for consistent analysis. 
Within this context and examining each of the proposed mitigation 
alternatives, it becomes clear that some of them tend to generate more 
significant reductions in CO2 emissions: the implementation of the integrated 
air traffic control system; the commercial use of vegetable kerosene; and the 
introduction of specific regulations. However, when based solely on the 
estimated potential reduction in CO2 emissions, suggesting or recommending 
the introduction of a given mitigation strategy could result in misguided 
results. In fact the indirect benefits of each alternative should be taken into 
consideration, in addition to the efforts that are necessary to overcome the 
several limitations for ensuring the feasibility of implementing the 
corresponding alternative (for example, from the financial, technological or 
political standpoints), and hence, generation of more jobs through the 
introduction of hydrated alcohol (through sugar cane crops, which is the raw 
material for alcohol production) and vegetable kerosene (through agro-
businesses of the vegetable oils) as aircraft fuels; absorption of outside 
environmental factors and the possibility of assigning income brought in 
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through jet fuel taxes to projects on minimizing environmental impacts 
caused by air transport activities; reduced local pollution conditions around 
airports through implementing specific regulations; and fuel savings with 
fewer delays and shorter waiting times at airports achieved through a broad-
range integrated air traffic control system.    
It is estimated that the alternatives of introducing specific regulations, 
boosting airline load-factors, and implementing the broad-range integrated 
air traffic control system would be the most appropriate and achievable 
options, as they largely depend on appropriate strategic airline marketing, 
management, and planning and/or government decisions, rather than on 
technological progress or heavy capital inputs, which would be the case, for 
instance, of the HST alternative. 
It should be noted that there are factors specifically relating to Brazil 
that will tend to provide leverage for aviation demands, which are already 
expanding. These factors include: in the medium term, a foreseeable 
economic growth with a much better distribution of income (meaning that 
more people will have access to air travel); heavy repressed demand; a 
country with continental dimensions; and a good airport infrastructure. The 
IPCC itself forecasts a boom in demand for air services in developing 
countries with industrialized bases, such as Brazil, from 2015 onwards 
(IPCC, 1999). Within this context, it is essential to implement alternatives 
that can lead to lower CO2 emissions in Brazil, helping to avoid any 
worsening of environmental problems at the global level. However, the 
estimated reduction of 28.5% of CO2 emissions by Brazil’s air transport 
sector by 2023 (compared to the Trend Projection) generated by the 
mitigation alternatives under consideration herein shows that the issue is 
very relevant and must be studied in great detail. 
There is no doubt that one of the main challenges facing Brazil, as well 
as the worldwide air transport sector during the twenty-first century, will be 
dealing with the inevitable upsurge in demand while minimizing air 
pollution. In the case of Brazil (and other developing countries), this 
challenge is even greater. After all, core environmental issues—protecting 
Earth’s atmosphere, for example—may not be ranked as top priority by the 
government as more pressing problems—such as meeting the basic needs of 
much of the population that is still not properly cared for—certainly warrant 
more urgent attention.   
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ABSTRACT 
Over the past five years, the Swiss air transport sector has witnessed an 
unprecedented number of accidents and incidents, leading to an independent 
analysis ordered by the government. The resulting report of 2003 identified 
significant regulatory and institutional deficiencies with direct implications for 
safety. The challenges to Switzerland’s institutional regulatory framework were 
further exacerbated because of the bankruptcy of the Swiss national flag carrier 
(Swissair in 2002) and the pressure on Zurich Unique airport resulting from of a 
new over flight regime in Germany in 2003. On the basis of this report, the 
government has ordered a profound transformation of the Swiss institutional 
regulatory framework, among which the transformation of the Swiss Federal Office 
of Civil Aviation (FOCA) into a regulator, whose predominant concern must be 
safety. This paper presents and critically analyzes the current transformation of the 
Swiss institutional regulatory regime against both regulation theory and safety 
performance criteria. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Swiss air transport sector has been struck, since the late 1990s, by a 
series of severe accidents. One may recall the crash of an MD-11 Swissair 
near Halifax in September 1998, the fatal accident of a Crossair Saab 340 in 
January 2000 and of another Crossair Avro 146 RJ, both near Zürich Airport, 
as well as most recently the mid-air collision on July 1, 2002, near 
Überlingen (Germany) over Swiss air space. Simultaneously, the Swiss 
National Bureau of Accident Investigation (AAIB) had reported various 
cases of near misses, as well as shortcomings in air traffic control (ATC) 
equipment.  
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In response, the Swiss government had commissioned the Dutch 
Airspace Laboratory (NLR) with an external evaluation on the safety of air 
transport in Switzerland (NLR, 2003). The main objective of this evaluation, 
of which the two authors were part, was to analyze whether the current 
structures for ensuring aviation safety within Switzerland were appropriate, 
and make recommendations as to how to improve them. And indeed, the 
report showed that the safety performance of Swiss aviation over the last 
decade had been declining, whereas the safety performance of the other 
European states had been improving. Where Switzerland had clearly been 
ahead of these states before the 1990s, this lead had been lost, and a negative 
trend had set in.  
The purpose of this article is not to reanalyze the safety performance of 
the Swiss aviation sector, nor summarize the findings of the NLR report, 
which is publicly available. Rather, this article focuses on one of the 
conceptual aspects treated in the NLR report, namely on the institutional 
dimension of air transport safety. While it uses the NLR data and is 
grounded in the Swiss case, our argumentation is more general, as we seek 
to: (a) conceptualize an ideal institutional framework for regulating air 
transport safety, and (b) design an organizational or institutional 
transformation process, by which such a framework can be reached. 
In the first section we briefly recall the problem, that is, the declining 
safety performance in the Swiss air transport sector and the corresponding 
institutional problems, as identified in the NLR report. In the second section 
we will frame the problem in terms of regulation and corresponding 
regulatory institutions and develop an ideal institutional safety regulation 
framework. In the third section we will outline the institutional and 
organizational transformations needed in order to address to reach this ideal 
framework, again by referring to the Swiss case. 
DIAGNOSIS: DECLINING SAFETY AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL 
ROOT CAUSES 
The purpose of this first section is to identify the problem as one of 
safety performance. Such safety performance—as will be argued in the next 
section—is considered to be the result of corresponding public policies and 
subsequent implementation by means of corresponding institutional 
arrangements. This section will therefore also highlight the institutional 
problems, as identified in the Swiss case. 
Over the past five years, the Swiss air transport sector has witnessed an 
unprecedented number of accidents and incidents. Air transport is an 
exceptionally safe mode of transport. Hence even a temporary increase in the 
number of accidents does not necessarily imply an unacceptable performance 
deficiency in absolute terms. However, public opinion, in general, and the 
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judgement of the travelling public, in particular, is not based on safety 
performance in absolute terms, but on safety performance in relative terms, 
both over time with an expectancy of continuous improvement and in 
comparison to relevant international performance. As shown in Figure 1, 
Swiss air transport has not faired well on either dimension. Not only does the 
accident rate (number of accidents per million flights) gradually increase 
over the last two decades but also the declining trend in safety performance 
in Switzerland is contrary to the worldwide improving trend and the 
improving trend in a smaller set of benchmark states of France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 1. Safety trend in Switzerland in comparison with benchmark countries and 
worldwide 
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The AAIB also shows, in its 2003 report (BFU, 2003), a significant 
increase of accidents and serious incidents of Swiss registered aircrafts (15 
in 2002 and 33 in 2003) and of foreign registered aircraft in Switzerland (3 
in 2002 and 11 in 2003). Table 1 shows the number of air traffic incident 
reports (ATIR) including those with a high risk of collision (risk A). Other 
incidents included are those with a possible risk of collision (risk B), and no 
risk of collision (risk C). 
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Table 1. Air Traffic Incident Reports of accidents and serious incidents of Swiss registered 
aircrafts, 1993-2003 
 
 
Total number of 
incident reports 
 
Number of incident 
reports with a high risk 
of collision 
Number of incident 
reports per 100,000 
flights 
1993 15 4 1.8 
1994 10 6 1.1 
1995 18 2 2.0 
1996 14 2 1.3 
1997 16 2 2.0 
1998 18 4 1.6 
1999 29 12 2.3 
2000 43 22 3.8 
2001 47 13 3.5 
2002 49 15 3.9 
2003 65 25 5.0 
 
When the NLR report was released the figures for the year 2003 had not 
been available, showing yet another significant increase in incidents, in 
particular in risk A incidents. The trend already identified by NLR has thus 
not been reversed.  
Also, it is important to point out that accident and serious incident 
statistics constitute a reactive indicator of the safety performance of the 
industry. While monitoring and analyzing accidents and incidents, data is 
certainly necessary, but it is obviously not an adequate basis for pro-active 
safety management. If safety trends in the industry are to be formally 
identified before accidents and incidents occur, an appropriate set of safety 
performance indicators must be developed and used. And this is something 
which should be done by the safety regulator. 
Safety performance as measured by accidents and incidents is of course 
the result of a combination of factors, not all of which have clear root causes. 
For example, declining safety performance can also result from growing 
traffic. Therefore, only benchmarking with other countries shows whether 
overall safety performance has or has not improved. In the case of 
Switzerland, however, safety performance has clearly declined, whereas it 
has increased on average in the rest of the world.  
The NLR report attributed this declining safety performance to 
institutional root causes, in particular to deficiencies in terms of regulatory 
institutions and behavior. More precisely, the NLR report had identified six 
such institutional root causes or problems, five of which we will briefly 
discuss here. 
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1. There is an absence of a national aviation safety policy and 
corresponding action plan, which would define clear targets in 
terms of safety performance and attribute corresponding 
institutional responsibilities for implementing it. From a public 
policy perspective, this is of course the primary root cause. 
However, we will not address this issue further, as our primary 
interest is on institutional aspects. A national aviation safety policy, 
if it were to be developed, should simply take these institutional 
aspects into account. 
2. There is an absence of a clear supervision of FOCA by the Ministry 
and corresponding responsibility. Indeed, it appeared that FOCA 
was neither properly instructed, nor controlled by the Ministry. This 
is an aspect we will discuss in more depth later. 
3. There is an absence of a clear separation or a clear identification of 
safety related issues and corresponding responsibilities within 
FOCA. Indeed, it appears that safety was pervasive all throughout 
FOCA without however clearly identifying an overall responsibility 
for safety and safety performance. We will discuss this aspect in 
further detail as well. 
4. The existence of a federal accident investigation commission 
(called EFUG) on top of the AAIB significantly delays 
recommendations by the AAIB and dilutes responsibilities. This is 
an institutional root cause, which will briefly be addressed later. 
5. There is a dysfunctional reporting structure and process, whereby 
the AAIB reports exclusively to FOCA, rather than to the Ministry. 
This is related to the fact that the recommendations did not legally 
oblige the concerned actor to take the AAIB recommendation into 
consideration. This is an institutional and legal problem, which will 
briefly be addressed later. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the original institutional framework of Swiss air 
transport safety, as identified at the time of the NLR report. 
We have summarized the safety performance problems of the Swiss air 
transport sector and the corresponding institutional and organizational root 
causes as they were identified by the NLR report. Now we will discuss the 
conceptual framework linking safety performance to regulatory institutions. 
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Figure 2. Original institutional framework of Swiss air transport safety 
 
 
THE REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT SAFETY 
We will now present an ideal institutional framework for air transport 
safety. Such a framework must be put into the larger context of the 
transformation of the air transport sector over the past 30 years, during 
which competition has gradually been introduced. It is this transformation of 
the sector which indeed leads to the fact that safety is no longer a concern of 
the operator, but becomes a public policy concerned to be enforced by means 
of regulation. Figure 3 summarizes this evolution in the case of Switzerland. 
In the remainder of this section we will present an ideal model for 
regulating air transport safety, as this becomes necessary in an increasingly 
competitive environment. This model is grounded both in public policy and 
in regulation theory. Both theories have been adapted to air transport in 
general and to air transport safety in particular. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of the Swiss air transport sector 
 
© Matthias Finger 
FOCA = Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation; SR = Swissair; LX = Croissair; EZY = Easyjet; 
GVA = Geneva 
 
Public policy theory distinguishes between (a) public policy objectives, 
(b) the implementation of such public policy by the government in 
collaboration with its administration, (c) the outputs of this administration 
(e.g., administrative decisions, subsidies, etc.), (d) the impacts of these 
outputs on the relevant operators with the aim of changing their behavior, 
and (e) the policy outcomes. Ideally, the policy outcomes should correspond 
to the policy objectives, all intermediate steps being a simple means for 
achieving such public policy objectives. Ideally, therefore, there exists an 
overall safety policy—or an air transport policy of which safety is an integral 
part—whose outcome precisely would be safe air transport. 
Regulation is therefore an instrument of the public policy 
implementation process. Regulators (e.g., the competition regulator or a 
sector regulator) are one among several actors contributing to the 
implementation of any given public policy objective. All actors of course 
interact and thus constitute an institutional arrangement, by which a public 
policy is being implemented. 
In liberal political systems, regulation pertains primarily to economic 
efficiency, meaning that the main regulatory activity is competition 
regulation. In the network industries however—of which the air transport 
sector is entirely part—regulation pertains yet to other, additional functions. 
Let us mention here, in particular, the function of attributing the scarce 
resource, that is, in our case the slots and the routes.  
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Safety in the air transport sector is typically part of these two regulatory 
functions, namely of allocating the scarce air space (e.g., airplanes must 
observe a certain critical distance) and of ensuring the system’s integrity 
(e.g., there must be smooth functioning of the overall air transport system by 
ensuring interoperability and the respect of safety and other industry 
standards). In addition and beyond ensuring such system’s integrity, one 
could also consider that safety is a public service concern.  
From the above elements, we can now deduce what we call public 
policy mechanics for air transport safety regulation. In addition to the above 
considerations, we introduce here the fact that many public policy objectives 
are not defined at a national, but rather at an international level, notably by 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), European Civil Aviation 
Conference, and Eurocontrol. National public policy is then simply limited 
to translating these objectives into national laws and norms. However, this 
does not change anything in the mechanics itself: institutional arrangements 
among relevant actors—among which is a safety regulator—then implement 
these safety policy objectives by means of standards and controls of these 
standards. Such standards impact upon the various operators (e.g., airports, 
airlines, ATC, and others), thus leading, in theory, to the desired safety 
outcomes. Figure 4 summarizes this approach. 
 
Figure 4. Air transport safety regulation as public policy 
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If one now looks at the specific role of the air traffic (AT) regulator 
(also called the sector regulator), one can come up with a much more 
detailed air transport regulation model, as we call it. This model puts the AT 
regulator in the center of the institutional framework charged with the 
implementation of the air transport safety policy. Let us explain this 
framework in little more detail: 
 
1. In order to contribute to the implementation of its safety policy 
objectives, the regulator will impact upon the various operators 
active in the sector. These are the ATC operator, the airlines, and 
the airports. One could add to this list yet other operators, such as 
aviation training institutions and equipment providers. The 
regulator will impact upon these operators by defining standards of 
operations and by controlling whether these standards are met. In 
most cases, these standards are not defined by the regulator, but by 
policy actors such as the national legislator or international 
legislative bodies (e.g., ICAO, Eurocontrol). However, the 
monitoring of the compliance remains generally the task of the 
regulator.  
2. Airports and ATC through their operations, in turn, impact upon the 
airlines, thus indirectly also implementing safety policy objectives. 
The role of the regulator is, in this case, to supervise their 
operational procedures and activities. 
3. If the regulator observes among the operators behavior deviation 
from the standards it should intervene by forcing the operator to 
correct—thus the term regulator—its behavior. In order to do so, 
the regulator ideally has at its disposal a set of mechanisms—both 
incentives and sanctions—ranging from rewards via warnings and 
fines to the withdrawal of the license, that is, the right to operate. 
4. If, despite this regulatory approach, accidents or incidents occur, 
there exists yet another corrective loop in the air transport industry, 
namely the independent accident investigator. Contrary to the 
regulator which acts ex-ante or prior to the events, the accident 
investigator acts ex-post, that is, comes to play its role only once an 
accident or an incident has occurred. It then investigates the 
behavior of the concerned operators, but also of the regulator. 
Indeed, if an accident occurs, this may be due to two different 
reasons: either the regulator has behaved properly, but safety 
policies were not sufficient, or safety policies were sufficient, but 
the regulator has not ensured their implementation. This is why the 
independent investigator must report to the political authorities, as 
they are in charge of both defining the policies and of supervising 
the regulator.  
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5. Furthermore, ideally, the regulator must be separate from policy 
advice. Policy advice is generally done by an administrative office 
and has as its function to prepare policies, which the political 
authorities then adopt and the regulator implements. It could indeed 
happen that such policies—for example as a result of a 
recommendation issued after an accident—pertain to the better 
supervision of the regulator. 
6. Finally, as civil and military aviation are generally structured into 
two separate ministries, there exists separate policy advice for each 
of them. However, ideally, the regulator should not be separate, as 
there should exist one integrated civil and military air transport 
safety policy. 
 
The Figure 5 summarizes the above arguments graphically. 
 
Figure 5. Ideal air traffic safety regulation framework 
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has been discussed in the previous section, three pertaining to institutional 
relations and one pertaining to the organization of FOCA. 
Institutional Relations 
As for institutional relations, the following three deficiencies had been 
identified by the NLR report. We will recall them here and outline the 
remedies, which were then reflected in NLR’s recommendations. 
 
1. Let us mention here first the dysfunctional reporting structure and 
process, whereby the AAIB reports exclusively to FOCA, rather 
than to the Ministry. Subsequently, the so-made recommendations 
did not legally oblige the concerned actor to take the AAIB 
recommendation into consideration. Quite logically, and in line 
with the above ideal institutional framework, NLR recommended to 
change the Ordinance on accident investigation so that the AAIB 
formally reports to the Minister of Transport instead of to FOCA, 
and that a legal obligation rests upon the actor addressed in an 
AAIB recommendation to take the recommendation into 
consideration and to report back to the Minister of Transport. 
2. Let us mention second the absence of a clear supervision of FOCA 
by the Ministry and corresponding responsibility. To recall, FOCA 
was neither properly instructed, nor controlled by the Ministry. 
Quite logically then the NLR again recommended to establish a 
position within the Ministry of Transport to monitor the 
performance of FOCA, to act on behalf of the Swiss government in 
aviation policy matters, and to act as the delegated accountable 
manager of the Minister with regard to the implementation of the 
recommendations of the AAIB. 
3. Let us finally mention the existence of a federal accident 
investigation commission on top of the AAIB, which significantly 
delayed the recommendations made by the AAIB and diluted the 
responsibilities. Here, NLR simply recommended to discontinue the 
recourse process. 
Organizational Dimension 
As for the organizational dimension, let us recall the main deficiency 
identified by the NLR report, namely the absence of a clear separation or a 
clear identification of safety related issues and corresponding responsibilities 
within FOCA. Indeed, one could expect that it is important for an 
organization like FOCA, which has safety as the primary objective, that the 
organization somehow reflects that. This is, however, not the case, as safety 
was not identified anywhere in the organization chart. Safety was considered 
everybody's job and not the responsibility of a particular individual. 
Basically, the act of regulation was and perhaps still is considered a form of 
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safety management since the purpose of regulation is to ensure safety. This 
approach is, however, a reflection of the old way of achieving safety through 
administrative compliance. Today's high levels of safety in the very complex 
and rapidly growing aviation industry cannot be sustained unless a proper 
safety management approach is adopted. The associated changes in 
processes should also be reflected in changes in the organizations of the 
government agency overseeing aviation (i.e., FOCA). While there is merit in 
making every employee aware of his or her personal responsibility for the 
safety aspects for the job, the effectiveness of such statements is limited 
unless it is administered in an organization where safety is the product and 
top-level management is accountable for that. 
FOCA is currently charged with both the promotion of aviation and 
safety. However, as long as these objectives remain subject to an implicit 
consideration at the level of the director of FOCA, the manager who is solely 
accountable for safety cannot be identified in the organization. Indeed, the 
total integration of these duties, as is currently the case in FOCA, presents 
serious risks in combination with the lack of a clear safety policy, 
accountability and culture. The integration means that the considerations and 
trade-offs around safety and economy are now made at the level of the 
individual employee. NLR therefore recommended a substantial 
organizational transformation process by which FOCA should develop 
separate units for Safety Regulation and Aviation. It could be admissible that 
both units report to an overall director of FOCA, but each of these two units 
should have their own director. 
From an international perspective, this organizational structure of FOCA 
is also rather unique (see Briand & Kelvin, 1998). Indeed, the organization 
charts of most other regulators reflect the primary regulatory tasks. In the 
UK, for example, the Safety Regulation Group and the Economic Regulation 
Group, each with own director, together form the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA). The flow of information between these two group is tightly 
controlled and regulated. In the Netherlands, the safety regulator and the 
policy group have been physically separated into different units reporting to 
different Directors General of the Ministry of Transport. While this provides 
a clear separation between safety regulation and policy, it has disadvantages 
too, mainly with regard to the application of domain knowledge in policy 
development. The Australian authority also underwent significant change in 
the area of safety regulation in the mid-1990s in response to the perceived 
need to clearly separate Safety Regulation from the other tasks of the 
Aviation Authority (Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 2001). The Australian 
Authority was at that time under strong pressure to become a smaller and 
more efficient government agency and at the same time a number of fatal 
accidents occurred in which the role of the safety regulator was implicated in 
the causal factors of the accidents. As a consequence, the resources of the 
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Australina Authority were slashed by 50% over a five year period, and the 
safety regulation activities, which were initially already a Division of the 
CAA, went through considerable change. Safety Regulation staff were 
reduced from 736 in the beginning of 1991 to 490 by the end of 1992. CAA 
management rejected a recommendation from one of a range of 
investigations and inquiries to the effect of setting up a separate Safety 
Regulation Directorate within the CAA. Public scrutiny however led to the 
demand upon the CAA to formally confirm that safety has primacy in 
CAA’s work and the establishment of a Directorate of Aviation Safety 
Regulation. A further fatal accident in which the oversight of the CAA was 
implicated prompted the government to take further action and led to the 
decision to establish a separate Aviation Safety Agency within the CAA. 
Another accident led to the removal of the director of the Safety Regulation 
Division and the decision to set up a new and separate Aviation Safety 
Agency, and to considerably increase funding for safety regulation. This 
agency became today’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). 
CONCLUSION 
This article did not have as an objective to assess the institutional and 
organizational transformation process of Swiss aviation safety regulation. 
Rather, its aim was to present and argue for the conceptual framework 
underpinning the recommendations that were made by the NLR report in 
institutional and organizational terms. We think that this conceptual 
framework is a solid one and that it is furthermore confirmed by examples of 
other countries.  
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ABSTRACT 
We present the first estimates for aircraft landing and take-off (LTO) emissions at 
40 Turkish airports in 2001, including the biggest airports: Ataturk International 
Airport in Istanbul (AIA), Antalya Airport in Antalya and Esenboga Airport in 
Ankara. The calculation model is based on flight data recorded by the State Airports 
Authority. The flight data include the type and number of aircraft, number of 
passengers, and cargo volume by date and time. For the emission calculations, we 
used the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Engine Exhaust 
Emissions Data Bank, which includes minimum and maximum values for both fuel 
flow rates and emissions factors. Total LTO emissions at Turkish airports are 
estimated to be between 7614 and 8338 tons per year. These results are comparable 
with U.S. airports on the average. Approximately half of the LTO emissions are, 
however, produced at the AIA. To predict future emissions, we estimated that an 
increase of 25% in LTO cycles might cause a rise of between 31% and 33% in 
emissions. The estimations show that a decrease of 2 minutes in taxiing time results 
in a decrease of 6% in LTO emissions. The model developed in this study was 
shown to perform well for airport environmental planning and expansion in the 
Turkish case. 
INTRODUCTION 
The exhaust emissions from an aircraft are carbon dioxide (CO2), water 
vapour (H2O), nitrogen oxides (NOX), various sulphur oxides (SOX), carbon 
monoxide (CO), various non-methane (NM) hydrocarbons (HC), and other 
gases and particles. Aircraft engines produce such emissions in a sensitive 
area of the atmosphere within and above the troposphere. Emissions from 
aircrafts are important from an environmental point of view. Not only 
because of environmental aspects but also for health reasons, it becomes 
increasingly important to know the types and amounts of emissions from 
aircrafts. Near airports, for example, the produced SOX and NOX may 
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contribute to smog, while CO is toxic and some HC and soot are suspected 
of being carcinogenic (Doeppelheuer, 2000). Smog and ozone formation in 
the vicinity of airports were the main environmental concern in the seventies 
and early eighties. Consequently, the emissions of unburned hydrocarbons 
(UHC) of aircraft engines were regulated. Emissions of NOX were also 
controlled by similar standards (Westerberg, 2000).  
Aircraft engines have two quite different requirements. The first is for 
very high combustion efficiency at low power, because of the large amounts 
of fuel burned during taxiing and ground manoeuvring. The primary problem 
here is the reduction of UHC. The main concern of the second requirement 
mentioned above is NOX at take-off power, climb and cruise. ICAO sets 
standards on a worldwide basis, for both landing and take-off (LTO) cycles 
and also for cruise at high altitude; the first is concerned with air quality in 
the vicinity of airports and the second with ozone depletion in the upper 
atmosphere. It has been shown that for a modern twin-engine transport 
operating over an 800 kilometre range, approximately 25% of the emissions 
is produced during the LTO cycle, with the remainder during climb, cruise 
and descent; approximately 86% of the total emissions is NOX 
(Saravanamuttoo, Rogers & Cohen, 2001). 
At present, exhaust emissions from aircrafts are small compared to 
anthropogenic surface emissions. Nearly 6% of all petrol products are 
burned as aviation fuel. Relative to the total anthropogenic emissions of CO2, 
aviation contributes about 2.6%. With respect to NOX the contributions from 
aviation is about 3% of all anthropogenic sources. Nevertheless, the unique 
location of aircraft emissions in the upper atmosphere and the predicted 
growth of air traffic require that particular attention is given to the effects of 
these emissions (Schumann, 2000). 
Aircraft emissions are likely to have their greatest effect upon the 
atmosphere and climate when discharged near the junction of the 
troposphere and stratosphere. Research related to the atmospheric effects of 
aircraft emissions has become increasingly important and several 
experimental studies have been performed on contamination of the 
atmosphere by emissions from aircraft engines in cruise flight conditions, to 
establish and improve models of the physical and chemical processes which 
take place in the aircraft wake and in the general zone of air traffic corridors 
(Dedesh, Leut & Boris, 2001; Kjellström, Feichter, Sausen & Hein, 1999; 
Lee, Dilosquer, Singh & Rycoft, 1996; Schumann et al., 1998).  
There are several studies to estimate the aircraft emissions at airports. In 
a study of airport-related emissions in the U.S., airports are estimated with a 
projection to the year 2010 (EPA, 1999). Perl, Patterson and Perez (1997) 
estimate the cost of air pollution from aviation at Lyon-Satolas airport for the 
years 1987, 1990 and 2015 by linking environmental assessment techniques 
that yield an emission inventory for aircraft operations with economic cost 
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evaluations of air pollution from ground based sources in Lyon. Stefanou 
and Haralambopoulos (1998) used an inventory calculation system for air 
traffic to determine annual fuel consumption and emissions. They used 
airline data on routes, hours of flights, density of traffic, fleet mix, and 
ratings of engine manufacturers for an airline company in Greece. They 
calculated annual environmental loads and showed that significant amounts 
of pollutants are received in areas around airports. In a previous study based 
on data from the State Airport Authority (DHMI) environmental effects of 
aircraft engine exhaust gases around Ataturk International Airport was 
studied by Sen (1997). 
Studies estimating present and future aircraft emissions have been 
performed recently. Dameris et al. (1998) present a global three-dimensional 
dynamic-chemical model to estimate present and future subsonic and 
supersonic aircraft NOX emissions on ozone. Grooss, Bruehl and Peter 
(1998) performed a study investigating the impact of air-traffic-induced NOX 
and H20 emissions on the chemical composition of the global troposphere 
and stratosphere for 1991 and a future scenario for 2015. Kalivoda and 
Kudrna (1997) present a study on the future development of air traffic and 
the expected changes and improvements in specific fuel consumption and air 
pollutant emissions for 2010 and 2020. Vedantham and Oppenheimer (1998) 
give long term scenarios for aviation through to the year 2100. 
This paper deals with estimating aircraft LTO emissions at 40 Turkish 
airports in 2001 including the biggest airports: AIA in Istanbul, Antalya 
Airport in Antalya and Esenboga Airport in Ankara. The calculation model 
is based on flight data recorded by State Airports Authority. The flight data 
includes type and number of aircraft, number of passengers, and amount of 
cargo by day, time of day and date as recorded by the State Airport 
Authority (DHMI, 2002). For the emission calculations the ICAO Engine 
Exhaust Emissions Data Bank is used. Additionally, the effect of taxiing 
time on the aircraft emissions is estimated. Finally, the future aircraft 
emissions are estimated using peak day emissions at the AIA. 
CALCULATING AIRCRAFT EMISSIONS 
Aircraft emissions at airports are calculated for the LTO cycle consisting 
of four operation modes: approach, taxi, take-off and climb. A typical LTO 
cycle described by ICAO is shown in Figure 1 (Penner, Lister, Griggs, 
Dokken & McFarland, 1999). ICAO defines the climbing as the interval 
between the end of take-off and the moment the plane exits the atmospheric 
boundary layer (ABL). ICAO’s norms therefore take air traffic emissions 
into account from the surface to the top of the ABL, whose height is defined 
to be 915 meters (3000 feet) by default.  
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The exhaust gas emissions from aircrafts are obtained by the following 
equation (Kalivoda & Kudrna, 1997; Perl et al., 1997; Stefanou & 
Haralambopoulos, 1998): 
 
amimemeaea
a e
ami tEFlnE ,,,,,,,    (1)  
  
Where:  
miE ,  = annual emission of pollutant i  for mode m , (kg yr-1), 
an  = number of engines of aircraft type a , (-) 
eal ,  = number of annual LTO cycles for aircraft type a  with engine 
type e , (-) 
meaF ,,  = fuel consumption for aircraft type a  with engine type e  in 
mode m , (kg s-1) 
imeE ,,  = emission factor for engine type e  and mode m  and 
pollutant i , (g kg-1) 
amt ,  = time in mode m  for aircraft type a , (s) 
 
 
Figure 1. A typical landing and take-off cycle 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fuel flow and emission rates and times in each operation mode of the 
LTO cycle vary. These depend on the aircraft type, meteorological 
conditions and operational considerations at the airport. In this study, the 
Climb-out 
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LTO  
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times for approach, taxi, take-off and climb are taken from a standard LTO 
cycle; that is, 4 minutes for approach, 26 minutes for taxi, 0.7 minutes for 
take-off and 2.2 minutes for climb (Penner et al., 1999). Fuel consumption 
and emission indexes of an aircraft for each operation mode are taken from 
the ICAO Engine Exhaust Emissions Data Bank (ICAO, 1995). A 
comparison shows that the calculation method based on emission indexes 
underestimate, for example, NOX emissions by about 12% on average 
(Penner et al., 1999).  As mentioned above, there is an obstacle for the 
calculations of emissions from aircrafts due to the fact that some aircraft 
engines have various fuel flow rates and emission factors as listed in the data 
bank. This obstacle is removed by calculating two estimations of aircraft 
LTO emissions at Turkish airports through the use of the minimum and the 
maximum values from the data bank: that is, minimum and maximum 
estimations. This methodology was developed and used by Woodmansey 
and Petterson (1994). Since this methodology gives minimum and maximum 
estimations of aircraft emissions, an error analysis is not necessary.  
AIR TRAFFIC AT TURKISH AIRPORTS 
There are forty commercial airports in Turkey which serve domestic and 
international flights with an aircraft capacity of 2,076,100, although only 
18% of this capacity was used in 2001. Table 1 shows aircraft movements 
and capacity of Turkish airports for 2001 (DHMI, 2002). The distribution of 
aircraft types at Turkish airports in 2001 is shown in Figure 2. Boeing 737s 
comprise 35% of the aircraft movements at Turkish airports.  
 
Table 1. Aircraft capacity and movements at Turkish airports, 2001 (DHMI, 2002) 
 
Airport Aircraft Capacity 
Aircraft 
Movements in 
2001 
Use of Capacity 
(%) 
Ataturk 350,400 160,901 46 
Antalya 262,800 62,443 24 
Esenboga 236,520 43,364 18 
Other 1,226,380 106,794 9 
TOTAL 2,076,100 373,502 18 
 
Because of a large mixture of aircraft types at Turkish airports 
approximately 92% of Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flights are taken into 
consideration for the estimation of aircraft emissions. The IFR ratios for 
AIA, Antalya and Esenboga are 96%, 96% and 83 %, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Aircraft types at use at Turkish airports (DHMI, 2002) 
Aircraft Types
 at Turkish 
Airports
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RESULTS FOR TURKISH AIRPORTS 
The total aircraft fuel consumption for LTO cycles at Turkish airports is 
estimated at approximately 174,000 tons in 2001. Dividing the total we find 
that the fuel consumption percentages during take-off, climb-out, taxi and 
approach are 11, 29, 42 and 18, respectively. Comparing this fuel 
consumption to total primary energy consumption in Turkey (MENS, 2004), 
shows that the fuel consumed by aircrafts in LTO cycles is approximately 
0.23 %. 
The amounts of minimum and maximum estimations of the aircraft LTO 
emissions at Turkish airports are listed in Table 2. Despite the fact that the 
AIA comprise only 43% of total LTO cycles at all Turkish airports, aircraft 
LTO cycles at the AIA produce half of the total emissions at all Turkish 
airports, as shown in Table 2. The distribution of aircraft emissions for 
different operation modes in Figure 3 shows that the taxiing mode has the 
biggest portion of LTO emissions, at around 72%. The second biggest 
portion belongs to the climb-out mode, at around 15%.  
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Table 2. Maximum and minimum estimates of landing and take off emissions (tons/year) 
at Turkish airports, 2001 (DHMI, 2002) 
 
 HC CO NOX SO2 Total Total 
(%) 
 
Ataturk 
Min 371.80 2,079.05 1,260.23 66.64 3,777.72 49.61 
Max 497.60 2,389.13 1,300.68 66.91 4,254.33 51.02 
 
Antalya 
Min. 107.22 772.74 498.14 25.13 1,403.23 18.43 
Max 145.64 847.63 507.39 25.31 1,525.98 18.30 
 
Esenboga 
Min. 73.26 390.05 218.90 12.13 694.34 9.12 
Max 88.25 417.44 228.53 12.15 746.38 8.95 
 
Other 
Min. 180.36 959.21 570.36 29.11 1,739.04 22.84 
Max 203.27 1,000.77 578.88 29.19 1,812.11 21.73 
All 
Turkish 
Airports 
Min. 732.64 4,201.04 2,547.64 133.01 7,614.34 100 
Max 934.77 4,654.98 2,615.48 133.57 8,338.79 100 
HC – hydrocarbons, CO – carbon monoxide, NOX – nitrogen oxides, SO2 – sulphur 
dioxide 
 
Figure 3. Maximum and minimum estimates of the distribution of aircraft emissions 
for each of the four landing and take-off cycle operation modes, at Turkish airports 
(DHMI, 2002) 
 
A projection up to the year 2020 gives the emission estimations 
throughout Turkey (Kaygusuz, 2003). Comparing the aircraft LTO emissions 
at Turkish airports to the total amount of emissions in Turkey for 2001, it 
can be stated that the aircraft LTO cycles produce 0.3% of NOX and 0.25% 
of CO in Turkey. 
Effect of taxiing time 
Taxiing time is necessary for an aircraft to access the terminal area, the 
runways, fixed based operators, and their home hangar or tie-down area.  
From an environmental point of view improved taxiways reduce emissions at 
the airport by providing quicker and more direct taxi routes with fewer stops, 
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turns, and runway crossings. Aircraft engines produce more emissions per 
unit of fuel while taxiing than other phases of airport operation. 
Consequently, taxiing aircrafts are a significant source of HC and CO 
emissions since the emission indexes of such emissions are the highest 
during the taxiing and idle phase, when engines operate at low power.  
In order to show the effect of taxiing time on emissions, the time for 
taxiing is varied from 20 minutes to 26 minutes and the results are shown in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Effect of increased taxiing time, in minutes, on percentage of emissions from 
taxiing compared to total emissions from landing and take-off cycle (DHMI, 2002) 
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A decrease of 2 minutes in taxiing mode results in a decrease of 
approximately 6% in the amount of LTO emissions and a decrease of 
approximately 8% in the amount of emissions in taxiing mode. That means 
that the taxiing mode will have a portion of 65% of total LTO emissions if 
time for taxiing is reduced from 26 minutes to 20 minutes. This reduction of 
23% in taxiing time results in a decrease of approximately 16.5% in the 
amount of the aircraft emissions. This result is comparable to that reported 
by Daniel (2002). He reports the benefits from reduced taxiing time, 
improved airport access, increased safety, decreased emissions, and reduced 
noise at the New Castle Airport in Delaware. He found that a reduction of 
25% in taxiing time results in a decrease of up to 16% in aircraft emissions. 
This information is very useful for airport expansion programs including 
projects involving environmental protection related to aircraft emissions. 
AIR TRAFFIC AT THE AIA 
The AIA, located southwest of Istanbul, is the biggest airport in Turkey, 
which is a connection point for international flights between the continents 
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of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and America. Table 3 shows the aircraft 
movements at the AIA in the year 2001. Its annual capacity of aircraft and 
passengers is 350,400 and 21.5 million, respectively. The AIA served 
approximately 13 million passengers in 2001. Consequently, the use of 
capacity of aircraft and passenger is 46% and 59%, respectively (DHMI, 
2002). The monthly distribution of aircraft movements at the AIA is shown 
in Figure 5.  
 
Table 3. Aircraft movements at the Ataturk International Airport, Istanbul, Turkey, 2001 
(DHMI, 2002) 
 
 Domestic International Total 
Turkish 57,518 55,566 113,084 
Foreign 0 47,817 47,817 
Total 57,518 103,383 160,901 
 
Figure 5. Monthly distribution of aircraft movements at the Ataturk International 
Airport, Istanbul, Turkey, 2001 (DHMI, 2002) 
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The AIA has a large mixture of aircraft types. Figure 6 shows 
distribution of aircraft types at the AIA in 2001. Boeing 737s comprise half 
of the aircraft movements at the AIA. As listed in Table 3, there were more 
than 80,000 LTO cycles at the AIA in 2001.  
RESULTS FOR THE AIA 
The minimum and maximum estimations of total LTO emissions from 
aircrafts at the AIA are shown both in Table 4 and in Figure 7. As seen in 
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Table 4, the amount of total aircraft emissions are estimated to be between 
3778 and 4254 tons per year and the rate of the estimated maximum total 
emissions to the estimated minimum total emissions is around 1.17. Both 
estimations in Table 4 show that the international flights cause around 67% 
of the amount of emissions from all flights.  
Table 4. Maximum and minimum estimates of landing and take off emissions at the 
Ataturk International Airport, Istanbul, Turkey, 2001 (DHMI, 2002) 
 HC CO NOX SO2 Total 
Estimated amount 
of LTO emissions 
from domestic 
flights  (tons/year) 
Min 109.90 684.24 424.35 22.56 1,241.05 
Max 150.69 795.62 444.32 22.46 1,413.10 
Estimated amount 
of LTO emissions 
from international 
flights (tons/year) 
Min 261.91 1,394.81 835.88 44.08 2,536.68 
Max 346.91 1,593.51 856.36 44.45 2,841.22 
Estimated total 
amount of LTO 
emissions 
(tons/year) 
Min 371.80 2,079.05 1,260.23 66.56 3,777.64 
Max 497.60 2,389.13 1,300.68 66.56 4,253.97 
International 
flights (%) 
Min 70.44 67.09 66.33 66.23 67.15 
Max 69.72 66.70 65.84 66.78 66.79 
HC – hydrocarbons, CO – carbon monoxide, NOX – nitrogen oxides, SO2 – sulphur dioxide 
Figure 6. Distribution of aircraft types in use at the Ataturk International Airport, 
Istanbul, Turkey, 2001 (DHMI, 2002) 
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Figure 7. Maximum and minimum estimates of the distribution of aircraft emissions for 
each of the four landing and take-off cycle operation modes, at Turkish airports (DHMI, 
2002) 
 
The distribution of aircraft emissions for different operation modes 
shown in Figure 7 shows that the taxiing mode has the biggest portion of 
LTO emissions, which is around 72%. The second biggest portion of around 
15% belongs to the climb mode, which is found to be the same for all other 
Turkish airports.  
The distribution of emissions from each type of aircrafts is shown in 
Figure 8. As mentioned above half of the aircraft movements at the AIA are 
with a Boeing 737. Despite this, movement of Boeing 737s has a smaller 
fraction of total emissions of between 31% (maximum) and 35% 
(minimum). Using the emission estimations in Turkey (Kaygusuz, 2003) it 
can be said that the aircraft LTO cycles at the AIA produce 0.15% of NOX 
and 0.13% CO in Turkey. 
Figure 8. Maximum and minimum estimates of the distribution of landing and take-off 
cycle emissions for aircraft types in use at Turkish airports (DHMI, 2002) 
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ESTIMATING FUTURE EMISSIONS: PEAK DAY EMISSIONS AT 
THE AIA 
Emissions from aircrafts contribute to pollution of the atmosphere. 
Although that pollution is a relatively small part of global human pollution 
(less than 3% in 1990), further emission reductions need to be achieved by 
the air transport community, since air traffic has a growth (3% to 5% per 
year), which exceeds the technology improvement rate. The longer-term 
prospects for the aeronautics industry are very promising. Market projections 
indicate that 15,000 to 16,000 new aircraft will be delivered over the next 
twenty years, significantly in excess of the number required to simply 
replace ageing air transport. Pollutants from air traffic are emitted at high 
altitudes, in the upper troposphere/lower stratosphere (8 to 12 kilometres), 
where they are of greater influence than those emitted at ground level. In 
spite of the aircraft engine industry having achieved 40% CO2 emission 
reduction without degrading of NOX emissions during the last forty years, 
further technological improvements are needed. Increasing engine efficiency 
of modern gas turbines with higher turbine inlet pressure and temperature 
conditions tends to increase the quantity of NOX generated per unit of fuel 
burn. 
Aviation fuel production grew by about 2.6% annually from 1981 to 
1997. For the future, global passenger air travel, as measured in revenue per 
passenger-kilometre, is expected to grow by about 5% per year between 
1990 and 2015, whereas total aviation fuel use, including passenger freight, 
and military, is projected to increase by 3% per year, over the same period 
(Schumann, 2000). 
A projection to estimate the number of aircraft movements at the 
Turkish airports from 2001 to 2006 shows that the air traffic at the AIA will 
grow by about 25% (SPO, 2001). To estimate the amount of aircraft 
emissions at the AIA for 2006 the following approximation is used. As 
mentioned above, around 80,000 LTO cycles (220 LTO cycles daily on 
average) occurred at the AIA in the year 2001. These LTO cycles cause a 
total amount of emissions of 10.35 tons at minimum and 11.66 tons at 
maximum on an average day. To estimate future emissions, this average per 
day result is compared with the peak day emissions in the year 2001. The 
peak day was August 30, 2001, and on this day 275 LTO cycles occurred. 
This value corresponds to an increase of 25% in LTO cycles. 
The calculated amount of LTO emissions for the peak day is listed in 
Table 5. It can be seen from Table 5 that an increase of 25% in LTO cycles 
causes an increase in emissions of around 31% to 33%. This increase in 
emissions can also be expected for emission estimation at the AIA in 2006.  
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Table 5. Maximum and minimum estimates of landing and take off emissions for average 
and peak day (DHMI, 2002) 
 HC CO NOx SO2 Total 
Estimated amount 
of emissions on 
an average day 
(tons/day) 
Min 1.0186 5.6960 3.4527 0.1826 10.3499 
Max 1.3633 6.5456 3.5635 0.1833 11.6557 
Estimated amount 
of emissions on 
the peak day 
(tons/day) 
Min 1.4987 7.6974 4.3833 0.2323 13.8167 
Max 1.9328 8.6277 4.5501 0.2334 15.3440 
Estimated rate of 
emission amounts 
between the peak 
day and an 
average day (%) 
Min 147.13 135.14 127.10 127.25 133.50 
Max 141.77 131.81 127.69 127.25 131.64 
HC – hydrocarbons, CO – carbon monoxide, NOX – nitrogen oxides, SO2 – sulphur dioxide 
Peak day used for calculations was August 30, 2001. 
It could be roughly estimated that motor vehicles in Istanbul emitted 
71,181 tons of NOX in 1994 (Istanbul Research Department, 1995). In 
comparison, the amount of NOX emissions from aircrafts at the AIA is only 
approximately 1.8% of NOX emissions from motor vehicles in Istanbul in 
this same period. On the other hand, Kesgin and Vardar (2001) estimate that 
ships at Istanbul Strait emitted 7,064 tons of NOX in 1997. In comparison, 
the aircrafts at the AIA emit only 18% as much NOX as do the ships at 
Istanbul Strait. These results are comparable to the values in the literature 
(IPCC, 1990; Perl et al., 1997; Schumann, 2000). Schumann (2000), for 
example, reports that aviation contributes only about 2% of total NOX 
emissions. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
The estimation of exhaust gas emissions of aircraft LTO cycles at 
Turkish airports has not been presented before. This study is based on the 
flight data, which includes the type and number of aircraft, number of 
passengers, and cargo volume by date and time. For the emission 
calculations, we used the ICAO Engine Exhaust Emissions Data Bank, 
which includes minimum and maximum values for both fuel flow rates and 
emissions factors. The minimum and maximum values from the data bank 
allowed us to estimate the minimum and maximum amount of emissions. 
The estimations of emissions were investigated for all Turkish airports 
including the biggest airports, that is, AIA, Antalya Airport in Antalya and 
Esenboga Airport in Ankara.  
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As a result, we draw the following conclusions from this study: 
  
1. Total LTO emissions from aircrafts at Turkish airports are 
estimated to be between 7,614 and 8,338 tons per year. 
Approximately half of these amounts will be produced at the AIA. 
2. Total aircraft LTO emissions at the AIA are estimated to be 
between 3,778 and 4,254 tons per year.  
3. International flights at the AIA emit 67% of total LTO emissions 
from aircraft. 
4. A decrease of 2 minutes in taxiing time results in a decrease of 
approximately 6% of LTO emissions. 
5. It has been estimated that an increase of 25% in LTO cycles might 
cause 31 to 33% more emissions.  
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GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ISO 
14001 AT AIRPORTS 
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ABSTRACT 
Today, many companies are subject to environmental regulations. A growing 
awareness of the impact of activities on the environment has created a greater need 
to take into account environmental factors in air transport. For that reason, an 
increasing number of corporations around the world are certifying their 
environmental management systems (EMS) by the ISO 14000 series standards.  
Improving the environmental performance of corporations is one way of limiting 
the environmental damage. EMS provide a framework for organizations that wish 
to effectively manage their environmental affairs. Implementing an EMS that 
conforms to the ISO 14001 standard may help businesses to integrate environmental 
values into their operations.  
This paper is intended to provide guidance to airports for the development and 
implementation of an EMS and assistance in meeting the requirements of ISO 
14001. We show that improving the environmental performance of airports through 
ISO 14001 can reduce the negative environmental effects. To achieve a more 
environmentally friendly business practice, airports must develop internal 
management processes that integrate environmental objectives into day-to-day 
operations.  
INTRODUCTION 
This study intends to stress the increasing worldwide awareness of the 
environmental impacts of air transportation. As a first step, a survey, 
questioning the goals and capabilities of environmental studies, was sent to 
international airports in Turkey. The results show that environmental issues 
at airports are not regarded as an important concern in Turkey. This paper 
intends to guide airports to prepare their own environmental management 
system (EMS) for the sustainability of aviation. 
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ISO 14000 
The adoption of EMS as frameworks for integrating corporate 
environmental protection policies, programs, and practices is growing among 
domestic and multinational companies around the world. Many multinational 
corporations have designed, certified, and implemented EMS under ISO 
14001 because it provides a harmonized standard for managing a 
corporation’s environmental impacts. ISO 14001 is a set of guidelines by 
which a facility—a single plant or a whole organization—can establish or 
strengthen its environmental policy, identify environmental aspects of its 
operations, define environmental objectives and targets, implement a 
program to attain environmental performance goals, monitor and measure 
effectiveness, correct deficiencies problems and review its management 
systems to promote continuous improvement.  
ISO 14000 embodies a new approach to environmental protection. It 
challenges each organization to take stock of its environmental aspects, 
establish its own objectives and targets, commit itself to effective, and 
reliable processes and continual improvement, and bring all employees and 
managers into a system of shared and enlightened awareness and personal 
responsibility for the environmental performance of the organization 
(Cascio, Woodside & Mitchell, 1996). 
ISO 14001, the foundation of the entire ISO 14000 series, is a proactive 
environmental protection strategy in which regulatory compliance is one of 
the elements of a more inclusive and all-encompassing approach. ISO 14001, 
the EMS standard, provides a framework to direct the use of organizational 
resources to full breadth of actual and potential environmental impacts 
through reliable management processes and a base of educated and 
committed employees.  
The globalization of environmental problems and rise of sustainable 
development has focused attention on environmental degradation outward 
from the developed to the developing regions of the world. These two issues 
have also contributed to the increased pace of adopting ISO 1000 and 
systematic EMS policies (Mohamed, 2001). 
The ISO 14000 standards are voluntary standards created by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ISO has over 100 
member countries represented mainly by industry and government standards 
groups (SAIC, 2003). ISO got its start just after World War II and is a non-
governmental, international organization based in Geneva.  
The term iso is a Greek word meaning equal. The term is well suited for 
the organization, since its main focus is to provide standardization on an 
international level. ISO focuses almost exclusively on product and safety 
standards. These technical standards have a great value over the years and 
have enhanced international commerce, product uniformity, and 
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interconnectivity. All the standards that ISO develop are voluntary. Since 
ISO is non-governmental, it has no authority to impose its standards on any 
country or organization (Cascio et al., 1996). 
During the 1980s, ISO embarked on a task to standardize one aspect of 
organizational management—quality management. This was the first time 
that ISO had ventured to create standards that were not essentially 
technically based and/or scientifically based. Technical Committee 176 was 
given the challenge to develop these quality management standards. The ISO 
9000 series were completed in 1987. These standards have been adopted and 
recognized worldwide as adding value to organizations’ quality management 
programs. During the same period, ozone depletion, global warming, 
deforestation, and other environmental issues were being viewed as global 
problems. Additional factors beyond the success of its ISO 9000 standards 
came into play in ISO’s decision to develop environmental management 
standards. 
In 1991, the United Nations (UN) announced its Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), commonly known as the Earth 
Summit, to be held in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Conference 
representatives asked ISO to participate and make a commitment at the 
UNCED to create international environmental standards. In mid-1991, on the 
basis of this request, ISO formed an advisory group named the Strategic 
Advisory Group on the Environment (SAGE) (Cascio et al., 1996). 
ISO 14000 is a set of international standards for improving the 
environmental performance of organizations. It includes the new standard for 
EMS called ISO 14001. This standard was published in 1996, so it is new on 
the international scene. Some countries and companies are quickly 
embracing it, while others are waiting to see if it becomes a requirement for 
doing international business and if there are benefits to adopting it (Haklik, 
2003). 
ISO 14000 can be divided into two separate areas. The first deals with 
organizations’ management and evaluation systems; and the second with 
environmental tools for product evaluation. In the former; Environmental 
Management System-ISO 14001, Environmental Auditing-ISO 14010, and 
Environmental Performance Evaluation-ISO 14031 are the standards used 
for organization evaluation; whereas, in the latter; Environmental Aspects in 
Product Standards-ISO 14060, Environmental Labeling-ISO 14020, and Life 
Cycle Assessment-ISO 14040 which correspond to the product evaluation 
(Cascio et al., 1996). 
ISO 14000 standard series can be considered as a double-edged tool 
providing tangible and intangible benefits to the government/regulatory 
agencies—such as the Environmental Protection Agency—and the 
organizations themselves. The standard aim of ISO 14000 is to assist ISO 
52 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
itself and organizations in procuring objectives such as the following (Zutshi 
and Sohal, 2002):  
 
1. Reduce waste, resource depletion and environmental pollution; 
2. Design products for minimizing environmental impact in product 
use and disposal; 
3. Control environmental impact of raw material sourcing and new 
product development; 
4. Promote environmental awareness among employees and within the 
community; 
5. Provide a platform for companies to demonstrate their commitment 
to environmental protection; 
6. Help management pursue continual improvement in environmental 
performance; 
7. Provide a worldwide focus on environmental management; 
8. Harmonize national environmental rules, labels, and methods; 
9. Demonstrate a commitment to moving beyond regulatory 
compliance; and 
10. Improve global environmental management and promote 
sustainable development through trade and minimize environmental 
trade barriers.   
ISO 14001 
Environmental management in the context of ISO 14000 means what an 
organization does to minimize harmful effects on the environment caused by 
its activities. It is a stated objective of the ISO to support the objective of 
sustainable development that emerged from the UNCED (Ball, 2002). The 
first of the ISO 14000 series of standards—ISO 14001—was issued in 
September 1996 (Bansal & Bogner, 2002) and is a voluntary international 
standard that establishes the requirements for an EMS. The objective is for 
an organization to establish an EMS that is integrated with its core business. 
An EMS is a comprehensive process to identify, prioritize, and manage an 
organization’s environmental aspects and impacts. A successful EMS 
improves environmental protection, reduces total costs of environmental 
management, and improves productivity (SAIC, 2003). On November 15th, 
the ISO published ISO 14001:2004. ISO 14001:2004 EMS specifications 
with guidance for use outlines requirements for an EMS that controls the 
impact of an organization’s activities. This replaces the current version, ISO 
14001:1996, which will expire on May 15, 2006, allowing organizations18 
months to complete the transition. (TUVAMERICA, 2005) 
Some firms are using ISO 14000 guidelines to develop new EMS, or to 
adopt their environmental practices to the international standard, without 
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formally certifying them. Other corporations, government agencies and 
environmental interest groups are skeptical about the real impacts of ISO 
14000 certification and either ignore the guidelines or question their 
effectiveness in improving environmental performance. But increasing 
number of corporations are, through external registrars, formally certifying 
their EMS based on ISO 14000 standards or the European Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme (Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000). 
An EMS dictates requirements for the organization’s structure, 
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources, so that 
responsible corporate environmental management is institutionalized in the 
organization. Currently, there are several certifiable EMS, including a British 
standard (BS7750) and European standard (Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme-EMAS). 
ISO 140001 has the widest geographical and industry coverage of any 
EMS certification system. Generally speaking, the wider the application of 
the standard, the more flexible and the less stringent its requirements are. For 
example, EMAS requires that the environmental policy programs be made 
public; whereas, ISO 14001 only requires disclosure of the firm’s 
environmental policy (Bansal & Bogner, 2002). 
In brief, ISO 14001 and EMAS have different aims. ISO 14001 provides 
guidelines to be implemented by almost any type of organization in any 
country and it was designed primarily to improve management. EMAS on 
the other hand, is designed to bring about changes in environmental 
performance (Morrow & Rondinelli, 2002). 
ISO 14001 does not set performance standards. Instead, ISO 14001 
focuses on management processes rather than specific environmental 
outcomes. If the firm meets the management system requirements dictated 
by the standard then it can register its conformance with a third party (Bansal 
& Bogner, 2002). 
To crystallize the concept of an EMS, the following lists summarize 
several different definitions that have been used to describe them. An EMS 
is (Yarnell, 1999): 
 
1. An organizational rather than a technical approach to environmental 
management; 
2. A complement to government regulations; 
3. Part of the larger management system of an organization; and 
4. Formally structured and rigorous.  
EMSs are concerned with:  
1. The environmental management of individual organizations; and 
2. An ongoing attempt to consistently achieve high standards of 
environmental performance and to improve upon them.     
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Benefits of ISO 14001 
In broad terms, ISO 14001 can fill two requirements in an organization. 
The first requirement is the internal need for a system that will help the 
organization address all of the legal, commercial and other challenges related 
to the environment that face it. The second requirement is the need to be able 
to assure those individuals holding an interest in the company that the 
organization is meeting its stated environmental policies.  
More specifically, companies often have to demonstrate that their 
products and services meet certain conditions. This is exactly what standards 
do efficiently, especially when combined with third party conformity 
assessment programs. They reduce or eliminate the need for companies to 
individually inspect each supplier’s products or services with its own 
auditors. International standards such as the ISO 14001 series provide the 
widest possible recognition of this assurance.  
Based on this discussion, some major benefits from ISO 14001 
registrations can be established and a list of these is presented in Table 1. 
(Petroni, 2001) 
Table 1. Potential Benefits of ISO 14001 
 
Increased market share  access to international markets  increase domestic market share 
Improved working 
climate 
 employees motivation 
 employees responsibility 
 corporation between management and employees 
Improved customer 
satisfaction 
 increase product quality 
 assurance of conformity 
Improved efficiency of 
operations and processes 
 administrative efficiency 
 manufacturing efficiency 
Cost reduction 
 reduction of environmental management costs 
 materials savings 
 reduction of other operating costs 
Improved image and 
reputation 
 by regulators 
 by customers 
 by shareholders and other investors 
Improved risk 
management practices 
 improve risk analysis capabilities 
 improved emergency preparedness of specific 
pollution prevention projects 
 increase in the attitude towards environmental 
responsibility 
 enhance regulatory compliance 
Adapted from “Developing a methodology for analysis of benefits and shortcomings of ISO 
14001 registration: Lessons from experience of a large machinery manufacturer,” by A. 
Petroni, 2001, Journal of Cleaner Production, 9(4), 351-362. Adapted with permission of the 
author. 
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Limitations of ISO 14001 
Though the ISO 14000 series has benefited from ISO’s experience in 
introducing the quality management standards known as the ISO 9000 series, 
there are several concerns about ISO 14001 that may limit its overall 
acceptance. These potential limitations of ISO 14001 are listed in Table 2. 
(Yarnell, 1999) 
 
Table 2. Potential Limitations of ISO 14001 
 
 Costs of training, documentation, process modification, registration fee, 
registration maintenance, organizational adaptation. 
 Ensuring consistency among ISO registrars will prove difficult. 
 Interpreting terms such as ‘environmental aspects’ and environmental aspects of 
a company ‘over which it can be expected to have an influence’. 
 Revoking of certification, based on third party audits, may not be reliable. 
 Measuring environmental performance is nor done, only conformance to the 
EMS. 
 Implementing an EMS may have costs that are too high for small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
 Allowing for self-declaration may create a wide variation among systems. 
 Creating a nontariff trade barriers through certification is a possibly, especially 
if the standard becomes mandated rather than voluntary. 
 Varying international rigor of environmental laws and enforcement may lessen 
the utility of the standard. 
 Increasing liability is a potential through the subpoena of EMS records. 
 Resisting change frequently occurs within organizations and presents barriers to 
implementation.  
Adapted from “Implementing an ISO 14001 environmental management system: A case study 
of environmental training and awareness at the Vancouver International Airport Authority, by P. 
Yarnell, 1999, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, Simon Fraser University. Adapted with 
permission of the author. 
ELEMENTS OF ISO 14001 
Henry Fayol suggested that successful management needed to follow a 
system that involved these principles; plan, organize, commend, coordinate, 
and control. A better-known model of management systems is called the 
plan-do-check-act cycle developed in the 1930s by Dr. Walter Shewart and 
sometimes referred to as the Demming Cycle since its reintroduction in the 
1950s. ISO 14001 refers to these management principles in the context of 
continual improvement. The content of ISO 14001, presenting the five core 
elements, called environmental policy; planning; implementation and 
operation; checking and corrective action; and management review, is 
illustrated in Figure 1 (Yarnell, 1999). 
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Figure 1. Elements of ISO 14001 
 
Adapted from “Implementing an ISO 14001 environmental management system: A case study 
of environmental training and awareness at the Vancouver International Airport Authority, by P. 
Yarnell, 1999, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, Simon Fraser University. Adapted with 
permission of the author. 
The intent of an ISO 14001 EMS is to develop a systematic 
management approach to the environmental concerns of the organization. 
The expected outcome of this approach is continual improvement in 
environmental management. 
By setting an environmental policy, then making the environmental 
concerns of the firm clear (aspects) and defining what will be done to control 
them (objectives and targets), planning is accomplished. Then by 
establishing organizational structure, personnel responsibilities, competency 
and training, implementation begins. Communication practices, 
documentation control and procedural documents, operational control and 
emergency preparedness define the operation portion of the program. These 
items are usually included in an EMS Manual. These along with routine 
systems audits and record keeping constitute the EMS checking and 
corrective action program. And finally, the program has a routine 
management review of its activities (Martin, 1998). 
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Environmental Policy  
Environmental Policy is the starting point for setting the organization’s 
EMS objectives and targets. The environmental policy is the documented 
statement of commitment from top management. This policy sets the overall 
EMS intentions of the organization and contains a commitment to the 
prevention of pollution and to continuous improvement. Each environmental 
policy is unique to an organization, is communicated to all employees and is 
made available to the public. (MGMT, 2004) 
Planning  
Planning is the stage where the requirements that an organization must 
meet are determined, the objectives and targets are set, and the programs to 
achieve the targets and objectives are developed. 
Environmental aspects 
 An organization needs to review its operations, activities, products and 
services to identify those that may have an interaction with the environment. 
This identification of the environmental aspects includes those that occur 
during normal business operations, abnormal conditions, incidents and future 
activities. When the aspects are identified, the organizations need to 
determine which aspects have or can have a significant impact on the 
environment. 
Legal and other requirements 
The organization must identify and have access to legal and other 
requirements that apply to the organization’s environmental aspects. 
Objectives and targets 
 Environmental objectives and targets need to be developed, 
documented and communicated through the organization. Objectives are 
long-term goals, such as “we will reduce solid waste to landfill,” and targets 
are short-term goals, such as “we will reduce non-hazardous waste by 50% 
and reduce waste by 80% this year.” Targets will generally vary throughout 
the various functions in an organization depending on the activities, products 
and services. 
Environmental management programs  
One or more programs are needed by the organization for achieving 
objectives and targets. These programs assign responsibility throughout the 
organization for achieving objectives and targets, and specify the means and 
time frame by which they will be achieved. (MGMT, 2004) 
Implementation and Operation  
For effective implementation, an organization should develop the 
capabilities and support mechanism necessary to achieve its environmental 
policy, objectives and targets (DENIX, 2005). 
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Structure and responsibility 
 Roles, responsibilities and authorities of personnel whose activities 
have or may have an impact on the environment need to be defined, 
documented and communicated throughout the organization. The 
organization must provide adequate resources for the implementation and 
maintenance of the EMS. One or more individuals need to be appointed by 
top management as the management representative(s). Irrespective of other 
responsibilities, the management representatives are given the responsibility 
for ensuring that the EMS complies with ISO 14001 and for reporting the 
performance of the EMS to the top management.  
Training, awareness and competence  
The organization needs to identify training requirements of personnel 
whose work may create a significant impact upon the environment and 
ensure that these personnel have received appropriate training. Awareness is 
required for all personnel throughout the organization of the environmental 
policy, the EMS program and procedures, and the actual or potential impact 
of their activities on the environment. 
Communication  
The relevant information on environmental aspects and the EMS 
requirements must be communicated throughout the organization including 
communication between different functions and levels of the organization, 
and externally interested parties.  
EMS documentation 
Information must be developed and maintained to describe basics of the 
EMS, the interaction of the EMS, and to provide direction to related 
documentation. This information may be paper-based, electronic or other 
media. 
Document control 
EMS documentation needs to be controlled to ensure that the current 
versions of the documents are available wherever the work activities or tasks 
are to be performed. The documents must be reviewed on a regular basis, 
revised as needed and approved before issuing or reissuing. Obsolete 
documents must be removed or otherwise safeguarded against inadvertent 
use. Documents may be in paper-based, electronic or using other media. 
Operational control 
Processes and activities that can have a significant impact on the 
environment and that are relevant to the organization’s policy; objectives and 
targets need to be identified. The organization must ensure that these 
operations are conducted as intended by planning these activities to ensure 
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that they are carried out under controlled conditions. Controlled conditions 
may include documented procedures containing operating criteria.  
Emergency preparedness and response 
The organization needs to identify its potential for accidents and 
emergency situations. The organization must have procedures for the 
appropriate response to accidents and emergency situations, which include 
the prevention and mitigation associated with the environmental impact. 
Emergency plans and procedures need to be developed, communicated and 
tested to help the organization in ensuring that internal and external 
personnel effectively respond to any unexpected incidents. (MGMT, 2004) 
Checking and Corrective Action  
An organization should measure, monitor and evaluate its environmental 
performance to ensure continuous improvements (DENIX, 2005). 
Monitoring and measuring 
Characteristics of operations and activities, which can have a significant 
impact on the environment, need to be monitored and measured regularly. 
Records of monitoring and measurement information are required to track 
performance, to prove that operating controls were effective and to 
demonstrate conformance with objectives and targets. Monitoring and 
measurements results need to be compared to the legal and other 
requirements to determine compliance. Any equipment used for monitoring 
and measurement must be capable of the accuracy required and calibrated on 
a regular basis. 
Nonconformance and corrective/preventive action 
Responsibility and authority needs to be defined for dealing with 
nonconformance found in the EMS including the actions to be taken to 
mitigate any impact caused and to initiate corrective and preventive action. 
Corrective and preventive action taken must be proportional to the 
magnitude of the actual or potential nonconformance. 
Records 
Records relating to the EMS must be identified, collected, stored and 
maintained to provide objective evidence of conformance to the ISO 14001 
standard, and to legal and other requirements. These records include training 
records, EMS audit results, management review records and the result of 
monitoring and measurement.  
EMS audit  
Audits of the EMS are required on a periodic basis to provide assurance 
to the organization of EMS implementation, to determine if the EMS is 
operating as planned, to provide information for management review and to 
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determine the capability of the EMS in achieving the organizations 
environmental objectives and targets. (MGMT, 2004) 
Management Review  
Management review is the check, by senior management, that the 
system is operating effectively and provides the opportunity to address 
changes that may be required to the EMS. Changes to policies, EMS, 
objectives or targets may be required due to changes in stakeholders’ 
expectations, altering business operations, advances in technology, results in 
audits, or for continual improvement (Tibor & Feldman, 2003). 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ISO 14001 AT AIRPORTS 
The aviation industry has not seen heightened environmental scrutiny 
and regulation to the same degree that many other industries have 
experienced. This is due to a number of reasons, including: critical safety 
issues, the cost of aircraft technology, and the complexity of the global 
aviation industry, especially as related to the national and international 
control of regulations. It may also be due to a general reluctance to burden 
the industry with expensive and time-consuming environmental programs 
because of the key role that aviation plays in the infrastructure of modern 
society. Also, the aviation industry has not had a critical environmental 
disaster. 
Air travel is growing rapidly and many major airports are planning 
physical and operational expansions. Airports have considerable effects on 
natural environment, and large numbers of people live in close proximity to 
airports. Airport operations can adversely affect their neighboring 
communities with the generation of noise and air pollution as well as through 
water contamination. Airports occupy relatively large areas of land and may 
detrimentally affect competing land uses, such as: other commercial uses, 
agriculture, fisheries and wildlife habitat, including endangered species, and 
recreation. 
Most large airports in the world show some commitment to 
environmental management and also have some environmental experts on 
staff. In recent years airport managers have been considering whether to 
implement EMS that would satisfy the specifications of ISO 14001. This 
may be due to the increased presence of standards like ISO 14001 and the 
increased public and regulatory scrutiny that airports are receiving (Yarnell, 
1999). 
Initial Environmental Review 
Top management support 
The successful development and implementation of an EMS is 
predicated on top management’s support, commitment, and foresight. 
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Significant investment in the airport’s human, financial, and technological 
resources will be required to complete the EMS development and 
implementation and to realize the benefits. Top management’s support must 
not end with the provision of resources. They must take an active role in 
developing EMS and supporting and reviewing the implementation of 
activities. 
EMS boundaries 
Before starting the process of EMS development and implementation, 
the airport must define the scope of its EMS. For airports, the scope of the 
EMS should be defined, at minimum, in terms of physical (geographical) 
boundaries and organizational boundaries. The physical boundaries of the 
EMS should be set to include all lands and buildings owned and/or managed 
by the airport, and may include off-site areas that are associated with 
significant environmental aspects, such as nearby wetlands and water 
sources, nearby bird habitats, and the noise template. Organizational 
boundaries should be set to include all of the airport organization itself, such 
that all activities, products, and services under the direct management of the 
airport will be subject to the EMS. The boundaries may also extend to 
include airport users, tenants, contractors, suppliers and other organizations 
sharing the facilities.  
Consultation with other parties  
The objective of consultation with interested parties is to identify any of 
their concerns that may influence the design of the EMS. Interested parties, 
individuals or groups concerned with or affected by the performance of an 
organization, may include government agencies, neighbors, the public, 
lenders, insurers, industrial associations, tenants, and suppliers (CSA, 1999). 
Review of past environmental performance  
The objective of the review of past environmental performance is to 
identify areas of strength and weakness in existing environmental 
management programs. This information will help when developing or 
modifying environmental management programs to meet the requirements of 
ISO 14001. The information will also be useful when developing the 
airport’s environmental policy (CSA, 1999). 
EMS gap analysis  
A gap analysis allows for a quick but comprehensive assessment of the 
existing environmental management practices and procedures and also 
compares them with requirements of the standards (Martin, 1998). A gap 
analysis illustrates how far the airport’s operations are from achieving ISO 
14001 certification. A gap analysis is a good way to introduce EMS to the 
employees (SAIC, 2003). 
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Environmental Policy 
The environmental policy should be appropriate to airport’s mission, 
vision and values and complies with environmental regulations. Top 
management is responsible for setting environmental policy (Martin, 1998). 
Environmental Planning 
Many airports have existing planning and management systems that can 
fit well into an EMS context. An EMS provides a systematic means for 
integrating environmental issues into all management actions, strengthening 
the organizational planning (Short & Sullivan, 2003). 
Environmental aspect 
The airport should identify all operational activities and identify the real 
or potential environmental impacts that may occur as a result of each 
activity. It is important to consider normal operations, emergency situations, 
and startup and shutdown activities, since different environmental impacts 
may be associated with each category of activity (CSA, 1999). 
Legal and other requirements  
The airport management should identify the minimum environmental 
performance and environmental protection measures required by national 
and international regulatory agencies and expected by others, such as 
industry associations, standards-setting organizations, and surrounding 
communities. These requirements and expectations will need to be 
considered and addressed when developing the operational controls, training 
programs, emergency response programs, communication procedures, 
monitoring programs, and record keeping systems for the EMS (CSA, 1999). 
Environmental objectives and targets 
Environmental objectives are overall environmental goal arising from 
the policy that an airport sets to achieve and which is guaranteed where 
practicable (Stapleton, Glover & David, 2001). The targets that accompany 
each objective should describe the desired level of performance with respect 
to the objectives. Targets may be written as the acronym SMARTER, that is, 
to meet the following criteria of being Specific and simple; Measurable; 
Achievable; Realistic and reasonable; Time-bounded; Economic; and 
Related or normalized to a base year and levels of production, traffic, 
staffing.  
These criteria indicate that targets should be established by taking into 
account the circumstances of the airport’s business, including financial, 
technical, and human resource limitations. Table 3 outlines how some typical 
airport environmental objectives are developed from typical airport 
significant environmental aspects (CSA, 1999). 
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Table 3. Significant  environmental aspects of a typical airport and possible environmental 
objectives and targets 
Activity, 
product or 
service 
Environmental 
interaction 
Potential 
impact 
Sample objective Sample 
target 
Aircraft de-
icing 
operations 
 
De-icing 
chemicals 
entering the 
surface water 
runoff or sewer 
discharges 
Elevated BOD 
in discharge 
effluent-
negative 
impact on 
aquatic life 
To reduce the 
impact to surface 
water bodies by 
reducing the amount 
of glycol released to 
surface water bodies 
and sewer system 
50% of the 
regulated 
limit for 
BOD within 
two years 
Runway/taxi
way/apron 
de-icing 
operations 
De-icing 
fluid storage 
Potential for 
large volume 
of de-icing 
chemicals 
entering the 
surface water 
runoff or sewer 
discharges 
To reduce the 
impact to surface 
water bodies by 
reducing the amount 
of glycol released to 
surface water bodies 
and sewer system 
50% 
reduction in 
the number 
of 
accidental 
releases 
Petroleum 
product 
storage 
Potential for 
large volume 
of petroleum 
products 
entering the 
surface water 
runoff or sewer 
discharges 
Elevated TOC 
and volatile 
organic 
compounds in 
discharge 
effluent- 
negative 
impact on 
aquatic life 
To reduce the 
impact to surface 
water bodies by 
reducing the amount 
of petroleum 
released to surface 
water bodies and 
sewer system 
50% 
reduction in 
the number 
of 
accidental 
releases 
With the permission of Canadian Standards Association, material is reproduced from CSA 
Standard, Plus 1147 guide to the implementation of ISO 14001 at airports, which is copyrighted 
by Canadian Standards Association, 178 Rexdale Blvd.Toronto, Ontario, M9W 1R3  
Implementation and Operation 
An airport can achieve continuous improvement in its environmental 
performance through implementation of its environmental program (Short & 
Sullivan, 2003). 
Structure and responsibility  
To implement EMS effectively, the airport should establish roles and 
responsibilities, appropriate lines and methods of communication for 
environmental management and provide adequate resources (Stapleton et al., 
2001). 
Training awareness and competence  
Airport employees should clearly understand their environmental roles 
and responsibilities. Top management defines and documents the 
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responsibilities, authorities and interrelationships of all key environmental 
personnel. An organization chart will be helpful for illustrating many of the 
responsibilities. The key roles that effect environmental performance should 
be included in the employee’s job description and performance evaluation 
(Martin, 1998). 
Communication  
The airport must clearly identify what information must be transmitted 
to a decision maker, and how it will be communicated, so that he or she can 
decide, for example, whether to release impounded storm water, and how the 
approval to release it will be transmitted to the technician. Communication 
with external but related parties, such as contractors, suppliers and tenants, is 
also required. Airport activities have the potential to impact external parties, 
so this element of the EMS is of particular importance to airports. External 
communication processes that may be appropriate for an airport include 
community consultation; complaint handling; liaison with contractors, 
suppliers, tenants, and users; liaison with regulatory agencies; involvement 
in airport industry associations; and public information programs (CSA, 
1999). 
EMS documentation and document control 
The airport is encouraged to integrate environmental procedures into 
existing operating and maintenance procedures as much as possible to 
minimize the volume or complexity of EMS documentation. Document 
control procedures are of a generic nature, and may already exist in another 
context in the airport’s business management system. It may be possible to 
use the existing procedure to satisfy the requirements of ISO 14001 (CSA, 
1999). 
Operational control 
Documented procedures and work instructions may be required for 
numerous airport activities. These procedures may take the form of step-by-
step instructions that lead an operator through an activity in a manner 
consistent with the direction provided by the environmental policy. For 
example, if an airport has determined there is a significant potential for 
overspray and loss of de-icing fluid, procedures should be developed for the 
de-icing process. The required documented procedure need not be a stand-
alone procedure; it may be part of an operating or maintenance procedure. 
Through their own activities, products, and services, suppliers, 
contractors, and tenants have the potential to affect the performance of the 
airport’s EMS. As well, the airport may incur legal, financial, and/or public 
relations liabilities as a result of the actions of these parties. Appropriate 
operational controls need to be developed and communicated to these parties 
to preclude undesirable results (CSA, 1999). 
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Emergency preparedness and response 
An effective emergency preparation and response program can reduce 
the possibility of accidents and other emergency situations (Stapleton et al., 
2001). Each emergency situation, such as aircraft crashes or fires, currently 
described in the airport’s emergency procedures should be assessed for 
potential environmental impacts. Procedures for prevention and mitigation of 
these impacts will form part of the emergency response plan (CSA, 1999). 
Checking and Corrective Action 
To achieve its business objectives, a responsible airport should measure 
its performance in achieving its targets and objectives with regard to its 
operations (Short & Sullivan, 2003).  
Monitoring and measuring 
This step enables an airport to evaluate its environmental performance, 
analyze root causes of problems, assess compliance with legal requirements, 
identify areas requiring corrective action, improve performance, and increase 
efficiency (Stapleton et al., 2001).  
Nonconformance and corrective/preventive action  
An airport should establish and maintain procedures for handling and 
investigating nonconformance, taking action to mitigate impacts and 
corrective/preventive actions. According to the procedures corrective or 
preventive actions could be implemented (Short & Sullivan, 2003). 
Records  
An airport should establish and maintain procedures for the 
identification, maintenance and disposition of environmental records 
including training and audit records. The records should be legible, 
identifiable, traceable and protected from loss and damage (Short & 
Sullivan, 2003). 
EMS audit  
The required audit program should set out how audits will be conducted 
at the airport, how they are to be managed, and how results are to be 
reported. The audit program should be based on the environmental 
importance of the activity concerned and the results of previous audit. (CSA, 
1999).  
Management Review 
ISO 1401 requires that the airport’s top management, at appropriate 
intervals, conduct a management review of the EMS to ensure its continuing 
suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness. That is, they are to determine if the 
EMS is enabling the airport to achieve the desired results and benefits, and if 
it continues to suit the airport’s business needs. Based on the findings of this 
review, top management can identify the actions required to improve the 
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EMS to meet the airport’s environmental policy and commitment to 
continual improvement. ISO 14001 does not stipulate a frequency for 
management reviews. However given the high level of environmental risk 
associated with airport activities and services, it may be appropriate to 
conduct management reviews at least annually and as often as quarterly. 
Management reviews may also be conducted after a significant change in 
airport operations, a significant event or incident, or a particularly major 
nonconformance, to discuss the results, implications, and potential impacts 
on the airport’s environmental performance (CSA, 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
The impacts of local and regional environmental problems on the global 
environment attract great attention today. EMS implementation and 
certification do help companies to integrate their environmental, health and 
safety management systems and in some cases their environmental and 
quality management systems. Among companies operating in international 
markets ISO 14001certification is an indicator of environmental 
responsibility and is often seen as a way of developing competitive 
advantage. 
With so many different companies and interests involved in the day-to-
day operation of airports, environmental management at an airport is a 
complex activity. Airlines, retailers and others who use its facilities create 
the main environmental impacts at an airport. Many airports are now 
introducing EMS to help manage this complexity and develop greater 
involvement by users and tenants.  
Much of what an organization must do in an ISO 14001 EMS is 
probably already implemented to an extent since no airport can operate 
without some environmental programs in place. These programs may need 
modification to comply with the ISO 14001 standard, but they serve as a 
good starting point to begin the construction of an ISO compliant EMS.  A 
good EMS will do two things. First, it will allow the firm to uncover ways in 
which they can reduce its environmental impacts while simultaneously 
reducing costs or increasing productivity. Second, it will coordinate their 
environmental activities to achieve greater organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
The purpose of the ISO 14000 family is the integration of better 
environmental management practices into the business. It fosters self-
organization and self-regulation, which represents the groundwork from 
which continuous improvement of environmental performance can be 
sustained. 
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This paper has been prepared to assist airports in the development of an 
EMS that is consistent with the ISO 140001 standard, and in the 
improvement of the overall environmental performance of airports.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents results of research, whose main objective is the quantification 
of four scenarios for long-term development in aviation and related emissions. The 
research placed special emphasis on constraints relating to infrastructure, regulation 
and assumptions of technology development. Overall scenario results show that 
infrastructure enhancements and noise emissions could be successfully targeted 
with landing charges while a reduction of emissions via fuel tax or a quick 
introduction of hydrogen powered aircraft reduces strongly the profitability of the 
aviation industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attempts to establish future world developments which could limit aviation 
growth is a hotly debated but crucial issue for the aerospace industry which 
is characterised by very long planning cycles (Gudmundsson, 2004). One 
method that has been utilised for this purpose is the scenario approach 
(Shell, 2001; 2002) that has been reported useful to establish different 
strategic options according to different future world pictures (Raskin et al., 
1998; 2002; The Millennium Project, 2002). For the aviation industry several 
projects have been completed that use the scenario approach in different 
contexts: Jarach (2004) used a marketing based scenario approach to assess 
trends in the airline industry; Eelman, Schmitt, Becker and Granzeier (2004) 
used scenarios to establish blended wing-body user configurations; and 
Urbatzka and Wilken (2004) used a scenario approach to assess future 
airport capacity utilization in Germany. In addition to this work a growing 
body of research using scenario approaches has been funded through  
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the European Research Frameworks1 and stakeholder associations such as 
Eurocontrol (ACARE, 2002; Eurocontrol, 2004). The diverse areas of these 
research projects and ground breaking nature, in some respects, necessitate at 
some stage collective or comparative approaches. Hence, the objective of the 
research presented here was to investigate global and aviation specific 
scenarios (i.e., ACARE, 2002; Eurocontrol, 2004; Penner, Lister, Griggs, 
Dokken & McFarland, 1999) to identify drivers and shaping factors; to 
establish possible constraints, future social trends, technology trends and 
other necessary inputs required for quantification; to perform a questionnaire 
survey of aviation experts and stakeholders; and to quantify impacts of 
constraints and amount of emissions for the scenarios with the AERO model2 
(AERO, 2000; Hancox & Lowe, 2000; NLR, 2000). 
The paper that follows presents some of the results of the research 
project, which is funded by the European Community under the title 
Constrained Scenarios on Aviation and Emissions with quantifications up to 
the year 2050 (CONSAVE 2050).  
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
The CONSAVE long term scenarios explore how the global aviation 
system may change over the first half of this century. They consider 
alternative paths focussing on different challenges like infrastructure 
impacts, ecological pressure, fractured markets and low demand. These paths 
are influenced by shaping factors like population and economic growth; and 
drivers like energy availability, consumption, price, technologies, policy 
regulations, citizen preferences and customers values. To develop the 
CONSAVE scenarios, several scenario workshops were held but using the 
same values for gross domestic product (GDP), population and income per 
capita as established by the  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic, N. and R. J. Swart (eds.), 2000). The 
reason was to include some reviewed numbers about external drivers of 
aviation which are important for quantification but not necessitating a need 
of an additional review of basic assumptions. 
The first high growth scenario called Unlimited Skies (ULS) deals with 
the infrastructure constraints of airports and runways. The second high 
growth scenario called Regulatory Push & Pull (RPP) assumes climate 
problems and environmental regulations. One low growth scenario called 
Fractured World (FW) assumes a worldwide fragmentation, dealing with 
                                                 
1 The European Community funds research in various areas in accordance to so called Research 
Frameworks that run over several years. The present Framework is the 6th with the upcoming 7th 
spanning from 2006 to 2010.  
2 The AERO model is the result of the AERO Project, initiated by the Dutch Civil Aviation 
Authority, to analyse engine emissions on a global scale (see AERO, 2000). 
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block building and higher security risks. The other low growth scenario 
called Down to Earth (DtE) focuses on a major value change with regional 
lifestyle and slower mobility.  
Recent forecasts expect a population increase of up to 8 until 9 billion in 
2050, while the World GDP in 2050 is expected to be between 80 and 180 
trillion dollars, based upon an annual GDP growth rate between 2,5 % and 
2,9 %. The quantification process considered these numbers as basic 
assumptions for three of four scenarios. In the FW scenario a lower global 
annual GDP growth rate of 2,3 % was assumed (leading to a lower average 
income per capita but broader regional differences) and an increase of the 
global population to over 11 billion by 2050. All these numbers and 
assumptions are in accordance with the IPCC (Nakicenovic, N. and R. J. 
Swart (eds.), 2000) SRES scenarios with the exception of GDP in the RPP 
scenario. 
 
Table 1. Four scenarios of long-term development in aviation and related emissions 
 
High growth 1: Unlimited Skies (ULS) Infrastructure constraints 
High growth 2: Regulatory Push & Pull (RPP) Environmental regulation 
Low growth 1: Fractured World (FW) Fragmentation 
Low growth 2: Down to Earth (DtE) Regional lifestyle and 
slow mobility 
 
Table 2. Assumptions of four scenarios of long-term development in aviation and related 
emissions 
 
2050 Scenario 
Assumptions  ULS RPP FW DtE 
Population (billions) 8,7 8,7 11,3 8,7 
World GDP 
(trillions) 
180 171* 82 136 
GDP growth (percent 
per annum) 
2.9 2.75 2,3 2,5 
Income per capita 
(10³ 1990 US dollars 
per capita) 
20,8 20,8 7,2 15,6 
Corresponding IPCC 
scenario 
SRES A1 Not 
applicable 
SRES A2 SRES B1 
Note:  World GDP in RPP was reduced by 5% to be consistent with storylines. 
IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 
While in the ULS and FW scenarios no dramatic climate change is 
assumed, environment is a critical driver in the RPP scenario—leading to 
strong regulations in environmentally relevant activities—and the DtE 
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scenario—where environmental concerns lead to a strong change of social 
values and behaviour. 
Energy scarcities are not expected until 2050 on the global level. 
However, in the FW scenario resources are distributed unequally and every 
region has to take care for their own future energy supply, leading to 
different regional technologies (Asia: synthetic fuels from coal; North and 
South America: unconventional oil; Africa: biomass; Mid-East: oil and gas; 
Eurasia: electricity and hydrogen) and comparably to the other scenarios 
high energy costs in the global average. The overall energy consumption for 
all scenarios in 2050 is in line with the recent Shell (2001) scenarios except 
for the ULS scenario where an optimistic (scenario) assumption was chosen 
for the future availability of oil.  
Technological innovations are expected in all scenarios, but with 
different main characteristic features. Within the ULS scenario there are high 
challenges to develop new technologies to enable the very high level of air 
transport and to meet the respective requirements especially on the 
effectiveness of airports and air traffic movement (ATM); the availability of 
energy; the reduction of noise; and the level of safety. Most typical for the 
RPP scenario will be a push and pull from policy especially for innovative 
environmental technologies. In the FW scenario technologies are driven by 
regional concepts and resources. Common for all blocks, high security level 
technologies will be essential. In the DtE scenario we assume a rapid 
diffusion of post-fossil technologies, driven by a change of values and 
preferences in the light of a strong movement towards sustainable 
development and innovations to ensure high safety and security standards.  
Policy as a Consequence of Circumstances 
Representing a market philosophy in ULS, policy is soft: liberalisation if 
possible, and compensation of negative impacts if necessary, combined with 
pragmatic choice of effective solutions. In RPP environmental pressure leads 
to limits of fossil fuel consumption and noise plus support of non-fossil 
technologies. In FW regions, blocks and nations are fending for themselves, 
decreasing chances for global policy approaches. In DtE citizens and 
customers with post-industrial lifestyle and values are playing a major role 
for policy, so that any pollution sources are tightly controlled.  
Depending to the potentials, goals and threats people have different 
preferences and values in the four scenarios, leading to different challenges, 
constraints, travel patterns and demand in the aviation system. In ULS their 
focus lies on fast and convenient intercontinental travel. In RPP mobility is 
more limited because of higher costs and environmental restrictions. In FW 
with confrontations between regions, terrorist activities increase as well as 
security concerns cutting down the traffic between blocks. In DtE people 
 Berghof 73 
 
prefer a slow and regional lifestyle, including a stigmatisation of fast and 
international travel patterns.  
 
Table 3. Selected influences on four scenarios of long-term development in aviation and 
related emissions 
 
 ULS RPP FW DtE 
Environment 
no 
catastrophic 
change 
significant 
change; main 
problems 
2052-2058 
little change 
some 
alarming, but 
no 
catastrophic 
change 
Energy 
availability available available 
depending to 
regions; 
scarcity after 
2050 expected 
available, 
scarcity after 
2050 expected 
Peak of 
world oil 
production 
(incl. 
artificial oil) 
2080 2050 2020 2020 
Energy use / 
EJ 1350 1100 970 810 
Energy price 
(1990 = 1) 2 4 8 4 
Technology 
development 
dynamism of 
technological 
innovation is 
broad-based; 
communicatio
n and 
transportation 
growth 
dynamism of 
technological 
innovation is 
broad-based; 
communicatio
n and 
transportation 
growth 
heterogeneous, 
partly 
incompatible, 
interchange 
problems 
rapid diffusion 
of post-fossil 
technologies - 
no solution for 
noise 
reduction 
Political 
development 
market 
philosophy 
emission 
regulations 
regional 
differences 
pollution 
sources tightly 
controlled 
Citizen 
preferences 
global 
orientation, 
pragmatic 
solutions 
regulatory 
approach in 
environmental 
issues 
autarky, 
regional 
orientation 
environmental 
and safety 
concerns 
Customer 
values 
convenient 
and flexible 
service and 
mobility 
cheap and 
environmental
ly okay 
security 
concerns 
stigmatisation 
of "fast" and 
international 
patterns 
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DEMAND, FLEET DEVELOPMENT, AND EMISSIONS 
Demand 
The demand for air transport is strongly driven by GDP, respectively 
GDP per capita. Furthermore, future elasticities and the level of saturation 
are essential (and difficult to estimate). The effect of saturation is relevant 
for all scenarios, but most relevant for ULS. In all scenarios, a saturation of 
the demand for air travel is assumed in terms of trips per capita: 15% in the 
year 2000 (and none for freight) for the North American region. Based on 
this assumption, ULS will result in 1073 billion Revenue-Tonne-Kilometres 
(RTK) per annum for 2020 and between 3936 billion until 4073 billion per 
annum (depending to the amount of landing charges) for 2050, 
corresponding to 4-5 trips per capita for North America and the Southwest 
Pacific region and nearly 4 trips per capita in Europe.  
The results for all four show demand increasing from 2000 to 2020/2050 
by a factor of 2.0/6.3 (ULS), 1.6/4.4 (RPP), 1.3/2.1 (FW), and 1.2/1.3 (DtE), 
what corresponds to average growth rates for the 45 years of respectively 
3.8% (ULS), 3.0% (RPP), 1.5% (FW), and 0.5% (DtE).  
Aircraft fleet and roll-over speed 
The aircraft fleet is, according to the different scenarios, increasing from 
2000 to 2050 by a factor of 5.9 (ULS), 4.1 (RPP), 3.2 (FW), and 1.2 (DtE), 
which corresponds to an average growth rate for 50 years of 3.6% (ULS), 
2.9% (RPP), 2.4% (FW), and 0.4% (DtE). Our results using the AERO-
model quantification show a share of aircraft younger than 12 years of 
around 56% for all scenarios in 2020, but significant differences after that 
until 2050, when this age category has generally slightly bigger share: 60% 
(ULS), 60% (RPP), 63% (FW), and 56% (DtE). In an additional sub-
scenario for RPP (called RPP-Cryoplane) the introduction of the hydrogen 
powered aircraft known as a cryoplane3 was quantified, starting in 2040 with 
a rapid fleet roll-over, leading to approximately 8.5% kerosene powered 
older (>12 years) aircraft in 2050 while the majority consists of hydrogen 
powered aircraft. 
Emissions 
ULS, RPP and FW show (with scenario specific differences) a reduction 
in fuel consumption that corresponds to a lower increase in total emissions of 
CO2/NOx for the two high growth scenarios with a factor of 4.6/3.3 (ULS), 
and 3.1/2.2 (RPP), and an increase of the total CO2 emissions in the year 
2050, compared to 2000 for the low growth scenarios with a factor of 1.8/1.6 
(FW) and 1.4/0.5 (DtE). The average growth rates for the CO2/NOx-
emissions between 2000 and 2050 amount to 3.1/2.4 (ULS), 2.2/1.6 (RPP), 
                                                 
3 See for instance: Ponater, Marquart, Ström, Gierens and Sausen, 2003. 
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1.0/0.9 (FW) and 0.3/-1.4 (DtE). The values reflect that in DtE strong 
emphasis is given to the reduction of NOx. In the sub-scenario RPP-
Cryoplane the CO2/NOx emissions could be reduced in 2050 to 14.3/62 of 
to the 2000 level, while water-vapour emissions, emitted during flight, 
increase by a factor of 3.4  
IMPACT OF CONSTRAINTS 
The main goal of the study was to consider constraints and challenges 
which could turn out as possible limits to growth for aviation. Consequently 
the needs and impacts related to constraints were quantified depending on 
each scenario. 
Needed Infrastructure in a High Growth Scenario 
In the highest growth scenario ULS, the expanding aviation activity may 
lead to a shortage of infrastructure, in particular at airports. In this respect 
the infrastructure becomes a challenge or in other words a constraint to 
aviation development.  
 
Figure 1. Additional runway requirements in 2020 and 2050 for the Unlimited Skies 
scenario of long-term development in aviation and related emissions 
 
 
Elaborated during the CONSAVE 2050 project by NLR 
 
Compliant to the storyline, it is assumed that the aviation sector 
generates the required funding for additional infrastructure by itself. To 
                                                 
4 Presently the impact of water emissions from Cryoplane use on the atmosphere and the 
resulting formation of contrails and/or cirrus clouds is still uncertain. 
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investigate to what extent the infrastructure needs expansion (especially in 
the EU and North American regions) landing charges are increased by 
different levels (based on public data on costs for new airports and the 
associated increase in capacity). The quantification considered and assumed, 
that: 
 
1. Demand will be lowered because airlines pass on the additional 
costs to ticket prices; 
2. Airlines move to relatively larger aircraft to minimise the additional 
landing costs; and 
3. The extra landing charges collected are used to build additional 
runways. 
 
The number of additional runways needed to accommodate all flights is 
based on: 
 
1. The aircraft movements in 2050 compared to 2000 by (major and 
aggregated minor) airports; 
2. An inventory of airports and number of runways available in 2000; 
and 
3. The effective level of runway capacity used in 2000. 
 
Several landing charge increases were tested to study the effect on 
yields for financing additional infrastructure and additional landing/takeoff 
capacity, and changes in demand for trips through ticket pricing. The results 
indicated that an increase of landing charges by a factor of 10 is required to 
finance additional infrastructure to accommodate ULS air traffic in the U.S. 
and EU. Within these tests only the cost levels are considered. The 
availability of the required space in term of land use is not assessed. One 
condition for the acceptance of new airports will be to ensure that noise 
nuisance and decline in air quality will be limited. Within the scenario 
storyline financial compensation for remaining nuisance is assumed. 
Accelerated Kerosene to Hydrogen Fleet Rollover 
Another interesting aspect is to quantify the effects of a quick fleet 
rollover from a kerosene fleet to aircraft using alternative fuels (hydrogen or 
bio-fuels), a change enhanced by environmental pressure. 
A transition from kerosene to bio-fuel is expected to have an impact 
limited to the production side with only very limited impact on the aviation 
industry. Aircraft probably do not need replacement, minor modifications to 
engines and systems will do. In addition, airport infrastructure will probably 
not need much adjustment either. In case the fleet roll-over is of the order of 
an average aircraft lifetime, costs and effects will be considerably lower. 
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A contrary scenario assumes a switch from kerosene to hydrogen 
necessitating a complete change of infrastructure, aircraft and operational 
procedures. Therefore in the sub-scenario RPP-Cryoplane a fast introduction 
of hydrogen powered aircraft was assumed and the perspective of an 
European manufacturer was considered, with the assumption that aviation 
could not support a permanent dual infrastructure or a production of two 
technologies at the same time and the transition from an all kerosene to a 
95% hydrogen powered fleet should be done a very short time (within 10 
years). 
New aircraft need to be designed with increased technological risks and 
development costs and—if a complete fleet rollover is intended—certified 
for virtually all aircraft sizes and ranges. Production facilities need to be 
transformed by closing down the kerosene aircraft production, causing an 
early write-off of capital costs. New production lines will be set up for the 
hydrogen powered aircraft that will need considerable investment. A typical 
rate of transition is 8 years for an all new generation of aircraft with the 
following impacts: 
 
1. Older kerosene powered aircraft need to be phased out early, 
without the opportunity to use them somewhere else;  
2. New hydrogen aircraft (cryoplane) need to be bought in a hectic 
market with relatively low production volumes; and  
3. The existing airport fuel installations need replacement by hydrogen 
ones, causing early write-off of kerosene installations. 
 
Results showed that under these circumstances there would be a very 
high challenge for the aircraft manufacturers to produce the needed number 
of new aircraft.  
Another question arises about who will pay for the necessary 
infrastructure. The RPP-Cryoplane scenario is based on the assumption that 
the government and society have a stake in reducing emissions and that the 
aviation sector (airline, aircraft and engine industries) is successful in 
negotiating a significant contribution to transition costs by the government. 
Thus, the costs of scrapping the kerosene-powered aircraft will be 
compensated fully by the government (buying the kerosene powered aircraft 
at residual, market prices). The capital investment of acquiring new 
hydrogen powered aircraft will be financed by the airlines and passed on as 
much as possible to the passengers. The new fuel infrastructure capital 
costs and early write-off of the kerosene fuel installations is recouped in fuel 
prices. Consequently, this leads to higher ticket prices and decrease in 
demand, compared to the RPP-All Kerosene scenario, by 8.0% in 2050. 
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Figure 2. Accelerated kerosene to hydrogen fleet rollover 
 
 
From “Aviation emissions and evaluation of reduction options. Main report part 1: Description 
of the AERO modelling system,” by National Aerospace Laboratory, 2000. Copyright 2000 by 
the National Aerospace Laboratory. Reprinted with permission. Elaborated during the 
CONSAVE 2050 project by NLR 
IMPACT OF REGULATION 
Intensification of regulation like emission trading, landing charges and 
fuel tax to reduce the environmental impact of activities, raises the question 
whether such regulations can really contribute to a sustainable aviation 
system without unintended side effects.  
We tested the regulatory assumption using the AERO model. The results 
of the scenario quantification is limited to the AERO model capabilities and 
therefore not a complete assessment. However, effects of landing charges (in 
ULS) and fuel tax (in RPP) on demand, fleet and emissions were calculated 
to give an impression. Compared with the base scenario (same charges as 
today and without any taxes) they showed interesting results. Even though 
the landing charges increased by a factor of 10 were assumed in ULS to 
regulate the access to infrastructure and to finance additional runways and 
airports, they lead to higher ticket prices and much fewer movements (-
14%). The use of bigger and newer aircraft and lower demand (-10.4%) 
leads to less fuel consumption (-1.7%) and lower emissions of CO2 and NOx 
(both -0.7%). On the other hand operating revenues of airlines will be 
reduced by up to 24% on average, making the airlines less profitable. Hence, 
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landing charges can successfully reduce movements and therefore noise 
around airports, but not emissions. 
In RPP, one sub-scenario assumes a fuel tax of 1.0 dollars/kilogram. 
Compared to the base scenario with no tax, demand would decrease by -
2.4%, movements by -5.3%, fuel use and emissions (CO2, NOx) would 
decrease by -5.5% and -5.4%, respectively. Under this scenario the 
profitability of airlines (1.01% = revenues in percentage of invested capital) 
would be unsustainable – surely not a viable economic situation for the air 
transport industry. 
NOISE ASSESSMENT 
Although noise contours depend on local routes and aircraft 
performance, an attempt has been undertaken to take into account 
technological advances (engine source noise), traffic densities and ATM 
noise abatement efficiency. 
 
Table 4. Contributing factors of noise reduction for four scenarios of long-term 
development in aviation and related emissions, for year 2050 compared to year 2000 
 
Scenario ULS 
RPP 
Hydrog
en 
RPP 
Kerose
ne 
FW FW DtE 
Region EU EU EU World EU EU 
Source weighted 
reduction -13,9 -15,8 -14,1 -12,5 -12,6 -15,3 
Traffic 
volume factor 2,26 1,46 1,57 2,82 1,13 0,72 
Traffic 
technology 
factor 
0,9 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 
Total noise 
reduction in 
Lden* 
-11 -14 -12 -8 -12 -17 
*Lden = Day-evening-night level. It is a descriptor of noise level based on energy equivalent 
noise level (Leq) over a whole day with a penalty of 10 dB(A) for night time noise (22.00–7.00) 
and an additional penalty of 5 dB(A) for evening noise (i.e. 19.00–23.00). 
 
For the various scenarios the noise change (reduction) is shown in Table 
4 with the contributing factors. The contribution of the fleet to the (source 
weighted) noise reduction is approximately equal throughout the world, 
except in FW, having a 1.6 dB difference between EU and the World 
average.  
The traffic volume factors are the EU numbers. The traffic technology 
factor compensates for the increase in runway capacity to accommodate the 
traffic volume, thereby spreading the noise over a larger area. The results 
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indicate that noise imposed at ground level will be reduced significantly. 
However, there is a major uncertainty here as it is assumed that the 
sensitivity of the communities to aviation noise and the accompanying 
regulations remain constant. 
REMARKS AND OUTLOOK 
Overall scenario results show that infrastructure enhancements and noise 
emissions could be successfully targeted with landing charges while a 
reduction of emissions via fuel tax or a quick introduction of hydrogen 
powered aircraft reduces strongly the profitability of the aviation industry.  
The scenario approach brings together different perspectives on 
problems, which are often interdependent within a system. Scenarios reduce 
complexity and generate a holistic view for stakeholders. However, 
scenarios are not forecasts, but a structured look at possible future 
developments to generate knowledge on unclear futures. Scenarios not only 
require an adequate quantification model, but also a carefully constructed set 
of assumptions, which should be monitored and updated.  
The results presented here have been quantified with a state of the art 
tool, the AERO Model. However, we do underline that this is a beginning 
and many questions are unresolved—necessitating further enhancement in 
this area. The external environment changes constantly necessitating 
constant review of assumptions including quantifications, cross checking of 
results and early warnings to improve our system knowledge, while the main 
goal remains to support an aviation system which is sustainable from an 
ecologic as well as economic and social perspective.5 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an empirical study to analyze how a policy of deregulation aimed at 
one segment of the transportation industry (surface transportation) may indirectly 
impact the stockholders of another segment of the industry (airlines).  The U.S. 
government eliminated the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) effective 
January 1, 1996.  Previous research has shown termination of the ICC benefited 
surface transportation providers.  However, what is unclear is whether or not the 
trend towards transportation deregulation impacts segments of the industry not 
directly targeted by the deregulation.  The current study shows that, while airlines 
received a short-term, indirect positive financial impact from termination of the 
ICC, the impact was not statistically significant.  Results show that transportation 
deregulation legislation must be specifically targeted to a particular segment of an 
industry and no carry over effect into other segments of the transportation industry 
appears to occur.     
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Joe B. Hanna, PhD. New Mexico State University, is an Associate Professor of Logistics in the 
Department of Aviation Management and Logistics, College of Business, Auburn University.  
He has published in numerous logistics and business journals and has co-authored or contributed 
to several logistics and supply chain textbooks. 
84 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Published research in the last dozen years has shown a growing interest 
in issues surrounding the liberalization of air cargo services (Dresner & 
Tretheway, 1992; Maillebiau & Hansen, 1995; Marin, 1995; Schipper, 
Rietveld, & Nijkamp, 2001; Zhang & Zhang, 2002).  One driving factor 
enhancing interest levels in air cargo deregulation has been the recent growth 
in aviation cargo volume due in large part to an increasingly global 
marketplace and an increase in the need for expedited and time sensitive 
shipments.  These factors have contributed to an increase in the demand for 
international airline cargo services, and have intensified the search for a 
more efficient trade regime (Zhang & Zhang, 2002). 
It has been proposed that air cargo rights be separated from air 
passenger rights when negotiating new international bi-lateral airline service 
agreements.  However, the negotiation of passenger rights might not be 
easily separated from the negotiation of air cargo rights, especially in the 
cases of carriers who rely on cargo business for a substantial share of their 
revenue.  In fact, there are still many aviation markets where no specific air 
cargo rights have been negotiated and carriers are content not to separate 
passenger and cargo privileges.  How should policy experts and bi-lateral 
airline service agreement negotiators approach the cargo versus passenger 
debate?  Should policy makers approach general deregulation of an industry 
with broad policy changes, or should they focus on targeted, segment 
specific policy alterations?  The current research builds on prior event study 
research in transportation to help determine the most prudent approach to 
transportation deregulation policies.     
INDUSTRY GROWTH AND ECONOMIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Air cargo is a quickly growing segment of the transportation market 
when measured in terms of the annual percentage increase of total value of 
cargo shipped per year (Larson, 1998).  As a result, it is becoming 
increasingly important to understand the impact of regulatory or 
deregulatory actions on the entire transportation industry and, more  
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specifically, on the aviation segment of the industry.  Past research has 
examined the impact on aviation of the Domestic All-Cargo Deregulation 
Statute of 1977 or the 1979 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act which 
deregulated domestic cargo air service in the United States (Zhang & Zhang, 
2002).  These studies have show that directly removing government control 
over aviation rates and routes has promoted lower rates and improved 
service to shippers using air cargo transportation (Larson, 1998).  
Some research has been performed on the long-term impact of U.S. 
deregulation specifically aimed at the aviation segment of the transportation 
industry.  However, research has failed to examine the immediate short-term 
economic impact of a general trend of transportation industry deregulation 
on an industry segment not directly targeted by a deregulatory policy.  This 
research attempts to determine if transportation industry deregulation aimed 
at one segment of the industry (surface transportation) has indirectly yielded 
a positive impact on a segment of the industry (the aviation segment) not 
directly targeted by the deregulatory policy. 
Obtaining a thorough understanding of the positive and negative impacts 
of regulatory authorities pursuing a general policy of transportation 
deregulation is of paramount importance to the continued financial health 
and prosperity of the industry.  As the U.S. proceeds into the early twenty-
first century, policy makers and industry leaders face the crucial decision of 
whether or not to deregulate entire industries or industry segments.  The 
dilemma facing policymakers is that there are opposing views as to whether 
deregulation is beneficial for consumers.   
Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) support the efficient-structure 
hypothesis and believe that deregulation benefits consumers because it 
makes the industry more efficient, which in turn results in more products and 
services for consumers at lower costs.  These individuals point to improved 
competition, lower costs, and improved service to help lobby the U.S. 
government for continued deregulation.  Conversely, others support the 
structure-performance hypothesis and believe that regulation is necessary to 
protect consumers by assuring fair prices and ensuring industry stability.  
Proponents of this view cite a tremendous number of bankruptcies, general 
destabilization of the workforce, and high concentration levels as primary 
reasons why additional deregulation of the industry may not be warranted.   
Another important issue regarding deregulation is to determine its 
effects on the owners of companies, and specifically company shareholders.  
Since managers have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize stockholders 
wealth, managers need to know whether or not deregulation is beneficial to 
their stockholders.  In other words, if a deregulated business environment is 
viewed favorably (unfavorably) and leads to an increase (decrease) in 
stockholders wealth, then managers have a responsibility to support (resist) 
efforts to further deregulate the industry.   
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As a result of the above questions, this paper attempts to determine 
investor impressions of a general policy trend of transportation deregulation.  
Specifically, this research examines the carry over effects of deregulation by 
looking at the impact on one segment of the transportation industry (airline) 
when deregulation aimed primarily at another segment of the industry 
(surface transportation) is signed into law.  This research differs from past 
deregulation research in two ways.  First, the authors adopt a unique 
methodology to examine the immediate financial impact of deregulation. 
Unlike most previous studies that have focused on long-term financial 
performance, this project isolates the immediate financial impact of general 
transportation deregulation on the airline industry.  Second, most 
deregulation research focuses solely on the mode(s) of transportation directly 
targeted by the specific regulatory adjustment.  This research examines how 
a general trend towards industry deregulation in one area of transportation 
(surface transportation) may be positively perceived by investors and 
indirectly impact other modes of transportation (Airlines) not directly 
targeted for deregulation.  More specifically, the research question examined 
is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Termination Act was 
viewed as favorable by all transportation industry investors or just those 
investing in the surface transportation companies.     
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
One target area of deregulation has been the elimination of the ICC, 
America’s oldest regulatory agency, created in 1887 to regulate the railroads.  
At the time railroads were made up of monopolies and characterized by 
monopolistic behavior.  By the 1990s, the primary responsibility of the ICC 
was to monitor surface transportation providers to determine whether they 
complied with federal regulations.  But as Congress worked to shrink the 
federal budget deficit and to further deregulate the transportation industry, 
the ICC and its $45 million plus budget was soon viewed as expendable and 
targeted for elimination.  Despite opposition from many groups such as 
unions and railroads, President Clinton signed the ICC Termination Act of 
1995, thereby terminating the ICC effective January 1, 1996.  The expected 
impact of the ICC Termination Act was to reduce the federal budget deficit, 
to allow transportation firms to operate in a freer and more competitive 
market environment, and to eliminate government red-tape and restrictions.  
Key provisions of the act included eliminating restrictions on contract 
carriers, reducing tariff filing requirements, and having less regulation on 
rates charged.   
For the stockholders of all transportation firms, this move could be 
viewed as positive or negative.  For example, one might argue the reduced 
regulation should reduce operating expenses and increase profits.  
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Conversely, some believe that regulation can serve as a barrier to entry in the 
market for new firms, enhancing the opportunity for current market 
participants to enhance their profits in the marketplace.  Previous research 
examining how deregulation has affected the profitability of transportation 
firms has focused on the long-term financial performance of the targeted 
industry segment following deregulation (Smith & Grimm, 1987; Corsi & 
Grimm, 1989; and Winston, Corsi, Grimm, & Evans, 1990).  While this 
approach has provided valuable insight to managers, there is great 
uncertainty as to whether the change in financial performance can truly be 
attributed to deregulation.  Over time, other events such as changes in 
interest rates, changes in oil prices, terrorist attacks, or a major conflict like 
the Gulf war can significantly affect the financial performance of the 
transportation industry.  Thus, there is a need to determine the immediate 
financial impact of deregulation on the stockholders of transportation firms.  
Past research (Hanna, Kunkel, & Kuhlemeyer, 1999) has shown that the 
ICC Termination Act was perceived to be positive by shareholders of surface 
transportation providers.  What is not clear is whether termination of the ICC 
was viewed as a positive move towards deregulation by investors of all 
segments of the transportation industry or just those in the surface 
transportation segments of the industry.  Researchers believe that if 
termination of the ICC positively impacts non-surface transportation 
providers (e.g., the airline industry), then a general trend of transportation 
deregulation in one segment of the industry (surface transportation) may 
appear to have carry over effects on all segments of the transportation 
industry.   
This paper examines if ICC termination was viewed as a positive 
development in the airline industry as denoted by increased stockholders’ 
wealth or, conversely, was it viewed as unfavorable, thereby decreasing 
stockholders’ wealth.  If the stockholders’ wealth increased, then the stock 
prices of publicly traded airline firms would have increased when it was 
publicly announced that President Clinton had signed the ICC Termination 
Act.   The results of this research allow for a determination of the response 
of the stock market to specific mid-1990 deregulation and to provide 
information on its financial impact on the airline industry.   
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHOD 
We formed a sample of transportation firms that included twenty-four 
airlines. To be included in the sample, a firm must have met four 
requirements.  One, the firm’s primary SIC code must have been 451 
(airlines).  Two, the firm must have been publicly traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the 
NASDAQ stock market.  Three, the firm must have had daily returns over an 
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eleven-day event period.1    Four, the firm must not have had any major news 
announcement reported in the Wall Street Journal Index during the eleven-
day event period.   Additionally, we checked the Wall Street Journal Index 
for any major industry announcements that would have contaminated the 
stock returns for all companies in that industry.  
We used an event study methodology (c.f., Brown & Warner, 1980;  
1985; Peterson, 1989) to determine the immediate impact of the ICC 
Termination Act of 1995 on the stock prices of airline firms.  It is possible to 
isolate the immediate impact of an event on stock prices because of two 
unique characteristics of stock prices. One, stock prices are a function of the 
firm’s expected future earnings. Two, stock prices react quickly and 
efficiently to an announcement of an event that impacts the firm’s expected 
future earnings.  Thus, the announcement of an event such as deregulation 
that is perceived by investors to increase (decrease) the future expected 
earnings of a firm will result in an immediate stock price increase (decrease).  
This means that managers can immediately gauge the expected economic 
impact on their firm or industry by examining the firm’s stock price reaction 
to an event via an event study methodology.  
The event study methodology subdivides a stock price change (or stock 
return) into two components.  The first component of the stock return is 
attributed to a general stock market movement.  The second component of 
the stock return is attributed to an informational event.  In this study the ICC 
Termination Act served as the informational event.  We defined an event 
period that was centered on the announcement date that we called day zero (t 
= 0).  The announcement date was December 29, 1995, which was the date 
that the Wall Street Journal reported that President Clinton signed the ICC 
Termination Act into law.2  To capture how the event affected stock prices, 
an eleven-day event period centered on and surrounding the announcement 
date was used.  Day plus one, (t = 1), was one trading day after the 
announcement, and so forth with day plus five, (t = 5) being five trading 
days after the announcement.  Day minus one, (t = -1), was one trading day 
before the announcement, and so forth with day minus five, (t = -5), being 
five trading days before the announcement.    
After identifying the eleven-day event period, we calculated the 
predicted (or normal) return for each firm for each day in the event period.  
The predicted return was what we would expect if no event took place.  
                                                 
1   The sample is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  All daily 
stock returns, S&P 500 Index returns, and market value of firms are obtained from CRSP. 
2   Although the House of Representatives and Senate had passed their versions of the bill in 
June 1995 and November 1995, respectively, President Clinton opposed the ICC Termination 
Act and threatened to veto the bill according to the December 21, 1995, Wall Street Journal.  
Thus, there was a good chance that the bill would not become law.  However, Clinton reversed 
his position and signed the bill into law the following week.   
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Since the market return is often used as the predicted return, we used the 
S&P 500 Index as a proxy for the market return.3  Next we calculated the 
daily excess return for each airline stock for each day over the eleven-day 
event period.  The daily excess return for each firm i on day t, ERit, was 
defined as: 
ERit = Rit - Rmt   (1) 
       
where Rit is the return on the stock of firm i on day t and Rmt is the return on 
the market index (S&P 500 Index) on day t.  The daily excess return 
represents the return not predicted by the market index and is an estimate of 
the change in the stock price on that day due to the event.   
We calculated the average excess return by summing the daily excess 
returns of the firms each day.  The average excess return can then be viewed 
as a diversified portfolio of airline stocks.  This diversified portfolio 
technique enabled us to use the portfolio to eliminate unique individual stock 
returns by offsetting random positive stock returns with random negative 
stock returns.  Thus, the average excess return, AERt, captures only the 
characteristics of the ICC Termination Act and is defined as: 
  N 
                AERt = [ ERit] / N  (2)   
  i =1 
 
where N is the number of firms in the sample, and ERit is the daily excess 
return for firm i on day t.  Now if the ICC Termination Act did not affect the 
future returns of airline firms, then the AERt should not be significantly 
different from zero.   
As Masulis (1980) and Dann (1981) explain, it is also necessary to 
analyze the cumulative average excess returns because in many cases the 
market reaction to the announcement of an event may be spread over several 
days.  For example, information regarding an event may be leaked to the 
financial market prior to the event’s announcement.  Likewise, it may take 
analysts and investors several days to completely digest the impact of the 
event upon future expected earnings.  Thus, the cumulative average excess 
return is an estimate of the stock return that is caused by the event over a 
period of time.  For robustness and completeness, we examined the 
cumulative average excess returns, CAER-1,t, over several different intervals 
and defined it as:                                 T 
  CAER-1,t = AERt   (3)   
                                                                                             t =1 
                                                 
3   The S&P 500 Index is a value weighted market index of 500 large domestic corporations 
whose market capitalization represents approximately 75 percent of the market capitalization 
value of all publicly traded corporations in the U.S.  Hence, the S&P 500 return is a good proxy 
for the overall equity market return.   
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where CAER-1,t is determined for a defined interval from day minus one to 
some day such as day zero (CAER-1,0) or day plus five (CAER-1,+5). 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
We examined the average excess returns (AERs) for each of the eleven 
days for the airline industry.  We also examined the percent of excess returns 
that are positive for each of the eleven days.  Then we examined the 
cumulative average excess returns (CAERs) for six periods for the airline 
industry.  We also examined the percent of returns that are positive for each 
of the six periods.  Lastly, if a statistically significant difference existed 
using the CAERs, we calculated an actual dollar amount that the 
shareholders appear to have gained or lost when it was announced that the 
ICC Termination Act was signed into law. 
AERs and Percent Positive 
We examined the AERs for each of the eleven days for the airline 
industry.  Table 1 presents the AERs for each of the eleven days.   
 
Research question #1: Did the industry experience any significant stock 
price increase (AER) on any of the eleven days surrounding the 
announcement of the ICC Termination Act of 1995?   
 
Ha: The AER of the industry on each of the eleven days 
surrounding the announcement of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 
will not be significantly different from zero.   
 
For the airlines industry, day –4 is positive and significantly different 
from zero while day 5 is negative and significantly different from zero at the 
.05 level.  Day 2 is positive and significantly different from zero at the .10 
level.  Clearly there were some excess returns in the airline industry during 
the eleven-day study period that could not be explained simply by general 
market fluctuations.  The airline stocks examined clearly experienced some 
indirect impact as a result of passage of the ICC Termination Act.  However, 
the size and direction of the excess returns is inconsistent and rarely 
produces statistically significant results.   
We then examined the percent of returns that were positive for each of 
the eleven days for the airline industry.  Table 1 presents the percent of 
returns that are positive for each of the eleven days.   
 
Research question #2: Did the industry experience any significant stock 
price increase (percent positive returns) on any of the eleven days 
surrounding the announcement of the ICC Termination Act of 1995?   
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Ha: The percent of positive excess returns of the industry on each of 
the eleven days surrounding the announcement of the ICC 
Termination Act of 1995 will not be significantly different from 
fifty percent.   
 
For the airline industry, three of the eleven days have percent positive 
returns less than fifty percent and significantly different from fifty percent.  
One of the eleven days has percent positive returns greater than fifty percent 
and significantly different from fifty percent.  With only one of the eleven 
days producing results where the percent positive was significantly greater 
than fifty percent does not provide strong support for termination of the ICC 
having an immediate positive impact on the airline industry.  
Table 1. Average Excess Returns (AERt) for the Airline Industry, for an eleven-day period 
surrounding the enactment of the ICC Termination Act of 1976, December 29, 1995 
Date Day AERt % Positive 
December 24, 1995 -5 -1.0078% 25.0 * 
December 25, 1995 -4 1.8715% * 50.0 
December 26, 1995 -3 0.3417% 45.8 
December 27, 1995 -2 -0.5571% 29.2 * 
December 28, 1995 -1 0.3926% 50.0 
December 29, 1995 0 0.9278% 37.5 
December 30, 1995 1 -0.5966% 41.7 
December 31, 1995 2 1.5734% ** 54.2 
January 1, 1996 3 0.6608% 45.8 
January 2, 1996 4 -0.0212% 66.7 * 
January 3, 1996 5 -2.3930% * 8.3 * 
* Denotes Statistically Significant from 0 at the .05 level. 
** Denotes Statistically Significant from 0 at the .10 level. 
 
In summary, the AERs and percent positive returns provide little, if any, 
support as to whether the airlines industry benefited from the ICC 
Termination Act.  Several days produced marginally supportive results, 
however; roughly the same number of days produced results to the contrary.  
An examination of average excess stock returns of airline stocks does not 
support the contention that a policy of deregulation targeted for one segment 
of the industry provides an indirect, positive impact on related industries.   
CAERs and Percent Positive 
We examined the CAERs for six different periods for the airline 
industry.  Table 2 presents the CAERs for each of the six periods.   
 
92 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
Research question #3: Did the industry experience a significant 
cumulative stock price increase (CAER) over the eleven days 
surrounding the announcement of the ICC Termination Act of 1995?   
 
Ha: The CAER of the industry over the eleven days surrounding the 
announcement of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 will not be 
significantly different from zero.   
 
For the airline industry, we found that all six CAERs are positive, but 
none of the six are significantly different from zero at the .05 level.  Clearly 
when measured in terms of the cumulative average excess return of stock 
prices, there is a short-term economic impact to the firms in the airline 
industry.  The financial significance of this cumulative stock price return is 
sizable, reaching into the millions of dollars.  While the CAERs for the 
airline industry appear positive, overall the results of this research support 
the conclusion that the airline industry was not positively or negatively 
impacted in a material manner from the passage of the ICC Termination Act.   
Next, we examined the percent positive returns for each of the six 
periods for the airline industry.  Table 2 presents the percent positive returns 
for each of the six periods.   
 
Research question #4: Did the industry experience a significant 
cumulative stock price increase (percent positive returns) over the 
eleven days surrounding the announcement of the ICC Termination Act 
of 1995?   
 
Ha: The percent of positive cumulative excess returns of the 
industry over the eleven days surrounding the announcement of the 
ICC Termination Act of 1995 will not be significantly different 
from fifty percent.   
 
For the airline industry, we found that the percent positive returns is 
greater than fifty percent for four of the six periods, but none of the four 
periods is significantly different from fifty percent.  One period produces a 
50% positive result, indicating that exactly half of the airline stocks 
examined produced a positive result with the other half experiencing a 
negative result.  The one remaining period analyzed is less than fifty percent 
positive and is significantly different from fifty percent.  The percent 
positive examination provides little support for the notion that an 
administration supportive of a general policy of deregulation produces carry 
over effects into similar segments of an industry.  Deregulation of the 
surface transportation industry appears to have had little impact on the 
financial wealth of airline firms. 
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 Table 2. Cumulative Average Excess Returns (CAERt) for the Airline Industry, for 
segments of an eleven-day period surrounding the enactment of the ICC Termination Act 
of 1976, December 29, 1995 
Dates Period CAERt % Positive 
December 28, 1995 – January 3, 1996 Day -1 to Day 5 0.5439% 50.0 
December 28, 1995 – January 2, 1996 Day -1 to Day 4 2.9369% 54.2 
December 28, 1995 – January 1, 1996 Day -1 to Day 3 2.9581% 54.2 
December 28 – December 31, 1995 Day -1 to Day 2 2.2973% 62.5 
December 28 – December 30, 1995 Day -1 to Day 1 0.7238% 58.3 
December 28 – December 29, 1995 Day -1 to Day 0 1.3204% 29.2 * 
* Denotes Statistically Significant from 0 at the .05 level. 
The results support the conclusion that the airline industry experienced 
neither a significant benefit nor material harm as a result of the passage of 
the ICC Termination Act.  Interestingly, as discovered in previous research 
(Hanna, Kunkel, & Kuhlemeyer, 1999) the motor carrier segment of the 
transportation industry experienced an immediate and direct positive benefit 
from ICC termination.  The results of this research indicate that, for 
economic deregulation to significantly impact an industry, it must be 
specifically targeted towards that particular segment of the industry.  The 
general appearance of a policy shift away from transportation regulation 
does not materially impact those segments of the industry that are not 
directly targeted by the legislation.   
CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The current research attempts to assist practitioners in accumulating 
knowledge about the importance of a general transportation policy change on 
their industry.  The lack of a sustained and significantly positive stock price 
reaction to general transportation deregulation impacts how a manager 
should pursue effective management of their company.  Clearly 
transportation executives should only consider providing significant 
resources to trade associations pursuing a deregulation agenda if the 
legislation has a direct impact on their segment of the industry.  While there 
are a couple of AERs in the airline industry that are significantly different 
from zero (one positive and one negative) overall the results of the current 
research fail to support the notion that transportation deregulation in one 
segment of the transportation industry has a  carry over effect into other 
segments of the industry.  Overall, no sustained significant differences were 
noted in airline stock prices when termination of the ICC was announced.  
Clearly the positive impact of a deregulation policy that was strongly felt by 
the surface transportation industry did not carry over to other, non-surface 
transportation segments of the industry.  
Although the study only measures the financial gain to publicly traded 
airlines by the passage of the ICC Termination Act of 1995, it should be 
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pointed out that deregulation also produces financial gains for other 
stakeholders including taxpayers, shippers, and consumers.  Taxpayers who 
do not have to pay the cost of operating unnecessary government agencies 
(e.g., ICC) realize a financial benefit since they are no longer required to 
fund the agency through federal tax dollars.  Customers (e.g., shippers and 
consumers) also benefit financially since deregulation tends to increase 
competition in the industry, oftentimes increasing service levels and 
decreasing costs.  The result is a better overall value for the many customers 
of the industry.    
While carry over effects from one segment of the industry to another 
appear not to be statistically significant, there is a short-term positive 
financial impact felt by the airline industry.  Furthermore, clearly there is a 
positive financial impact felt by the segment of the industry that is directly 
impacted by deregulation.  Occasionally managers of one segment of the 
transportation industry will argue that their business will be negatively 
impacted if another segment of the industry experiences deregulation.  
Current research indicates that, while the segment of the industry targeted by 
deregulation experiences a positive benefit, other segments of the industry 
are not harmed in a significant manner.  Therefore, in general terms, it 
appears economic deregulation yields positive short-term economic benefits 
to the industry when examined in its entirety. 
The current research illustrates that a general trend of transportation 
deregulation by the government does not sufficiently impact all segments of 
the industry.  If regulators are to achieve the positive economic impacts 
desired from deregulation, they must study each market segment thoroughly 
and then implement policies aimed at altering economic operating conditions 
in that segment.  Successful deregulatory policies will only be achieved if 
regulatory bodies avoid a broad, general trend towards deregulation in favor 
of targeting each segment individually and implement specific, targeted 
policies as opposed to a broad, general deregulatory policy.   
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ABSTRACT 
Milan is the third richest catchment area in Europe, just behind London and Paris, 
in terms of individual gross domestic product. Nevertheless, airport operations in 
Milan have not had the same degree of development that one would expect in such 
a wealthy area. The main reason is due to the existence of three airports located 
within in the same metropolitan area, which creates a negative offer fragmentation 
and doesn’t allow for airlines, and especially the hub carrier, to achieve significant 
returns on investment from improved outputs. Moreover, this situation, in the 
absence of a market-driven regulatory regime of flight activities able to split 
operations between the three sites in correlation with their technical, geographical 
and vocational characteristics, naturally tends to create overlapping and cross-
cannibalization. Recent proposals to solve these problems have proved to be short-
minded remedies. This paper aims to analyze the current situation of Milan’s 
metropolitan area for airport operations and propose some innovative regulatory 
solutions that are needed to make Milan airports more marketable and, thus, create a 
platform for their distinctive strategic marketing positioning within the European 
airport scenario. 
COMPETITION IN THE AIRPORT BUSINESS:  THE NEED FOR A 
DISTINCTIVE MARKET POSITIONING 
Competition in the air transport pipeline is rapidly migrating from 
airlines to other value chain operators. One of the most dynamic contexts is 
the one represented by the airport industry.  
Here deregulation effects are putting pressure on old patterns of 
conduct and forcing incumbents and newcomers as well to face new 
evolutionary strategies. Greenfield sites, or former military sites which are 
being reconverted to civil operations, are multiplying the number, scope and 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
David Jarach is a Professor of International Marketing at Bocconi University, Milan, a 
Professor of Air Transportation Marketing at Bocconi’s Graduate School of Business and 
visiting Professor at Toulouse Business School’s Aerospace MBA and at ESIC, Madrid. He also 
acts as top advisor for air transport companies.  
 Jarach 97 
 
typology of players in the airport environment. Reaction by incumbents to 
this threat typically takes the form of a price competition. In this situation, 
airlines will be offered huge marketing support system plans, like in the U.S. 
and European markets, or even discounted handling fees, like for low-cost 
carriers1 (Jarach, 2005). This policy will bring decreasing yields from the 
historical core of aviation-related activities and put extraordinary pressure on 
the financial side for all players. In other words, subsidizing carriers on start-
up routes will provide – most of the time – a good political return on 
investment, whilst economic figures will not tolerate this practice for many 
more years. 
In this tough scenario, the only apparent way for airports to escape a 
suicidal price-war trap lies in the creation of some valuable differentiation, 
starting from an innovative value proposition. This can firstly be done by 
choosing some form of market positioning that may help to build up a 
perception of a distinctive image in the market. Table 1 shows some of the 
main possible airport positioning criteria, whilst table 2 provides much richer 
evidence.  
Table 1. Some elective airport market positionings 
 
 Airport Positioning Examples 
1 Primary hub Paris CDG, London Heathrow, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, 
Dallas Ft.Worth, Singapore, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, 
Dubai, Milan Malpensa 
2 Secondary hub Barcelone, St. Louis, Lion, Clermont Ferrant, Macau, 
Seattle, Mumbai, Nairobi 
3 Regional airport Valencia, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, New York La Guardia, 
Venice 
3a City airport London City Airport, Stockholm Bromma, Düsseldorf City, 
Toronto City 
3b Charter airport Crete, Punta Cana 
4 All-cargo airport Euro port Vatry 
5 Low-cost airport (in 
progress) 
Milan Orio, London Stansted, Paris Beauvois, Frankfurt 
Hahn, Dallas Love Field 
Note: From Airport Marketing, by David Jarach, 2005, Ashgate Publishing.  
 
Of course, choosing an airport market positioning is a strategic decision 
that involves the evaluation of a bundle of correlated elements by airport 
managers.  
First, the width and weight of the airport’s primary catchment area have 
to be measured. For instance, primary and secondary hubs can be 
successfully built up only where a substantial local market demand permits 
operating carriers—and most definitely the hub carrier—a sound return on 
                                                 
1 Although the latter pattern has been hardly touched by the recent Ryanair-Charleroi Court 
case. 
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investment from these flight operations2. In addition to local, Origin & 
Destination traffics, Connecting & Transfer (C&T) fluxes are added to raise 
load factors and achieve some sort of cost economies3 that can improve the 
hub carrier’s economic viability. The value of a primary catchment area4 will 
be related to some key factors like the number of living inhabitants, their 
annual flight propensity, the pace of industrial instalments and, eventually, 
the strategic role played by the city, like in the case of a State’s capital in 
which most administrative practices are located.  
Second, the package of available multimodal infrastructures—rail, road 
or even sea—will play a crucial role in extending the airport’s secondary 
catchment areas5. For instance, high-speed train connections will be a strong 
multiplier effect of airport traffics, as shown at Paris Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG) or Frankfurt.  
Third, competitive positioning chosen by other airport players will have 
to be taken into serious account. For instance, geographic proximity between 
two sites showing significant product portfolio’s similarities will have a 
highly negative impact on the chances of market success of both players. 
Moreover, an identical positioning with the one of a neighbouring site will 
damage an airport’s commercial visibility, especially in the case of 
grandfather-clause airports that are historically operating in a certain context 
and, thus, recognised by customers. In this case, a start-up airport will have 
to adapt a radical innovation in its own positioning to get some chances to 
survive economically.  
Fourth, market positioning options can also be dictated by governmental 
decisions or restrictions to operations. This is quite common for airports 
located within metropolitan areas, where noise pollution and gas emissions 
may emerge as primary issues and force local governments to limit in some 
way an airport’s operations. Or it could also be the case of a multi-airport 
condition, where the presence of a number of airports requires that public 
authorities pose a limit on cross-cannibalization. In the latter case, the built-
up of a distinctive market positioning really becomes a must, especially if 
the ownership of the various airports is the same and is public, too. This is 
exactly the case of Milan’s metropolitan area, where three airports, namely 
                                                 
2 Typically the average yield from Origin/Destination traffic is much higher than one which is 
related to transfer traffic. This has a sense, given the fact that transfer passengers have to 
stopover at an intermediate airport before reaching the end destination, this implying a longer 
travel time and additional hassles, especially in the post-September 11 scenario. 
3 Which sounds like coming from additional revenues from the mixture of local and connecting 
traffics, on the one hand, and from the achievement of significant economies of scope, density 
and scale from the hub platform, on the other hand. 
4 The dimension of a primary catchment area can typically be calculated by measuring 1-hour 
drive time in terms of distance from the airport location. 
5 A secondary catchment area is the one that usually exceeds the 1-hour drive time area. 
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Linate Airport, Malpensa Airport and Orio al Serio International Airport 
(Orio), are located.  
 
Table 2. Analysis of selected airport market positionings 
 
 Market Positioning Examples of Airports Located in the 
Described Category 
1 Airports integrated in a city’s marketing plan Manchester 
2 Airports integrated in a region’s (federal, state, 
etc.) marketing plan 
Munich 
3 Airports with a growing path, although limited by 
physical constraints 
Brussels, San Francisco, Amsterdam 
4 Airports integrated within a systemic design and 
with a dominance of the same hub carrier 
Paris Orly and CDG, London 
Heathrow and Gatwick 
5 Airports integrated within a systemic design by 
the will of a regulator 
Milan Linate and Malpensa, Tokyo 
Haneda and Narita, Washington Dulles 
and Reagan 
6 Airports operating within the same catchment 
area, although with different value propositions 
Chicago O’Hare and Midway, 
Stockholm Arlanda and Bromma, 
Milan Malpensa and Orio 
7 Airports hosting residual traffic London Biggin Hill, Paris Le Bourget, 
Rome Ciampino 
8 Airports with an alternative (low-cost) vocation London Luton and Stansted, Paris 
Beauvois, Brussels Charleroi, Milan 
Orio, Frankfurt Hahn 
9 Airports implementing co- evolutionary policies 
with neighbouring residents and counties 
Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Tokyo Narita 
10 Airports having technical limitations (city 
airports) 
London City Airport, Florence, 
Toronto City, Courchevel, Chambery, 
Düsseldorf Express, Aosta 
11 Airports under reengineering, due to the 
abandonment by the hub carrier 
St. Louis, Raleigh-Durham, London 
Gatwick, Geneva 
12 Airports with a vocational task of national or pan 
regional gateways (primary and secondary hubs)  
Wien, Miami, Toronto, Johannesburg, 
Dubai, Los Angeles, Bangkok, New 
York JFK 
13 Airports with a cargo focus (all-cargo airports) Vatry, Rotterdam (scheduled), 
Memphis, Louisville, Liege 
14 Greenfield airports Munich, Oslo, Seoul, Athens 
15 Upgraded airports, on a basis of previously 
existing infrastructures 
London Heathrow, Milan Malpensa, 
Doha, Dubai, Bahrain, Madrid, Paris 
CDG 
16 Airports with limitations in the range of air 
services offered, due to infrastructural limits 
New York La Guardia, Tokyo Narita, 
Washington Reagan, Teheran 
17 Airports acting as country’s sole gateways Singapore, Hong Kong, Malta, 
Larnaca/Nicosia 
18 Airports with undergoing projects of turnaround 
from military to civil operations 
Torrejon (Spain), El Toro (California), 
Grazzanise (Italy) 
19 Dominant airports (not the sole country’s 
gateway, but with the most of market power) 
Helsinki, Copenhagen, Tel Aviv, 
Wien, San Juan, Dublin 
Note: From Airport Marketing, by David Jarach, 2005, Ashgate Publishing. 
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 MILAN’S LINATE AND MALPENSA AIRPORTS:  CROSS-
CANNIBALIZ 
According to all economic studies, the Milan area is the third richest in 
Europe, after London and Paris, in terms of individual gross domestic 
product. Moreover, Milan is the main industrial and trade centre in Italy, 
with many multinationals’ headquarters located in its suburbs and with 
strong local industrial and service platforms, too. This condition creates a 
basis for strong inbound and outbound traffic that is exacerbated by two 
other significant aspects: a strong fashion district located in Milan downtown 
(Milan is considered the world’s capital of ready to wear fashions) and a 
buoyant fair business that has recently reinforced its own visibility in the 
international market thanks to additional available exhibition spaces. In 
addition, a strong outgoing leisure demand, typically concentrated during 
Christmas and Easter periods and in July-August, originates from Milan’s 
primary catchment area that hosts more than 5 million inhabitants. 
After the Second World War, local governments decided to develop an 
airport at Linate, an airfield located just 7 kilometres from downtown Milan. 
On the contrary, an existing airfield at Malpensa, 50 kilometres northbound 
from Milan and actually closer to Varese, was considered a secondary site 
with only a few intercontinental point-to-point services and since the 1980s 
all charter services were located there. Finally, a third site was being 
developed at Orio al Serio, 60 kilometres eastbound of Milan in the Bergamo 
province.  
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a dramatic increase in passenger 
numbers for Linate, which started to face tough congestion, due to the fact 
that there was actually no space for the airport’s expansion, as its own 
boundaries were completely surrounded by factories and houses. Moreover, 
its main6 runway was only 2,440 kilometers long, preventing intercontinental 
services to be started. Extemporary solutions, like the mentioned transfer of 
charters to Malpensa, did not solve the situation, as all 34 parking spaces 
available on tarmac were constantly occupied by daily operations. Some 
carriers, like Alitalia, British Airways and Iberia started to use wide-bodied 
aircraft to improve their capacity given slot constraints, but, once again, this 
option still did not mitigate the massive increase in air travel demand. In 
fact, given the absence of direct intercontinental services from Linate, most 
European carriers were targeting the Milan area to attract extra long-haul 
passengers to their hubs. The chance to exploit these so-called sixth freedom 
rights was mainly in the hands of foreign carriers. The domestic operator, 
Alitalia was experiencing a lower power of attraction due to its thinner hub 
at Rome Fiumicino.   
                                                 
6 Linate has another parallel runway, but it is only 700 meters long and scarcely used for general 
aviation movements. 
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At those times, thus, SEA, the airport operator for both Linate and 
Malpensa, decided to launch a substantial upgrade of Malpensa facilities 
dubbing it the Malpensa 2000 project. This consisted of construction of a 
new three-pier terminal, a cargo city, a light railway link with downtown 
Milan, plus a complete renovation of the two existing 4,000 meters runways. 
SEA’s goal was to substantially improve Milan’s airport capacity and, as a 
consequence, promote wider air accessibility to the area. In the end, the 
transfer of most of Linate’s air services would have created such a critical 
mass as to establish a new primary hub in Malpensa. This project was clearly 
welcomed by Alitalia, both due to its role as flagship and State-owned 
carrier and to the fact that more than 70% of Italian air traffic was 
originating in the Northern part of Italy and, thus, significant chances to 
compact it on Malpensa were in sight. 
Although Malpensa’s upgrade was kicked off in the early 1980s, the 
official inauguration came only in 1998. A lot of problems, like delays in the 
financing procedures by European bodies7 and investigations on bribes paid 
to politicians by engineering companies, may explain the delay. The official 
opening of the new Malpensa 2000, actually, came when only two-thirds of 
the infrastructure was built and while no cargo city and railway link were yet 
on the field.  
An initial governmental decree, named Burlando Decree, imposed that 
all flights, except Milan-Rome ones, would be transferred to Linate. 
However, lobbying activities by sixth freedom holders—notably Lufthansa 
and British Airways—sought a reverse and then a block of the decree. A 
number of other decrees were then promulgated and each time Malpensa was 
losing flights that were coming back to Linate. The last one, known as 
Bersani-Two Decree,8 put into action in 2001 and still in practice, establishes 
that all-intra European connections with States’ capitals or Zone 1 areas9 be 
operated from Linate, although with limitations in both frequency and 
capacity. Table 3 illustrates the traffic dynamics between Linate and 
Malpensa for the last years, where the cannibalization effect is evident 
between the two airports, with Linate growing and Malpensa losing traffic. 
After an initial supremacy of Malpensa over Linate, due to massive 
flight transfers, Linate has constantly increased its passenger share since 
2001 whilst Malpensa has progressively reduced its traffic. This ex cathedra 
traffic allocation, thus, made Linate strongly reemphasise itself as a primary 
catalyser in the airport business and Malpensa to abandon its ambitions to 
acquire a status of primary hub, due to the decrease both in connecting 
                                                 
7 Basically through European Investment Bank. 
8 Bersani and Burlando are the surname of the two ruling Ministers of Transportation at those 
times. 
9 The European Union includes in Zone 1 or Objective 1 areas those less-developed territories, 
like Portugal or Sicily, for instance.  
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flights and in intercontinental services.10 This latter condition is highly 
correlated to the former one, as a lower online and interline feedering comes 
to be produced. For instance, all U.S. carriers, expect Delta,11 have closed 
their Milan services and also Alitalia has been forced to abandon many long-
haul services,12 with post-September 11, 2001, market conditions simply 
exacerbating this downward spiral for Malpensa. Only from 2003, with start-
up of some low-cost and full service operations, does the situation seem to 
be improving. On the contrary, Linate is rapidly reaching its saturation 
point—estimated around 9 million passengers although the airport has 
managed in the past to accommodate up to 14 million passengers.13 
 
Table 3. Traffic between Linate and Malpensa airports, 2000-2004, passenger numbers 
 
 Jan-Dec 00 Jan-Dec 01 Jan-Dec 02 Jan-Dec 03 Jan-Mar 04 
Linate 
(LIN) 6,026,342 7,136,337 7,815,316 8,757,038 2,102,971 
Malpensa 
(MXP) 20,716,815 18,570,494 17,441,250 17,621,585 3,872,918 
Delta 
increase at  
LIN over 
past year 
(9.1) 18.4 9.5 12.0 5.3 
Delta 
increase at 
MXP over 
past year 
22.1 (10.4) (6.1) (1.0) (3.1) 
Note: Assaeroporti (Italian association of airports) database. 
ORIO’S EVOLUTION 
The third airport within Milan’s metropolitan area, Orio, has played a 
minor role for decades. Its main traffic has consisted for years of diverted 
movements from Linate in case of poor visibility,14 some summer charter 
flights to provide additional unplanned capacity and, eventually courier 
flights. In fact, Orio has acquired over the years the status of primary 
gateway for the Northern Italian market for DHL, UPS and TNT, although 
                                                 
10 Moreover, premium high-yield traffic is intercepted by Linate, whilst Malpensa mainly 
receive less significant tourist and visual flight rules traffic. 
11 Delta Air Lines is a member of the Skyteam alliance that includes Alitalia, too. 
12 From 2001 Alitalia has progressively cut services from Milan to San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Bangkok, Hong Kong, Beijing, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago 
del Chile, Sydney, and Singapore.    
13 That is before the opening of Malpensa 2000. 
14 In the winter season, the Milan area may prove to be problematic in terms of visibility due to 
fog. 
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the latter one has recently moved to Linate.15 Table 4 illustrates Orio’s traffic 
evolution from 2000 until 2004. 
 
Table 4. Orio’s traffic evolution 
 
 Jan-Dec 00 Jan-Dec 01 Jan-Dec 02 Jan-Dec 03 Jan-Dec 04 
Orio al Serio 
(BGY) 1,237,445 1,056,876 1,248,912 2,840,481 683,108 
Delta increase at 
BGY over past year (10.7) (14.6) 18.2 127.4 17.4 
Source: Assaeroporti (Italian association of airports) database. 
 
Recent improvements in 2003 and 2004 have been possible thanks to the 
launch of dozens of new low-cost links and, most definitely, to the 
establishment of an operating base at Orio by Ryanair. The focus on this 
cluster of industry was not, however, a consequence of a clear and structured 
marketing positioning by SACBO, Orio’s airport authority, but rather a naive 
and product-driven approach. Low-cost operators were looking at chances to 
inaugurate flights to Milan and Orio simply proved to be ideal for a bundle 
of reasons: absence of any congestion, proximity to a major motorway, and 
fast terminal operations. Moreover, the airport authority was apparently 
willing to grant significant marketing supports and thus subsidize16 these 
operators in order to improve its scope of visibility in the Milan’s 
community and, as a consequence of this, increase both passenger figures 
and political grip.    
Although part by decree of the Milan’s metropolitan area, Orio airport 
does not share a common ownership with that of Linate and Malpensa. In 
fact, SEA, Linate’s operator, has 49.9% shares of SACBO, Orio’s operator, 
whilst 51.1% lies in the hands of local shareholders of Bergamo County. 
This explains why sometimes Linate has made some direct competition to 
Orio, like in the case of TNT’s redeployment from Orio to Linate. And, in a 
broader sense, explains why no integrated systematic view is implemented 
for Milan’s three airports. As proof of this, Malpensa has recently started to 
host low-cost services in the old Terminal 2 previously allocated to charter 
services only, whilst Linate hosts Easyjet low-cost operations. 
 
                                                 
15 This decision was due to strong political pressures and not to strong economic rationales. 
16 We do not have clear quantitative evidence about the amount of marketing supports, although 
it appears clear that the Orio’s airport authority has deeply used them to attract new operators. 
Recently, some of Orio’s top officials have also admitted this practice in some press interviews, 
although their behaviour seems to be different from that of Charleroi, where discriminatory 
discounts on landing fees were involved, too. 
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LINATE, MALPENSA, AND ORIO: TECHNICAL AND 
INFRASTRUCTURAL LIMITS 
All three of Milan’s airport has some technical and infrastructural gaps 
that limit their growth path and, consequently, diminish their market 
appealing. 
Linate’s proximity to downtown creates some natural limit to expansion, 
due to absence of space and noise and environmental issues. Moreover, the 
mixture between general and commercial aviation, both existing on the 
same, single runway, may be a source of danger, as tragically shown in 
October 2001 in the fatal crash between a SAS MD80 and a Cessna, where 
more than 100 people died. In addition, Linate has no fast links with the 
city’s centre. No underground reaches Linate and only one bus links the 
airport with the city, which takes more than 40 minutes. This condition is 
mainly due to strong lobbyist pressures by some categories (notably taxi 
drivers) that have defended their privileges for year.17 Actually, one 
underground line touches a small suburb only 2 kilometres from Linate. 
Malpensa shares inferior accessibility with Linate, this condition being 
exacerbated by the longer distance that divides Milan from Malpensa. The 
existing motorway is highly congested at all hours of the day, whilst the light 
railway service is operated just twice per hour and takes approximately 40 
minutes. No high-speed rail services stop at Malpensa, as it happens, instead 
it stops at Paris CDG. This means that the airport naturally loses chances to 
acquire some extra multimodal feedering and defeedering from other 
Northern Italian destinations, like Turin, Verona or Venice, or from Southern 
Switzerland, especially after the collapse of Swissair and massive capacity 
reductions operated by the Swiss at Lugano. Finally, the number of hourly 
aircraft movements at Malpensa is limited at roughly 70 per hour due to the 
interference between the two runways that may prevent simultaneous 
operations and require aircraft landing on the right runway to cross the left 
one before reaching the terminal building, with some clear risk of 
unauthorised runway incursions.18 Some military interference, due to the 
proximity of Cameri Air Force Base and Venegono, home of Aermacchi, 
may seldom be in practice, too.  
Orio is constrained in its potential growth due to the absence of any kind 
of project for a light railways connection. Moreover, the airport’s 
accessibility lies entirely on the A4 motorway, which is number one in Italy 
for truck movements and highly congested, too. This kind of uncertainty in 
the amount of time it takes to reach the nearest town, Bergamo, threatens its 
                                                 
17 This privilege still today consists in an extra-surcharge that taxis put on their fares for all 
Milan to Linate services. 
18 Some intrusions on a runway where an aircraft was taking off have been already happened. 
Luckily, no tragic consequence has been provoked. 
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expansion towards Milan’s eastern metropolitan area, with its primary 
catchment area impacted in its overall dimensions.19    
CURRENT TRAFFIC SPLIT BETWEEN MILAN’S THREE 
AIRPORTS 
When the Malpensa 2000 project eventually became reality, politicians 
and technicians started to think about some methods that could create a 
critical mass for a primary hub on Malpensa, on the one hand, and limit 
Linate and Malpensa cross-cannibalization, on the other hand. 
Some Governmental decisions were adopted. They include the 
following. 
 
1. All charter and extra-European Union traffic had only to be 
operated from Malpensa. As a consequence of this, for instance, 
Swissair had to immediately transfer its Zurich-Milan feeder flights 
to Malpensa, reducing its power of competitive attraction, whilst 
Lufthansa, BA, Air France, KLM and Iberia were able to maintain 
operations on Linate. 
2. Only single-aisled aircraft were allowed to operate at Linate, whilst 
no limits were imposed on Malpensa. 
3. An 18 per hour limit on the number of ground movements was 
imposed on Linate. Slots were only partly allocated by applying the 
grandfather clause rule, as some of them were devoted to favour the 
start-up service of new comers. 
4. A maximum number of frequencies per day were imposed on 
services from Linate (for instance, no more than three per airline 
towards Paris), the magnitude of frequencies being decided on the 
basis of previous passenger movements. 
5. As a consequence of the mentioned capacity and frequency 
limitations, Alitalia20 lost its dominant position at Linate, whilst 
other carriers maintained most of their rights. 
6. Services from Linate to all European Union’s capitals plus links to 
and from Zone 1 areas were allowed. 
7. Code-sharing was tolerated, with some carriers inviting partner 
airlines to get slot rights at Linate to improve their market coverage, 
                                                 
19 A basic criterion of definition for a primary catchment area lies on the so-called one-hour 
drive time method. Traffic congestion naturally impacts adversely on the amount of distance 
that can be included in this calculation. 
20 Alitalia was clearly penalised from the distribution of slots to new comers, as the Italian flag 
carrier was not able to let its dominant past market position be working again in this evolved 
scenario as it was in the previous regulatory environment. Given the fact that high-yield traffic 
was concentrating on Linate, this partly explains the worsening economic and financial results 
provided by Alitalia since 2001 to current days. 
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as in the Alitalia-Eurofly, Alitalia-Alitalia Express and Lufthansa-
Air Dolomiti cases. 
8. This kind of traffic regulation was to be considered as transitional 
and subject to review in the coming years. 
 
This review has never come into practice, actually. Periodically, 
proposals from various stakeholders (notably from Alitalia) apply pressure 
for it to be done. These kind of suggested modifications are about, for 
instance, moving all flights that do not exceed 700,000 or 1,000,000 
passengers per year to Malpensa, thus leaving some primary destinations 
only to Linate. 
No limits were imposed on Orio. Regulators were thinking about the 
intent of some carriers to move to Orio instead of to Malpensa if willing to 
comply with lower congestion level of tarmac operations. 
OUR PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION: A CHANGE IN THE 
AIRPORT REGULATION TO MAKE AIRPORTS MORE 
MARKETABLE 
The problem with the threshold method21 is that this kind of proposal 
actually would provide only a short-term solution to the chronic cross-
cannibalization between Linate and Malpensa. For instance, if Milan-
Frankfurt flights were transferred to Malpensa,22 Lufthansa could well 
encourage Germanwings, its low-cost affiliate,23 to start services on that 
route and sell tickets even below cost with the only goals to  improve city-
pair traffic levels and, thus, to come back to Linate. Thus, this condition 
would simply create a temporary situation, with all major foreign carriers 
developing some strategies to reacquire downtown operations. 
Our own suggested solutions, instead, looks for a final solution to the 
problem, that envisions Malpensa growing to a primary hub status thanks to 
increasing feedering traffic, on the one hand, and Linate positioned as the 
city airport—much like the London City Airport, Stockholm Bromma and 
Düsseldorf Moenchengladbach—on the other hand.     
Therefore, our possible solutions are the following. 
 
1. Impose a restriction on flight operations due to pollution. Linate’s 
proximity to downtown could well be exploited by the regulator to 
                                                 
21 This method, as shown before, implies the determination of a traffic limit, usually in terms of 
passenger, for each destination. The current traffic figure will give a final answer if the flight 
has to be operated from one airport or from another one. 
22 Because of traffic figures being fewer than 700,000 passengers per year, for instance. 
23 Germanwings is a fully-owned subsidiary of Eurowings, which is 49, 9% owned by 
Lufthansa. 
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impose an overall cut of daily aircraft movements, in order to 
reduce acoustic and environmental pollution. This decision could be 
taken in accordance with recent European Union directives on 
airports compliancy with environmental limits that puts a 
mandatory limit to noise emissions to be accomplished by 2005. 
Thus, overall daily slots on Linate could be cut (from, say, 300 to 
150) and then reallocated in the same percentage to incumbent 
carriers. The additional capacity would then naturally move to 
Malpensa and Orio. 
2. Transfer all low-cost operations from Linate to Malpensa. This 
decision would be only a minor contribution to the problem, as low-
cost operations count only for 8% of Linate’s movements. 
However, this decision would be effective in improving Linate’s 
positioning as a city airport that usually has no discount carriers 
operate since the targeted traffic is business traffic. 
3. Impose a limit on Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW). Putting a 
limit on MTOW would naturally let Linate’s operations be much 
more costly for operating carriers, as fewer seats and less cargo 
could be boarded. This situation would then force carriers to move 
flight operations to non-limited airports or implement a radical price 
discrimination that only business traffic could support. All the other 
clusters would then look at Malpensa or Orio for their travel needs. 
4. Impose a limit on the type of aircraft allowed at Linate. Imposing 
that only regional jets could operate on Linate could provide to be a 
multi-tier bonanza. First, pollution and noise issues would be 
immediately solved. Second, less capacity at Linate would 
definitely impose the city airport model and let Malpensa grow. 
Eventually, lower risks, due to possible general aviation or single-
aisled aircraft intrusions, could be achieved, with an inherent 
benefit in terms of higher safety standards. 
 
The modification of the current regulatory regime by means of one of 
the suggested criteria would certainly impact on the three airports’ marketing 
path, creating new spaces for their growth in both their positioning and, as a 
consequence of that, in the commercial practices. 
THE FUTURE FOR MILAN’S METROPOLITAN AREA: RAPID 
NEED FOR CHANGE 
It is now time for politicians and regulators to take a sound and final 
decision on the future of Milan’s three airports. The current condition 
penalises all of them, as no clear positioning is achieved. Nevertheless, local 
interests between counties and political parties or broader competitive 
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battles, such as the one between Alitalia and its industry’s counterparts, are 
totally blocking any kind of choice. 
The longer the stakeholders take to understand the need for a systematic 
approach to solve this problem, the higher the risks for Milan’s airports to be 
marginalised on the European map. For example, a great opportunity was 
lost when Swissair went bankrupt. Malpensa’s and Zurich’s primary 
catchment areas overlap. However, most of the Swiss market was acquired 
by Munich and not Malpensa, especially after the recent takeover of Swiss 
by Lufthansa. Better multimodal connections and a greater scale of long-haul 
destinations proved to be critical factors in Munich succeeding.  
Of course, the Milan’s business case and its proposed solutions may 
prove helpful for many other international practices where technical and 
infrastructural overlapping may be solved by choosing a proactive and 
marketing-oriented strategy. In other words, the airport business is becoming 
fully global and open and this new scenario no longer tolerates political-
driven decisions that are typically short-minded in an economical sense. In 
today’s world, regulators have to put airports in the right market status and 
let them acquire a distinctive visibility if they want them to produce some 
sort of return on investment. Otherwise, the industry will have to be 
subsidized in the coming years, and this latter choice seems hardly 
implemental in a budget-constrained situation for many States. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the effects of airport’s pricing systems on welfare, comparing 
peak load with uniform pricing. It introduces a model with three firms—two airlines 
and one airport—in a two-stage game that solves the airlines’ duopoly problem in a 
Bertrand competition setting and the airport’s profit maximization problem. 
Conclusions are different from others in previous research, which stress the 
importance of putting all firms together in the game. Mainly, results show that 
welfare does not always increase with peak load prices, and that the low quality 
airline and the airport increase their profits while the high quality airline loses 
profits. As an extension of the paper, airport deregulation is applied to the model 
and effects are found to be different from those of deregulating other utilities. In 
particular results point out that congested airports’ deregulation will have better 
results for welfare than uncongested airports. 
INTRODUCTION 
The air travel industry has reached high levels of growth in the last 
decades. Airbus (2003) illustrates this fact with data such as annual growth 
rates (in number of passengers) of 5.8% between 1980 and 1997 and of 7.1% 
between 1991 and 2000. For the period 2000-2020 the same source forecasts 
annual growth rates of 4.7% for world air travel and of 6.1% for Europe 
alone.  
As an industry in expansion air transport certainly creates many 
opportunities but also serious bottlenecks where urgent adjustments and new 
solutions are needed. One of them is in airport congestion. As the number of 
flights grows airports’ capacities for landing and taking off become scarce. 
But expanding airports’ capacities is a slow and difficult process. Besides its 
high cost, urban and environmental considerations are important constraints 
to capacity expansion.  
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Also, airlines adjust schedules as much as possible in order to meet the 
passengers’ preferences by flying at more convenient times. The result is that 
all the available slots are taken by flagship airlines at their base airports at 
the passenger’s most convenient times while during other periods of the day 
these airports have idle capacity.  
Some airports have tried to mitigate this problem with the policy of peak 
load pricing. This means that the charges airlines pay for facilities like 
landing and taking off, luggage and passengers handling, aircraft parking and 
others are differentiated, with higher prices at peak load hours and lower 
prices at off-peak periods. In Europe this system is practiced in London 
airports (Heathrow and Gatwick) as well as in Dublin, among others. 
Conversely, in busy and congested airports like Frankfurt, Paris Orly and 
Charles de Gaulle (CDG), charges vary according to aircrafts’ maximum 
take-off weight (MTOW). From the practical point of view the application of 
peak load pricing is not widely followed, which suggests that its effects may 
be a controversial matter that is worth investigating.  
Data shown in Table 1 for summer 2003 enables a comparison of both 
pricing systems by means of a single variable, charge per passenger. The 
number of passengers was computed for five aircrafts of different sizes. To 
find a uniform number of seats per aircraft Lufthansa average patterns were 
used, with a 100% load factor.1 Charges include movements (take-off or 
landing), aircraft handling, parking (up to one hour), and noise charges. 
Directly paid passenger fees are excluded.  
The selected airports have different pricing systems. Frankfurt, Paris 
Orly/CDG, Lisbon and Porto practice only a MTOW price while Dublin 
applies both systems but with a much wider differentiation according to the 
time of the day than according to aircrafts’ weighs. Landing and taking off 
charges together with handling charges are the most important ones. For 
instance, at Frankfurt airport they represent 92% of the total aeronautical 
fees while noise charges account only for 7% for a Boeing 747 and 3% for 
an Airbus 340. These percentages do not differ much in the other airports.  
At Frankfurt, Porto, Lisbon, and Paris Orly/CDG airport fees are clearly 
differentiated according to the weight of the aircraft. Average deviations are 
respectively of 2.4, 2.1 and 3.4 euros, much higher than the same value for 
Dublin (1.4 euros peak and 0.5 euros off-peak). Dublin airport practices a 
strong differentiation between standard and off-peak times but exhibits a low 
level of MTOW charging differential. The average for all aircraft charges per 
passenger at peak load times exceeds charges at off-peak hours by 300%. 
This margin comes close to the ones existing in other busy airports. For 
instance, in Heathrow peak fees exceed off-peak ones by 230%, while in 
                                                 
1 A 100% load factor is not realistic. But the average fare per passenger is used only for 
comparison. Then, a more reasonable load factor (say, 70%) would give the same results. 
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Gatwick this difference goes up to 300% (Ewers, 2001). Besides, at Dublin 
airport off-peak prices are very low, about 50 cents per passenger with 100% 
load factor and 70 cents with 80% load factor, probably reflecting low (or 
almost zero) marginal costs of landing and taking off during this period. 
 
Table 1. Prices per passenger at selected airports, in euros, May 2003 
 
 Frankfurt Lisbon and Porto Orly and CDG 
Bowing B747-400 4,5 5,4 8,4 
Airbus A340-200 7,3 6,7 10,6 
Airbus A319 2,2 2,4 4,4 
Boeing B737-500 2,5 2,3 4,3 
Canadair CRJ 700 1,4 2,1 2,3 
Average Deviation 2,4 2,1 3,4 
    
Dublin 
 Standard Off-Peak 
Standard/Off-
Peak 
Bowing B747-400 3,9 1,3 2,9 
Airbus A340-200 5,0 1,7 2,9 
Airbus A319 2,1 0,9 2,3 
Boeing B737-500 2,0 0,4 4,7 
Canadair CRJ 700 1,9 0,6 3,4 
Average Deviation 1,4 0,5  
Note:  Data were collected from the airport’s website for Dublin, in May 2003, and kindly given 
by Frankfurt, Orly/CDG and ANA- Aeroportos de Portugal, for summer 2003.  
 
Official recommendations towards applying peak-load pricing to 
airports were very strong throughout the 1970s and 1980s but seem to have 
been progressively losing its importance (Starkie, 2001). In fact, recent 
documents published by the European Commission do not refer to the issue 
though they are quite concerned with other items, such as grandfathering and 
slots’ trading, that in some ways relate to the objectives of peak-load pricing. 
The Commission recommends that airports should not discriminate their 
charges though it suggests that there may be exceptions, allowing for 
differences in prices as long as based on objective and non-discriminatory 
criteria (European Commission, 2000).  
The theoretical basis of peak load pricing is related to demand 
fluctuations during a certain period (for instance, a day) and to a limited 
capacity of production. Thus at peak load times capacity is fully used and 
marginal cost includes not only variable costs but also the additional 
capacity cost. When demand is low there is idle capacity and its marginal 
cost is zero. Thus if prices should meet marginal costs they should be higher 
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at peak load times inducing a shift in demand and consequently a more 
efficient use of scarce capacity. 
The same effects are expected to occur for what concerns airports. One 
of the first papers on airport pricing was Carlin and Park (1970) where the 
authors use delay costs and discuss the adequacy of some pricing policies 
such as marginal cost pricing. Recent research has stressed the welfare 
effects of peak load pricing. Daniel (2001) uses evidence from the 
Minneapolis-St Paul airport to simulate the effects of congestion pricing on 
welfare. He finds out that overall net surplus increases with peak-load 
pricing for three different patterns of demand elasticity. The simulations are 
made using costs that include those derived from layover time, queuing 
delays and the probability of losing connection flights in hub airports. Net 
surplus increases mainly by the reduction in these costs. 
Most research on airports economics considers airlines as price-takers. 
Brueckner (2002) stresses this point while analyzing airport congestion with 
a non-atomistic behavior of airlines. He finds that the peak and off-peak 
allocation of flights may be efficient when only one airline is present in the 
market. In his model only consumers and airlines are considered and the 
central variables are flights prices and flights demands. The airport is absent 
and therefore it cannot contribute to equilibrium solutions. On the contrary, 
Oum, Zhang and Zhang’s (2003) model is centered on the airport’s 
strategies and on its relations with consumers with airlines not playing an 
active role. They analyze welfare and profit maximizing airports’ solutions 
and compare them to those of several forms of regulation, providing some 
interesting insights on the impact of deregulation. One important feature of 
their model is the inclusion of non-airside activities’ revenues in the airport’s 
profits.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of peak load pricing 
and of airports’ deregulation in a context that captures the essential features 
of the problem. In order to achieve this aim the author introduces a model 
that is based on four crucial assumptions. 
 
1. There is imperfect competition between airlines. 
2. There are three active firms: one airport and two airlines. 
3. The airport gets an important part of its revenues from non-airside 
activities. 
4. Flights in peak load and off-peak times have different qualities for 
passengers. 
 
The first assumption is imperfect competition between airlines. In fact, 
in any particular route only a small number of airlines operate, sometimes 
only one, but often two or three. This rules out any kind of unreal atomistic 
behavior.  
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The second one relates to the need of including both airlines and the 
airport in a three-firm model where all of them play an active role in a two-
stage game. Thus both flight prices and airport charges are central variables. 
The model includes one airline operating in each period of time where the 
flagship airline operates at peak load times and the other airline operates the 
same route at off-peak times. The number of active airlines in each period 
could be extended up to a certain limit, preserving imperfect competition. 
Having only two airlines operate in the model is a simplifying assumption.  
Third, it is essential to integrate in the model the revenues of non-airside 
activities which are a significant part of airports’ revenues. Non-airside (or 
concession) activities generated from 40% to 80% of all revenues in 50 
major world airports in 1999 (Oum et al., 2003). At Heathrow and Gatwick 
they account for about 60% of all airport revenues (Starkie, 2001).  As 
reported by Oum et al. (2003), these activities had an operating margin of 
64% in BAA’s airports in 1999, while the same margin for airside activities 
was 7%.  
The last assumption is the existence of product vertical differentiation. 
This means that passengers are not buying tickets for flights that are 
homogeneous from their point of view. In this paper it is supposed that all 
passengers prefer to fly at peak load hours. This assumption has consistency, 
in the sense that peak load hours are the most suitable timetables. If they 
were not the periods preferred by passengers and when demand is higher, 
flights would be more uniformly distributed along the day. When flying 
during these periods passengers may take return flights on the same day, not 
having to stay overnight and consequently they spend more money for 
accommodations and food. They also may get faster connections to other 
airports. In this sense, peak load times’ flights are considered by consumers 
as a high quality product. Flights departing or arriving at off-peak periods 
have all these inconveniences and therefore consumers view them as a lower 
quality product. Thus, vertical differentiation theory provides a basis for 
flights’ demand in the present model. Brueckner (2002) uses a similar kind 
of demand though there is not an explicit reference to vertical 
differentiation. He accounts for passengers’ benefits but also for congestion 
costs of traveling at peak load times.  
Airlines charge higher fares2 for higher quality, or peak load, flights. 
Table 2 displays a few examples of price differentials, according to fares of 
Lufthansa and British Airways from Frankfurt and London, respectively, to 
some European cities. In this small sample of prices, the differences among 
                                                 
2 Airlines fares are assumed to be identical for the same flight. This is a simplifying assumption, 
which is not realistic. It is well known that airlines charge different prices for the same seats, 
according to quotas of seats, and to tickets restrictions.  
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peak load and off-peak prices vary from 688% to 24%. These differences 
also depend on the destination and on each airline’s strategy.  
As an extension of peak load pricing analysis, the same model is used to 
assess the effects of airports’ deregulation. Though much has been written 
on airline deregulation the implementation of such policy to airports 
deserves some more theoretical work on it.3  
 
Table 2. Fares from Frankfurt and London to other European cities, in euros, 2004 
 
 Peak Load Price Off-Peak Price Difference (%) 
Frankfurt-Vienna 707,7 289,2 145% 
Frankfurt-Amsterdam 650,2 312,2 108% 
Frankfurt-Madrid 425,4 325,4 31% 
Frankfurt-Rome 409,6 294,6 39% 
Frankfurt-Brussels 362,1 292,1 24% 
    
London-Vienna 196,2 79,1 148% 
London-Brussels 171,3 26,4 550% 
London-Amsterdam 196,2 24,9 688% 
London-Madrid 106,9 48,3 121% 
London-Rome 297,2 76,1 290% 
Notes: Data for peak load and off-peak prices was taken for the two flag airlines of the departing 
countries, Lufthansa and British Airways, for return flights on the same weekday, with 
departures on the 1st of March and returns on the 5th of April 2004. Source: British Airways 
(2004, February 2) and Lufthansa Airlines (2004, February 2).  
 
The second section of this article presents the model and its 
assumptions. The third and fourth sections develop the cases of single 
pricing and peak load pricing with conclusions about the effects of changing 
from the first system to the second, respectively. An analysis of the effects of 
deregulation is presented in the fifth section.  
THE MODEL 
The model should be simple enough in order to allow comparisons but it 
should capture the essential features of the airports’ and airlines’ services 
markets.  
        First, firms and their products are defined. The product consists of a 
certain number, y, of flights with the same departing and arriving airport. 
The aircrafts are supposed to be the same for all flights and to have identical 
capacity. However, some flights are supplied in peak load times, where 
                                                 
3 The paper of Oum et al. (2003) is quite interesting on this matter. 
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congestion is possible, and others at off-peak times. The number of these 
flights is denoted respectively by y2 and y1, respectively. Flights operating 
during peak load times offer a better quality, which may be denoted by q2, as 
passengers prefer to fly at more convenient times. Off-peak time flights have 
a lower quality, which can be expressed by q1. As qualities are perfectly 
defined and cannot be changed, q1 may be set equal to the unity and q2 equal 
to a parameter a that expresses the quality differential. 
       Peak load time flights are subject to congestion problems, such as delays 
in taking off and landing with consequent losses of connections and other 
inconveniences. However, passengers are supposed to be optimistic and do 
not anticipate these losses of utility. It is quite plausible that when a 
consumer chooses a flight he or she will not think that there will be delays or 
other problems. Decisions are taken independently of possible 
inconveniences that are not forecast by passengers. However these losses of 
utility represent a congestion externality that must be included in the model 
and are accounted for by the parameter k that denotes the loss of utility per 
passenger flying during peak load periods. The exact meaning of the 
parameter k is the loss of utility that an average passenger suffers on account 
of an unexpected waste of time for delayed flights or connections. In this 
sense, k is an opportunity cost. It could be, for example, the money that a 
passenger does not earn for not being able to attend a meeting, or to sign a 
valuable contract. Or it could be the loss of utility for arriving one day late to 
a certain holiday destiny. Parameter k does not influence passengers’ 
decisions but does influence consumer surplus. 
        There are two airlines operating in the model. Their market shares and 
consequent market power are not very different. This is truly the case in 
Europe when two airlines compete in the same line. Lisbon airport has a 
share of 50% for TAP and 50% for Portugália in departures from Lisbon to 
Porto, the second largest town in Portugal. At Heathrow the shares of British 
Airways and British Midlands are 57% and 43%, respectively, in the 
London- Manchester line, and of 54% and 46%, respectively, on flights from 
London to Edinburgh. 
       Airline 2 operates during the congested period and airline 1 in the off-
peak period. This is typical of congested airports where national companies 
have chosen their flight times first on account of grandfathering rights and 
newcomers had to take the remaining timetables. An illustration of this fact 
is the pattern of slots use at Frankfurt airport. Lufthansa and Star Alliance 
use 79% of slots at peak load hours, and 32% at off-peak hours.4   Of course 
                                                 
 
4  Data was gathered from Frankfurt airport’ website for Monday, December 15, 2003 for 
flights’ departures.  Peak load and off-peak times defined according to the website of Flughafen 
Koordination Deutchland.  
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the remaining 21% of peak load time slots may be (and is) used by other 
airlines. Reality shows that flagship airlines use most of the peak load time 
slots, and other airlines use the remaining ones. The model uses this fact 
with the simplifying assumption that each type of airline operates only in 
each different period of time, peak load and off-peak.  
 The third firm is the airport, which is assumed to be a privately owned 
and unregulated firm and maximizes its profits without constraints. This may 
not be the most usual pattern in Europe where some airports are publicly 
owned. Some have already been privatized (like Fiumicino in Rome and 
London’s Heathrow and Gatwick) but they operate under regulation. 
However, privatization and deregulation are important issues at the moment 
and are in the agenda of EU authorities.5 The effects of deregulation within 
the context of this model will be analyzed in the fifth section. 
The airport’s revenues are originated both by the so-called airside 
activities and by retail, restaurant, car hire and other activities. Other firms, 
under a concession by the airport, usually operate these latter and they are 
often called concession activities. 
Charges like fees added to passengers’ tickets are excluded as they are 
not part of airlines’ costs but are directly paid to airports. Their inclusion 
would only strengthen the results of the model as it would be one extra 
source of revenues for the airport. This point will be understood through the 
development of the model. 
        There are two kinds of demand functions in the model. Demand for 
flights is a direct demand from passengers to airlines. Ticket’s prices are p1 
for off-peak flights and p2 peak load flights. The demand for airport activities 
is derived from the demand for flights. As flights have different qualities, 
vertical differentiation theory should be an adequate source to find the 
demand functions. This theoretical framework is described by Gabszewicz 
and Thisse (1979), and Shaked and Sutton (1982). A brief explanation is 
provided for those who are unfamiliar with it.  Passengers are consumers 
who either buy one unit of the good or do not buy one unit of the good. They 
are uniformly distributed according to a certain parameter v, with unit 
density. The value of v is set between 0and 1 and expresses the utility 
derived from the consumption of one unit of quality. The consumer who is 
indifferent between buying and not buying one ticket is denoted by (v0 - p1) 
= 0, as the lower quality was set equal to the unit. For the consumer 
indifferent between buying a ticket to airline 1 or a ticket to airline 2 this 
equation will be (v1 - p1) = (v1a - p2), as the higher quality is normalized to 
                                                 
5 It is interesting to quote Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) (2001, p. 17), “The CAA has long 
believed that the interests of passengers will be better protected by liberalisation and an actively 
competitive market, rather than by regulation.” Also for the United Kingdom, Jones and Viehoff 
(1993) state that the rationale for applying regulation to airports is highly dubious on account of 
BAA’s strong market position.  For a modelling approach, see Barbot (2003). 
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the parameter a, and consumers do not anticipate inconveniences due to 
congestion. Demand for off-peak flights (y1) is v1 - v0, and demand for peak 
load flights (y2) is 1 - v1, so that after solving the above equations demand 
functions may be written as the following: 
 
y1 = (p2 - p1) / (a - 1) - p1  
y2 = 1 - (p2 - p1) / (a - 1) 
 
The airport’s demand will then be of y = y1 + y2 passengers. These 
passengers generate two kinds of revenues, one derived from what airlines 
pay for facilities and another from concession activities. In order to avoid the 
introduction of too many variables each passenger is supposed to buy one 
unit of retail and other concessions and their price is normalized to one euro. 
The normalization leads to the assumption that concession activities are price 
takers though this is a questionable point. Most items supplied by retail or 
car hiring can also be bought outside the airport. Concession activities’ 
market power derive from the fact that passengers cannot leave the airport or 
that they had no time to buy gifts or other items in similar shops outside the 
airport.  
Concession revenues are then y1 + y2, and the whole airport’s revenue is 
P (y1 + y2) + y1 + y2. 
Quality costs are equal to zero as qualities are only derived from flying 
at peak load or off-peak hours and this is cost free. Airline 2 has no extra 
cost for flying at the best timetable because it had first choice of this period 
and is protected by grandfathering rules. Quantity costs from flying (fuel, 
staff, aircraft leasing fees or depreciation) are omitted in the model for 
simplicity. This omission does not make much difference, as these costs 
would be identical for both airlines. Both airlines bear a cost for buying the 
airport facilities, which equals a price per passenger for those facilities, P, 
times the number of passengers they carry. Besides, and because it flies at 
peak load hours, airline 2 has a congestion cost of t per passenger due to 
several kind of losses, such as less passengers in connections, compensations 
paid to consumers, inefficient allocation of aircrafts or changes of planned 
schedules.  
Thus the model includes two sources of congestion costs, one for 
consumers, with the value of k per passenger, and one for airlines, expressed 
by t per passenger. Readers should notice that these costs are different. The 
cost k is an opportunity cost while t is a measurable cost.  
The airport is supposed to have only a fixed cost, C. Capacity expansion 
in airports is a very slow process on account of land, environmental and 
financial constraints therefore it seems more reasonable to limit the airport’s 
behavior to a short term analysis. 
Finally, the values of a, t and k do have some restrictions. 
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1. a > t + 1. This is necessary so that the model’s variables are all 
positive. If a < t + 1 some of the firms would not be active. With a - 1 
> t the difference between qualities is higher than unitary congestion 
costs. 
2.  t > k. This means that congestion costs are higher for firms than for 
passengers. As passengers receive monetary compensations for 
congestion inconveniences, which are costs to airlines, this hypothesis 
is plausible.   
 
The game is developed in two stages. In the first stage the airport 
chooses the price P. In the second stage airlines choose their tickets’ prices 
competing in a Bertrand setting. 
SINGLE PRICING 
In this case the airport charges airlines a single price. Then, as airlines 
use similar aircrafts the airport’s charge per passenger is identical whether 
they fly in peak load or off-peak times. The airlines’ profits, 1 and 2, 
respectively for airlines 1 and 2, can be expressed as the following: 
 
1 = (p1 - P) ((p2 - p1) / (a - 1) - p1) 
2 = (p2 - P - t) ((1- (p2 - p1) / (a - 1)) 
 
In the second stage both firms maximize profits in prices leading to two 
best reply functions. Solving these functions, first stage demands and prices 
may be computed and are as follows. 
 
p1 = (2aP + a - 1 + P + t) / (4a - 1) 
p2 = a (2a - 2 + 3P + 2t) / (4a - 1) 
y1 = a (2P - 1 + a + t - 2aP) / (4a - 1) (a - 1) 
y2 = (2a2 - 2a - aP + P + t -2at) / (4a- 1) (a - 1) 
 
The airport’s profit is easily derived from the demand functions and 
according to the above considerations: A = P (y1 + y2) + ( y1 + y2) - C. 
Maximization of this profit in P yields the first stage solution for the 
airport’s price: 
 
P = (a - t - 1) / 2 (2a + 1) 
 
 P depends on the congestion cost t and dP / dt < 0 which means that 
with a lower congestion cost the airport would charge a higher P as demand 
would not be so restricted by the rise in p2. Here it should be stressed that the 
airport’s strategy relies heavily on not decreasing its demand and revenues, 
accounting for the importance of non-airside revenues. If these revenues 
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were not included in the computation of the airport’s profits P would be 
higher, indeed equal to (3a - t) / 2 (2a + 1). A higher P would decrease 
passengers’ demand for flights through higher ticket’s prices. The presence 
of concession revenues softens the effects of congestion costs on demand 
and therefore on consumers’ surplus. 
        The solution for P allows for the computation of the values of p1, p2, y1, 
y2, a, 1, and 2 depending only on a and t, which are parameters of the 
model. 
        A common measure of welfare was used, equal to the sum of consumer 
surplus and the three firms’ profits. Consumer surplus, CS, is expressed as 
the following: 
 
 
 
In the computation of consumer surplus the parameter k that represents 
the loss of utility due to congestion inconveniences to passengers was 
included.6 These values do not have an important meaning by themselves but 
they were computed in order to be compared with the results of the case in 
the next section. 
Using these results it can be easily shown that 2 / t < 0 and A / t 
< 0 but 1 / t > 0. The heavier the congestion is at an airport then the 
lower are airline 2’s profits, as would be expected, and the lower are the 
airport’s profits. The high quality airline transfers some of its losses from 
congestion to the airport. And even without setting peak load prices the 
airport loses profit with heavier traffic. But the low quality airline benefits 
from congestion both because its demand is higher and because when p2 
rises with t, it also makes p1 rise. 
PEAK LOAD PRICING 
Now suppose that the airport opts for charging peak load prices, P1 to 
airline 1 and P2 to airline 2, where P1 < P2. 
The process is identical to the one in the last section. The airline’s 
second stage profits are now expressed as the following: 
1 = (p1 - P1) ((p2 - p1) / (a - 1) - p1) 
2 = (p2 - P2 - t) (1 - (p2 - p1) / (a - 1)) 
 
                                                 
6 Second order conditions where checked and proved all solutions to be maximal. Calculus was 
done with the program Scientific Workplace, version 4.1. The expressions of variables are long 
and therefore not included in the text. Calculus sheets may be requested to the author. 
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Profit maximization in the second stage leads to solutions for the flights’ 
prices and demands. 
p1 = (2aP1 + a - 1 + P2 + t) / (4a - 1) 
p2 = a (2a - 2 + P2 + 2t + P1) / (4a - 1) 
y1 = a (a - 1 + P2 + P1 + t - 2aP1) / (4a - 1) (a - 1) 
y2 = (2a2 - 2a + aP1 + P2 + t - 2at - 2aP2) / (4a - 1) (a - 1) 
 
Where y1 + y2 is the airport’s first stage derived demand. Maximizing its 
profits by forecasting this demand, in the first stage the airport comes to a 
unique solution for each one of P1 and P2. 
 
P1 = 0  
 P2 = (a - 1 - t) / 2 
 
The off-peak price is zero and equal to the airport’s marginal cost since 
at off-peak times an extra arrival or departure has no additional capacity 
costs for the airport. If operating costs were included in the model, P would 
equal the marginal operating cost. Setting a low off-peak price is part of the 
airport’s strategy. By forecasting higher flight prices it realizes there will be 
a reduction in demand but this will affect both airlines’ demand for landing 
and taking-off facilities and passengers’ demand for retail and other 
activities, which are so important to the airport’s revenues. Because capacity 
is fixed the airport can only base its strategy on revenues and prefers not to 
lose demand. The result is an option for a higher price (in fact higher than P 
in the last section) for peak load times and a zero price at off-peak times.7  
In the second stage, and having watched the airport’s strategy, airlines 
set their prices. Airline 1 has lower costs (in fact, zero costs). Airline 2 
registers now higher costs so it is expected that p2 increases and y2 
diminishes. According to reaction functions, p1 should increase too, but on 
account of lower costs it should decrease. Balancing these two conditions 
airline 1 keeps p1 with the same value and because of the rise in p2 it faces 
now a higher demand. And the whole demand is the same as before. 
All this can be verified by computing the values of all variables, 
depending on a and t, and also on k for consumer surplus and welfare. The 
shift in demand that is predicted by the theory effectively occurs but is 
balanced by the airport’s active role. If the airport’s strategy was not 
included in the model with its need to keep revenues, mainly those derived 
from retail activities, the fall in P1 would have a smaller magnitude and the 
                                                 
7 This is not so far from some airport’s practices. For example, Dublin airport charges from 1.3 
to 0.4 euros per passenger at off-peak times depending on the size of the aircraft (see table 1). 
These are very low prices. 
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rise in P2 would be larger. This would mean higher flight prices and less 
demand in spite of the shift.  
As y2 becomes smaller, congestion costs are lower and more passengers 
fly at off-peak time. Less consumers face congestion inconveniences but 
more of them have to fly at inadequate hours. The question then becomes, 
who benefits and who loses with peak load prices. 
It is expected that along with the shift in demand there is a shift in 
airlines’ profits. This effectively happens according to the model’s results. 
With peak load prices airline 1 gets a higher demand, lower costs and the 
same flights’ price so 1 increases. Conversely, for airline 2 profits are 
lower as both the price cost margin and the number of passengers decreases.  
The airport faces the same demand and the same retail revenues. Simple 
computation shows that airside facilities revenues are higher with congestion 
pricing. The airport benefits with this pricing system and, as a profit 
maximizing firm, it would of course choose it.  
To check how consumers’ utility changes when shifting from uniform 
pricing to peak load pricing, consider the following for utility:  
 
 
Differentiating this expression in p2 while keeping p1 constant, as its 
value does not change with peak load pricing results in the following: 
U / p2 = (k + p1 - p2) / (a - 1) 
The derivative is negative if p2 - k > p1, and positive in the opposite 
case. The condition p2 - k > p1 means that the price of high quality flights 
discounted of their congestion inconveniences is higher than the price of low 
quality flights. If this happens an increase in p2 keeping p1 constant decreases 
consumers’ utility. When these losses exist it must happen that k < p2 - p1 so 
that there is a decrease in utility. 
Total welfare can be written as W = CS +A . In other words, welfare is 
the sum of the difference between utility and the flights’ revenues, plus the 
difference between the flights’ revenues and the flights’ non-congestion 
costs plus the difference between the airport’s revenues and the airport’s 
cost. Putting it more simply, welfare is equal to utility minus the airport’s 
costs and congestion costs. Solving demand equations to find inverse 
demands and changing the limits of the integrals accordingly results in the 
following: 
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As y is kept constant with the change in the pricing system the 
derivative of W will be the following: 
W / y2 = y2 - 1 - ay2 + a - k - t 
Substituting y2 for the expression of its demand function, it may be 
shown that the derivative is negative for k + t < p2 - p1 or that welfare is only 
higher with peak load prices under this condition. To interpret the condition 
note that if consumers accounted for congestion inconveniences the value of 
v1, the utility of each unit of quality of the consumer who is indifferent 
between the two qualities, would be the following: 
v1 = (p2 - k - p1) / (a - 1)   or  v1a - v1 = p2 - k - p1 
The condition above can be changed for t + k < v1a - v1. So that society 
may be better off with peak load prices, unitary congestion costs must be 
lower than the difference between the utility of high quality flights and low 
quality ones. Thus, according to this model, the effects of applying a peak 
load pricing policy to reduce congestion depend much on the parameters t 
and a, as it must happen that t < v1 (a - 1). Unless congestion costs are high 
and/or capacity small when compared to the airports’ traffic and the quality 
differential small enough, it will be worth using congestion prices. We could 
think this happens in large hub airports with heavy traffic where congestion 
is serious. But probably passengers in these airports are mainly business 
travelers who highly value flying at convenient times. 
EXTENSIONS: PUBLIC AIRPORT AND AIRPORT 
DEREGULATION 
In the precedent analysis the airport was considered as a profit 
maximizing privately owned firm. Though most of these airports are 
regulated, deregulation is an important issue at the moment. It is interesting 
to check what insights this model provides on public airports’ behavior and 
on airport deregulation.  
A public airport would maximize welfare. However, in the context of 
the present model welfare maximization constrained by zero profits for the 
public airport is not a feasible situation as it results in a negative value for P. 
The result of a negative value for P is due to the fact that the public airport 
bears more congestion costs than a profit maximizing one. When 
maximizing welfare, the airport is constrained both by passengers’ losses of 
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utility due to congestion and by firm 2’s congestion costs. Airside losses are 
covered by means of profits from concession activities.  
The analysis is developed with single pricing. Airlines maximize profits 
in the second stage and the airport maximizes welfare subject to the 
constraint A = 0 in the first stage.  
Price capping and rate of return (ROR) are the most frequent regulation 
systems in Europe. As the present model does not allow for analyzing ROR 
regulation without introducing new variables the analysis will be developed 
with a price cap regulation. Price is set equal to marginal cost and so P = 0, 
meaning that the airport covers its depreciation costs by means of concession 
activities revenues. Airlines’ profits are now expressed as the following:  
 
1 = (p1 (p2 - ap1)) / (a - 1)  
2 = (p2 - t) ((a-1- p2 - p1) / (a - 1)) 
 
The game involves only one stage as the second stage problem is solved 
by price capping P. Airlines maximize profits in a Bertrand price 
competition and the results are the following: 
p1 = (a – 1 + t) / (4a - 1) 
p2 = 2a (a - 1 + t) / (4a - 1) 
y1 = a (a - 1 + t) / (4a - 1) (a - 1) 
y2 = (2a2 - 2a + t - 2at) / (4a - 1) (a - 1) 
y = (3a - t) / (4a - 1) 
 
The airport’s profits are now:   
 
A = y - C = (3a-t) / (4a-1) -C  
 
The airlines’ profits are: 
 
1 = a (a - 1 + t)2 / (4a - 1)2 (a - 1) 
2 = (2a2 - 2a + t - 2at)2 / (4a - 1) (a - 1)2 
 
By computing the differences between these results and those in the 
third section it is possible to analyze the impact of deregulation using the 
present model. With deregulation less consumers fly at both peak load and 
off-peak periods therefore congestion is smaller and its costs are lower. The 
airport gets higher profits as expected. Costs are the same but the reduction 
in demand affects both kinds of revenues. However, the existence of airside 
activities revenues offsets the decrease in demand, which lowers concession 
revenues. 
These results are common to almost all cases of deregulation. It is also 
expected that consumers are worse off with it. But here consumer surplus 
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will have a small decrease because of airlines’ market power. If airlines were 
price takers with deregulated they would increase their prices by P. In a 
Bertrand competition both flights’ prices raise by less than P. Airline 1 
charges higher flights prices but its unitary costs are higher too and their 
demands decrease. Consequently, airline 1 has a reduction of profits.  
Airline 2’s prices also become higher with deregulation, but demand is 
reduced. Moreover, congestion costs are diminished but airport charges have 
increased. The effects on the high quality airline’s profits depend on the 
magnitude all these effects. Computation of the difference in profits shows 
that 2 increases with deregulation under the condition: t > (a - 1)(16a2 + 7a 
+ 1) / (16a3 - a - 3). If t is high enough the fall in congestion costs 
countervails the effect on the demand side. For a low value of t the opposite 
happens.  
The interesting point here is that airlines do not always lose with 
deregulation. The low quality airline will be worse off while the high quality 
firm may (or may not) be better off, according to the relation between the 
parameters a and t. Part of consumer’ loss of surplus is transferred to 
airlines.  
A smaller number of passengers will buy tickets at higher prices. But a 
smaller number of them will be affected by congestion inconveniences. 
Computation of the difference of this variable with and without regulation 
makes it impossible to establish conditions that are clearly understandable. 
But it is easy to see that only when unitary congestion damages for 
passengers (k) are very high so that they offset the other benefits, will 
consumers be better off with deregulation. The same applies to welfare. As 
in the precedent section, W can be written as the following: 
 
W = U + y - ty2 - C 
The decrease in demand has a negative effect in the airport’s retail 
revenues but positive effects both on firm 2’s congestion costs and on 
consumers’ loss of utility due to congestion. Again, the net effect on welfare 
depends on the magnitude of congestion costs compared to demands’ 
reductions and consequently to prices’ increases. 
Conclusions of this section stress the importance of airlines’ demand 
elasticity and of congestion costs when analyzing deregulation policies for 
airports. Airlines may be interested in airport regulation as it lowers its costs 
but for the airline flying at peak load time this depends on the degree of 
congestion and on the consequences for its costs. If congestion is very 
intense deregulation may benefit consumers and society as a whole. So there 
is a point for a priority of deregulation in highly congested airports.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The most important result of this model is that in the airport’s case 
congestion pricing does not always improve welfare. It all depends on the 
magnitude of unitary congestion costs compared to the relative preference of 
flying at peak load periods net of congestion inconveniences. Put in another 
way, it depends on the costs congestion causes to firm 2 (which are partially 
transferred to the airport) and to consumers, balanced with the quality 
differential of flights. Brueckner (2002) showed that this might happen with 
peak load pricing of airlines’ flights. Here the two pricing systems apply 
only to airports as flight prices are always differentiated according to their 
quality for passengers. But in the present model it is possible to determine 
who benefits from peak load pricing (the airport and the low quality airline), 
and who loses (airline 2 and, under some conditions, passengers and society 
as a whole). Besides the model provides insights on all of the firms’ 
strategies that account for these results.  
Deregulation brings out some expected effects such as a reduction is 
demand and a rise in all prices, but welfare and the high quality airline’s 
profits do not always increase. Welfare will decrease less (or increase) the 
higher congestion becomes. The model suggests that deregulation is a more 
adequate policy for highly congested airports. 
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